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Author: Andrzej J. Noras

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Andrzej J. Noras

The debate on the method of philosophy at the turn of the 19th and the 20th centuries

Edmund Husserl writes, when analysing the understanding of cognition by Hans Cornelius (1863—1947), which is included in the psychological trend of Neo-Kantianism — “To show that a scientific movement has gone astray, nothing is more instructive than to study its consequences as worked out by its adherents, and so to convince oneself that the final theory they think they have gained, has rather involved them in self-evident contradictions.”¹ This surprising and precious remark by Husserl is applicable in analyses devoted to the question of method. It is surprising because Husserl talks about history of philosophy very rarely. However, it is also precious because it shows the necessity of consideration of a philosophical question until its end in order to show its absurdity. Would it be possible to talk here about Husserl’s relating to all those who — following positivism — talk about the necessity of verifying cognition. The first to do so was physiologist Claude Bernard (1813—1878) who in his book, which was an introduction to experimental medicine, formulated rules of scientific proceedings, among them the rule of “counter-proof,” which was the prototype of the falsification method.²

¹ E. Husserl: *Logical Investigations*. Vol. 1 [Volume II of the German edition]. Trans. J.N. Findlay. London, 1970, p. 420.

² C. Bernard: *Introduction à l'étude de la médecine expérimentale*. Paris, 1865.

“Question of proper method of philosophizing — stresses Leonard Nelson (1882—1927) — in modern times was made again the object of particular considerations. It is always about opposition of two main points of view, which under many names, were emphasized as a dispute between metaphysical and anthropological method, objective and subjective, critical and genetic, concerning theory of cognition and psychological or transcendental and psychological.”³

First of all one has to underline that Nelson appears here, which is directly suggested by the title, as an intercessor of Jakob Friedrich Fries and in this sense he inscribes himself in all of the traditions of psychological trend of Neo-Kantianism, placing himself in the company of such thinkers as Jürgen Bona Meyer (1829—1897) and Hans Cornelius, although Carl Grapengiesser,⁴ the author of book about the attempts to solve a dispute between Friedrich Adolf Trendelenburg and Kuno Fischer,⁵ is worth mentioning here too. At the same time Nelson emphasises two questions. Firstly, he points out at the authors of this distinction, who are Kuno Fischer (1824—1907) in his vice-rector speech, Paul Natorp (1854—1924),⁶ Wilhelm Windelband (1848—1915),⁷ Carl Stumpf (1848—1936)⁸ and Max Scheler (1874—1928).⁹ However, at the same time he underlines that he

³ L. Nelson: “Jakob Friedrich Fries und seine jüngsten Kritiker.” In: *Abhandlungen der Frieschen Schule. Neue Folge*. Hrsg. von G. Hessenberg, K. Kaiser, L. Nelson. Bd. 1. Heft 2. Göttingen, 1905, p. 241.

⁴ Actually Christian Andreas Hieronymus Grapengiesser, born on August 9, 1810 in Hamburg and died there on May 2, 1883.

⁵ C. Grapengiesser: *Kants Lehre von Raum und Zeit. Kuno Fischer und Adolf Trendelenburg*. Jena, 1870.

⁶ P. Natorp: “Über objektive und subjektive Begründung der Erkenntnis.” *Philosophische Monatshefte* 1887, Bd. 23, p. 257—286. Polish translation: “O obiektywnym bądź subiektywnym ugruntowaniu poznania.” Trans. W. Marzęda. In: *Neokantyzm badeński i marburski. Antologia tekstów. [Baden and Marburg Neo-Kantianism. Anthology]*. Ed. by: A.J. Noras, T. Kubalica. Katowice, 2011, pp. 219—240.

⁷ W. Windelband: *Kritische oder genetische Methode?* In: *Idem: Präludien. Aufsätze und Reden zur Einführung in die Philosophie*. 4. Aufl. Bd. 2. Tübingen, 1911, pp. 99—135. Polish translation: “Metoda krytyczna czy genetyczna?” Trans. A. Pietras. In: *Neokantyzm badeński i marburski. Antologia tekstów...*, pp. 47—69.

⁸ C. Stumpf: “Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie.” *Abhandlungen der philosophisch-philologischen Classe der Königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften* [München] 1892, Bd. 19, pp. 465—516.

⁹ M. Scheler: *Die transszendentale und die psychologische Methode. Eine grundsätzliche Erörterung zur philosophischen Methodik*. Leipzig, 1900.

omits the standpoint of Fries, which cannot be surprising under any circumstances in this dispute. “In these considerations,” Nelson writes, Fries’s method was not taken into account at all. When his name is mentioned, it is only as an example to quote the name of representative of genetic method or ‘psychologism’.”¹⁰ Meanwhile, Nelson attempts to prove that Fries’s attitude to psychologism was negative, while that towards transcendental method — it was positive. Nelson refers to Max Scheler as someone who presented the newest understanding of transcendental method, which is not consistent with actual state because it means that Nelson did not notice a difference between Scheler’s standpoint and Neo-Kantianism, since Scheler criticises both psychologism and transcendentalism to the same extent. By the way Nelson points to some places in Fries’s works where he refers to transcendental method¹¹ and states that Fries is a follower of the transcendental method. Later on Nelson starts his polemics with the standpoint of Theodor Elsenhans, which was included in his text of 1902,¹² because in 1905, when Nelson published the article “Jakob Friedrich Fries und seine jüngsten Kritiker,” he could not have known Elsenhans’ book of 1906.¹³ Taking into account Elsenhans’ analysis of relation problem Kant-Fries, Nelson underlines that “Kant got acquainted with psychological nature of transcendental cognition”¹⁴ and, at the same time, he strongly emphasises the fact that it was not noticed by Jürgen Bona Meyer either. For the author of *Kants Psychologie* claimed that Fries was mistaken saying that “Kant got acquainted with psychological nature of his own investigations.”¹⁵

¹⁰ L. Nelson: *Jakob Friedrich Fries und seine jüngsten Kritiker...*, p. 241.

¹¹ For example, J.F. Fries: *System der Logik. Ein Handbuch für Lehrer und zum Selbstgebrauch*. 3. Aufl. Heidelberg, 1837, pp. 417—418; Idem: *Reinhold, Fichte und Schelling*. Leipzig, 1803, p. 197.

¹² T. Elsenhans: *Das Kant-Friesische Problem*. Heidelberg, 1902.

¹³ T. Elsenhans: *Fries und Kant. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte und zur systematischen Grundlegung der Erkenntnistheorie*. Bd. 1: *Historischer Teil. Jakob Friedrich Fries als Erkenntniskritiker und sein Verhältnis zu Kant*; Bd. 2: *Kritisch Systematischer Teil. Grundlegung der Erkenntnistheorie als Ergebnis einer Auseinandersetzung mit Kant vom Standpunkte der Friesischen Problemstellung*. Giessen, 1906.

¹⁴ L. Nelson: *Jakob Friedrich Fries und seine jüngsten Kritiker...*, p. 297.

¹⁵ J. Bona Meyer: *Kants Psychologie*. Berlin, 1870, p. 143. Cf. L. Nelson: *Jakob Friedrich Fries und seine jüngsten Kritiker...*, p. 299.

The analysis of philosophical method in the context of Leonard Nelson's critique will be the clearest when it is conducted with chronological order. The earliest text is obviously Kuno Fischer's one. Windelband's text comes from 1883 and Natorp's from 1887. Stumpf's article was published in 1892 and Scheler published *Die transzendente und die psychologische Methode...* in 1900. Nelson's attitude and his followers' will be presented during the analyses, if it requires a comment.

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Initially, Nelson criticises the arrangements of Kuno Fischer. On the occasion of taking the office of vice-rector of Jena University on February 1, 1862 Kuno Fischer gave a speech entitled "Die beiden kantischen Schulen in Jena" that was published twice in the same year: first in *Deutsche Vierteljahrs-Schrift*,¹⁶ and then in the work *Akademische Reden*.¹⁷ Kuno Fischer's speech was an insult to all of Fries's followers, to mention only the most famous individuals, Jürgen Bona Meyer, Carl Grapengiesser and Leonard Nelson. On the one hand, Kuno Fischer remarks at the beginning of his speech that he wants to order the standpoints of Kant, Reinhold, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Fries, Herbart and Schopenhauer and present them "how they refer to each other according to internal relationships,"¹⁸ and it is difficult to disagree with his opponents that he does not succeed in doing this. However, on the other hand one cannot agree with the argument of Fries's defender, that is, Heinrich Eggeling

¹⁶ K. F i s c h e r: "Die beiden kantischen Schulen in Jena." *Deutsche Vierteljahrs-Schrift* 1862, Jahrgang 25, Heft 2, pp. 348—366.

¹⁷ K. F i s c h e r: "Die beiden kantischen Schulen in Jena." In: I d e m: *Akademische Reden*. Stuttgart, 1862, pp. 77—102.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 79.

(1838—1911), especially as Jakob Friedrich Fries was his grandfather. “Nearly always,” Eggeling states in his book of 1875 “Fries was misunderstood by authors of history of modern philosophy.”¹⁹ The author of these words does not point at Kuno Fischer, but at Eduard Zeller who was the author of a thesis on the dependence of Fries’s philosophy on the thoughts of Kant and Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743—1819). “In his philosophy,” Zeller writes “Fries mostly refers to Kant. Like Kant, he expresses a conviction that any real philosophy is criticism, that investigating cognitive abilities constitutes the only possible task of human speculation to be solved [...].”²⁰ Though the problem is, as Zeller notices in relation to Fries, Kant’s philosophy is not lacking in mistakes and therefore a reference to mental anthropology becomes necessary, and this still constitutes a reference to Jacobi’s philosophy.²¹

“In Königsberg,” Kuno Fischer writes. “there appeared philosophy which until now has dominated the course of German speculation from which the following systems derive, partially by continuation (*Fortbildung*), and partially by opposition. In Jena, Kant’s philosophy finds its most favourable place, its most significant school and its richest and most fruitful development. I will enumerate names: Reinhold the elder, Schiller, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Oken, Fries.”²² All of these philosophers were connected with Jena University. Karl Leonhard Reinhold (1758—1823) was associated with Jena University in the years 1787—1794 and Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762—1814) became his successor and he was the head of the Philosophy Department in Jena in the years 1794—1799. Friedrich Schiller (1759—1805) also gave lectures on philosophy in Jena (and also on history) in the years 1789—1799. Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling (1775—1854) became a pro-

¹⁹ H. Eggeling: *Kant und Fries. Die anthropologische Auffassung der Kritik der reinen Vernunft in ihren wesentlichen Punkten erörtert*. Braunschweig, 1875, p. 4.

²⁰ E. Zeller: *Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie seit Leibniz*. 2. Aufl. München, 1875, p. 456.

²¹ “What is the most characteristic are mental investigations by means of which Fries wants to justify assumptions of his predecessors more exactly and define their relationship more closely.” *Ibid.*, p. 456.

²² K. Fischer: “Die beiden kantischen Schulen in Jena...,” p. 81.

fessor in Jena in 1798 owing to Goethe's support, but in 1803 he moved to the University in Würzburg. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770—1831) was associated with Jena University in the years 1801—1806 and in 1805 he was appointed an associate professor. Lorenz Oken (actually: Okenfuß, 1779—1851) had classes at Jena University from 1807—1827, with a break between 1819 and 1822 that was caused, as it was in Fries's case, by his being involved in the celebration of students' corporations (*Wartburgfest*, 1817). And finally Jakob Friedrich Fries, who taught at Jena University in the years 1801—1805, 1816—1819 (was shortly dismissed after Oken) and in 1824—1837. What is more, which is also underlined by Kuno Fischer, Artur Schopenhauer (1788—1860) and Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776—1841) were also connected with Jena. Herbart studied in Jena and attended the lectures of Fichte, while Schopenhauer received a doctorate degree in Jena.

There is no doubt about one thing. Kuno Fischer was right in maintaining that the list of philosophers connected with Jena is impressive. Moreover, this was a time when even more of them were employed there. "At the same time," Fischer writes, "Schiller, Fichte, Schelling, later Schelling, Hegel, Fries, and later Hegel, Fries, Oken were here all together."²³ Fischer stresses the fact that the first investigator of Kant was Jenie Reinhold, and that his system was completed by Fichte, whose theory of knowledge led to Schelling's philosophy of nature and to Hegel's system. What do these two philosophers have in common? "They are," Fischer claims. "seized by the highest leitmotif which they consider to be the basis of understanding and continuation of Kant's philosophy."²⁴ This thesis is in accordance with Gerhard Lehmann's conviction that the philosophy of German idealism is based on "philosophy of the highest principle" (*Grundsatzphilosophie*), and that its representatives are: Reinhold, Salomon Maimon (1754—1800), Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Jacob Sigismund Beck (1761—1840).²⁵ However, out of

²³ Ibid., p. 84.

²⁴ Ibid., p. 85.

²⁵ See G. L e h m a n n: *Geschichte der Philosophie*. Bd. 8: *Die Philosophie des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts I*. Berlin, 1953, p. 24.

the group of thinkers mentioned here, Fischer distinguishes Fries, for whom he assigns a special task. “But” Kuno Fischer writes. “an opposite direction might be thought in relation to this thought, the direction which considers Kant’s philosophy as a basis and from this perspective fights continuation introduced by Reinhold. This attitude is accepted by Fries. In relation to Kant he takes a positive and depending stand, while towards development of Kant’s philosophy in the understanding of Reinhold, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, he takes definitely polemic stand.”²⁶ Fischer underlines that he wants to expose this opposition because, as he claims. “as a matter of fact it is all about understanding Kant’s philosophy”²⁷ and the dispute among representatives of the “philosophy of the highest principle” and Fries is, according to Fischer, the most important dispute among Jena philosophers. It is worth stressing here that, taking into account the significance of Jena University for the state of philosophy of the time, this is also the most important dispute of German philosophy of those days.

Fischer is right when he stresses the dissimilarity of Fries’s standpoint from representatives of German idealism. Fries certainly did not look for the highest principle in such a meaning in which he built a philosophy of the highest principle — after Reinhold — Fichte, and later, Schelling and Hegel used it. “Reinhold,” Kuno Fischer says in this context, “started in Jena the first Kant school and Fries the last one.”²⁸ Later he calls them the older and the younger school. The schools are not equivalent, as far as representatives are concerned because Fischer mentions only one follower of Fries, namely his first disciple Ernst Friedrich Apelt (1812—1859), although there were other followers along with him — Ernst Sigismund Mirbt (1799—1847) was connected with Jena; (Johann) Friedrich (August) van Calker (1790—1870), studied at Fries’s and at the same time was a professor at Bonn; the theologian Wilhelm Martin Leberecht de Wette (1780—1849), who was connected with Heidelberg (where he met Fries) and Berlin, and who, like Fries

²⁶ K. Fischer: “Die beiden kantischen Schulen in Jena...,” p. 85.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Ibid.

and Oken, was dismissed from the chair in connection with the murder of August von Kotzebue (1761—1819). On March 23, 1819 the student of theology Karl Ludwig Sand (1795—1820), who after *Wartburgfest* moved to Jena to attend the lectures of Fries, Oken and the historian Heinrich Luden (1778—1847), murdered the writer, lawyer and Emperor's spy, August von Kotzebue in Mannheim, which was the main reason for the Carlsbad Decrees and suspension of Fries who was an avid follower of students corporations (*Burschenschaften*).²⁹ The mistake of de Wette consisted in the fact that he had sent a letter of condolences to Sand's mother. Another follower of Fries was the biologist and botanist, Matthias Jakob Schleiden (1804—1881), who was a professor at Jena University in the years 1839—1863, when he was appointed to Dorpat. Fischer does not mention them because he only notes Ernst Friedrich Apelt, which for Fischer's opponents might be an argument for not full and objective presentation of Fries's school.

"The whole problem of philosophy," Kuno Fischer writes, "finishes with the question: What does critique of reason want to be and what can it be? How is it related to the system of philosophy? What is it for philosophical study?"³⁰ This question is left in the context of the relation between the development of Kant's philosophy in the frames of the "philosophy of highest principle" or in German idealism and the one that was characteristic of Fries's philosophy. Heinrich Moritz Chalybäus (1796—1862), one of the thinkers who is included among the representatives of speculative theism, when analysing the situation of post-Kant philosophy, underlines: "The next task after Kant was overcoming of subjectivism of his attitude and reaching the real knowledge and wanting of truth. This task was also undertaken by Fichte, Schelling and Hegel, and the last one carried them out methodically. However, when it seemed that everything had been finished in this way, it turned out that this transition from subjectivity to objectivity was accomplished at the expense of subjectivity. Thus — as the third one — there appears the problem of concrete connec-

²⁹ See more: E.L.T. Henke: *Jakob Friedrich Fries. Aus seinen handschriftlichen Nachlasse dargestellt*. Leipzig, 1867, p. 202ff.

³⁰ K. Fischer: "Die beiden kantischen Schulen in Jena...", p. 86.

tion of both sides, and neither objectivity would be lost in subjectivity in this connection, as it is in the concept of Kant and Fichte, nor subjectivity would be lost in objectivity as it happens in the attitude of Schelling and Hegel, but they would be both taken into account.”³¹ However, Fries who, according to Fischer, played a fundamental role for understanding of psychologism was not considered in this analysis, which was expressed in the fifth volume of his *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*, writing: “The question about establishing of,” he explains in the introduction to the fifth volume of his *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*, “transcendental ability discovered by Kant coincides with the question: What is critique? What can only be more consistent: psychology or metaphysics? Here is a disputable matter which divides post-Kant philosophy into two different trends. What is the cognition of human reason if not self-knowledge, self-observation, psychology? Some say so. How can one want psychology to be basic philosophical study when it must be established itself — like every empirical study? Others answer like this. [...] Psychological continuation and renewing of Kant’s criticism, so — called anthropological criticism, find their essential presentation at J.F. Fries and his followers.”³²

Kuno Fischer — and this was also reflected in volumes of his *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*,³³ devoted to Kant — emphasises the fact that Kant’s intention consisted in distinguishing between the critique of reason and the system of reason. However, this distinction leads to definite consequences among which one has to be pointed out:

³¹ H.M. Chalybäus: *Historische Entwicklung der speculativen Philosophie von Kant bis Hegel. Zu näherer Verständigung des wissenschaftlichen Publicums mit der neuesten Schule*. 5. Aufl. Leipzig, 1860, p. 343.

³² K. Fischer: *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*. Bd. 5: *Fichte und seine Vorgänger*. Heidelberg, 1869, p. 14.

³³ K. Fischer: *Immanuel Kant. Entwicklungsgeschichte und System der kritischen Philosophie*. Bd. 1: *Entstehung und Begründung der kritischen Philosophie. Die Kritik der reinen Vernunft*; Bd. 2: *Das Lehrgebäude der kritischen Philosophie. Das System der reinen Vernunft*. Mannheim, 1860; I d e m: *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*. Bd. 3: *Kants Vernunftkritik und deren Entstehung*; Bd. 4: *Kants System der reinen Vernunft auf Grund der Vernunftkritik*. 2. rev. Aufl. Heidelberg, 1869; I d e m: *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*. Bd. 3—4: *Immanuel Kant und seine Lehre*; Bd. 1: *Entstehung und Grundlegung der kritischen Philosophie*; Bd. 2: *Das Vernunftsystem auf der Grundlage der Vernunftkritik*. 3. neu bearb. Aufl. München, 1882.

“[...] human reason is divided into many source (*ursprünglicher*) powers! Isn't reason the one (*eine*)?”³⁴ It seems that this is the classic problem of relation: one of many; however, Fischer is still convinced that this is a contradiction impossible to overcome, and such attitude automatically locates him by the side of followers of “philosophy of the highest principle.” It seems that Fries's defenders are actually right in this aspect — Fischer was not objective in his assessment of his intentions to the end. One has to distinguish two questions, namely Fries's intention and its result. The intention was to show that, after all, one can find a source of unity in man, and that there is no need to look for this outside of him. The source does not have to be the highest principle (*Grundsatz*), and if so the source of unity might be the human soul. “We possess,” Kuno Fischer writes in this context, “the concept of human soul which is contradictory in itself: psychology which does not agree with logic.”³⁵ Therefore, Fischer emphasises the need for unity but he thinks that this question should be solved in a different way.

“In one reason,” Fischer continues, confirming his access to those who consider the necessity of pointing to the highest principle, “there are a lot of identical powers. Identity is becoming a slogan. The problem should be solved with the help of the notion of identity. With every step one takes the solution will become more significant.”³⁶ Thus, to the author of *Die beiden kantischen Schulen in Jena* the philosophy of identity seems to be the only solution to the problem that was not solved by the author of critical philosophy. Fischer pays attention to the opponents of “identity philosophy” who are connected with Jena, namely Schopenhauer and Herbart who agree with its followers anyway. Schopenhauer recognises the principle of identity and the fact that metaphysics constitutes the foundation of philosophy. While Herbart agrees with them, Fischer thinks that metaphysics is the first study. “Basic philosophical study,” Fischer states. “is not metaphysics. This explanation is against philosophers of identity and against Herbart.”³⁷ There

³⁴ K. Fischer: “Die beiden kantischen Schulen in Jena...,” p. 88.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 89.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 92.

is no doubt that Fischer's thesis is a thesis conditioned by his attitudes because it certainly cannot be accepted by the followers of metaphysical Neo-Kantianism, such as his disciple Otto Liebmann, and also Johannes Volkelt, Friedrich Paulsen and others. It is rightly believed by Hans-Ludwig Ollig that Liebmann did not adopt an understanding of post-Kant philosophy after his teacher because he created his own optics of the perception of this development, in which the notion of "the thing-in-itself"³⁸ occupies the central position. The most well-known Liebmann work, the one that is considered to give the beginning of Neo-Kantianism (although this question is not unequivocal), namely *Kant und die Epigonen*, was written in this optics.³⁹ Obviously, the point is not to immediately accept the beliefs of Liebmann and his followers. The problem is that both Fischer and Liebmann, when assessing post-Kant philosophy, locate themselves in the tradition of understanding it in the light of the defined premises. However, this is understandable under the condition that every criticism appears as a breach in the wall because only this helps *ex post* to accomplish the assessment of the whole. At the same time, in this specific situation it means both Fischer and Liebmann may be right. A historian of philosophy, who is investigating the relations between philosophers, has to take into account the beliefs of both of these thinkers.

"However," Fischer asks, "what is the critique of reason if not metaphysics? This is the cognition of human reason and its powers. This self-cognition is only possible due to self-observation, that is, inner experience. The study of experience is the study of nature [*Naturlehre*]. Inner study of experience is inner study of nature [*Naturlehre*], that is, anthropology, more psychology, empirical psychology. Therefore, the critique of reason, if it is properly understood, is an empirical study of soul. Its contents is anthropological, its cognition — empirical. F r i e s takes exactly such standpoint."⁴⁰ Fries's followers refer specifically to these arrangements to show that he

³⁸ See H.-L. Ollig: *Der Neukantianismus*. Stuttgart, 1979, p. 11.

³⁹ O. Liebmann: *Kant und die Epigonen. Eine kritische Abhandlung*. Stuttgart, 1865.

⁴⁰ K. Fischer: "Die beiden kantischen Schulen in Jena...", p. 92. Cf. Idem: *Geschichte der neuern Philosophie...*, Bd. 5, p. 14.

was not properly understood and they consider Kuno Fischer to be the main culprit who identified Fries as the one taking polemic attitude towards the philosophy of identity. Fischer admittedly claims that when it is about posing a question, the spirit of Fries's philosophy is that of Kant, and this means that Fries poses the question in the same way as Kant. The problem is, however, Fischer continues, that Fries's standpoint amounts to an alternative: if the critique of reason cannot be metaphysical, then it has to be anthropological. And from this he concludes the following: "If its insights cannot be *a priori* so they cannot be anything else but empirical insights."⁴¹ Fischer is convinced that the assessment of the opponents made by Fries is very objective but the direction in which he develops Kant's philosophy is not acceptable to Fischer.

"Therefore, according to Fries the basic philosophical study is not metaphysics but anthropology in the meaning of inner study on nature [*Naturlehre*], that is mental anthropology. This is the right *philosophia prima*. Critique of reason, as well as metaphysical cognition, a system of philosophy in its dismemberment, are based on this anthropological basis."⁴² Kuno Fischer's standpoint in this question is different from the one which is taken by Fries and his followers. For already in the next sentence Fischer underlines that "Kant's criticism did not want to be anthropological."⁴³ For Fischer this means the dissimilarity of Fries's attitude to the one that was the starting point, namely to Kant and therefore Fischer talks about renewing Kant's criticism. "He made it," Fischer writes about Fries, "in his 'Neue Kritik der Vernunft', which is anything else but anthropological transformation of Kant's critique of reason, in its most part it is a translation of the latter one into the language of empirical psychology."⁴⁴ It was not a problem for Fries's followers that Fischer understood him as a continuator of Kant's philosophy. For, undoubtedly, the author of *Neue Kritik der Vernunft* is a thinker who takes up the problem of establishing critical philosophy afresh,

⁴¹ K. Fischer: "Die beiden kantischen Schulen in Jena...", p. 92.

⁴² Ibid., p. 94.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

taking into account the impossibility of accepting this direction of Kant's development of philosophy which was accepted within the framework of "the highest principle" or "philosophy of identity." In this case it seems that Kuno Fischer is also in the right. "Fichte and Fries," he writes, "remain on the opposite poles, closely related to Kant's philosophy."⁴⁵ The problem here is the reproach of establishing philosophy in psychology, which is reflected in anthropological attitude, according to Fischer. It is interesting that the idea of completing psychology is found in another thinker of that time, namely Rudolph Hermann Lotze, who said that the philosophy of history seemed to him a "necessary completion of psychology and hence the plan of making an attempt of anthropology which would look for all the meaning of human existence on the basis of combined consideration of individual life and the history of our species culture."⁴⁶ There are even more similarities because they both combine the problem of anthropology with *a priori* reasoning although Lotze considers ethics as the first study because he claims that metaphysics and logic have to be established in ethics.

A fundamental mistake of Fischer — from the perspective of Fries's followers with Jürgen Bona Meyer and later Leonard Nelson — consists in the fact that he rejects the possibility of an anthropological approach to the critique of reason. "For if the critique of reason is only anthropological, it is understandable that primary contents of the reason must be given, that it must be directly present in our inside; it is understandable that we do not create the contents but we only realize this; that to this unity reason needs to have power, by virtue of which it reflects its inner processes; that this power of reflection does not create anything but it can only observe what is given, explain what is dark, that — to be able to do the last one — the power of reflection must have an ability to willful approaching to the one or another."⁴⁷ Because, according to Fischer, intellect is this power for Fries, therefore "our intellectual cognition is nothing else but renewed awareness,

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ H. Lotze: *Streitschriften*. Erstes Heft: *In Bezug auf Prof. I.H. Fichte's Anthropologie*. Leipzig, 1857, p. 15.

⁴⁷ K. Fischer: "Die beiden kantischen Schulen in Jena...", p. 95.

ἀνάμνησις.”⁴⁸ In this way, in Fischer’s opinion, Fries betrays Kant’s teaching. Primary rational cognition is not given through intellect but is given to intellect. Intellect does not create it but only realises and this is tightly connected with the feeling of truth (*Wahrheitsgefühl*), which is characteristic of Fries’s philosophy, as Fischer thinks. Fischer claims that Fries goes back to such philosophers like:

- a) John Locke and David Hume — considering intellect to be empty;
- b) Leibniz — convinced that human reason possesses source cognitions which he only realizes owing to abstraction (reflection);
- c) Thomas Reid (1710—1796) and Dugald Stewart (1753—1828) — convinced that this direct cognition might be compared to common sense;
- d) Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi and Wilhelm Martin Leberecht de Wette — convinced that this emotional factor in cognition is equivalent to bringing man over sensual world.⁴⁹

Thus, another big problem appears in the assessment of Fries’s philosophy. The first one consisted in reference to psychology and anthropology which are of empirical character. The second problem, which is of the same significance, refers to the fact that Fries’s philosophy is not *de facto* — as it seemed to all supporters of the author of *Neue Kritik der Vernunft* — a development of Kant’s philosophy but rather a return to pre-Kantian philosophy. This insult is justified by Fischer by Fries’s vision of *a priori* cognition. Fischer underlines that Fries’s intention is consistent with Kant’s intention, that is, that critique of reason is to be “cognition of *a priori* cognition. But this cognition is not only *a priori*.”⁵⁰ Fischer thinks that Fries draws a conclusion that transcendental cognition is not a transcendental cognition at all and such attitude is called “transcendental superstition” or “Kant’s superstition.”⁵¹

The problem consists in the fact that a criticism of cognition is supposed to be, Fischer thinks, a self-cognition according to Fries, and therefore it should be of a psychological character. Fischer asks: “Is there another way of self-cognition than the way of observing psychology? Isn’t all cognition of our inside a psychological insight

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ See *ibid.*, pp. 96—97.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 97.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

[*Einsicht*]?”⁵² Fischer uses the notion *beobachtende Psychologie* and one has to think if there is no reference to the notion of “observing mind” (*beobachtende Vernunft*) present in Hegel’s *The Phenomenology of Spirit*.⁵³ However, irrespective of this, there was a problem that for many years would dominate the discussion on understanding Kant’s philosophy. For Fischer underlines that this psychology leads to insights that are of an empirical character and only empirical ones. “The critique of reason, as Fries wants, is an inner experience, empirical study on soul and nothing else.”⁵⁴ In a criticism of reason that is understood in such a way, there is no place for *a priori* cognition. While Fries thinks that what is *a priori* might be discovered *a posteriori*, Fischer is of different opinion. “What is *a priori* cannot be recognized *a posteriori*.”⁵⁵ At the same time he expresses the conviction that Fries’s philosophy does not fulfil the condition that justifies insights into cognition because these insights are of a psychological, empirical character, and thus they can deliver *a priori* cognitions. “What is,” Fischer writes, “self-observation? I am observing only myself. What I find in this observation does not have, first of all, any right to be of importance to everyone. Where does common importance of results remain? In this observation I only behave empirically. What I recognize through experience should not and cannot lay claims to strict necessity. Where does necessity of result remain? So, if the critique of reason does not want to be anything else but an empirical observation, where is common and necessary importance of its insights: Where, I am asking, does it remain a critique of reason without it?”⁵⁶

However, Fischer’s critics do not notice that he can perceive the problem posed by Fries after all and emphasises that, as a matter of fact, the anthropological approach of criticism belongs to critical philosophy. For the problem is more complicated than Fries’s followers notice — who want to prove the authenticity and rightness

⁵² Ibid., p. 98.

⁵³ See G.W.F. Hegel: *Phänomenologie des Geistes*. Hrsg. Von J. Schulze. 2. Aufl. Berlin, 1841, p. X.

⁵⁴ K. Fischer: “Die beiden kantischen Schulen in Jena...,” p. 98.

⁵⁵ Ibid., p. 99.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 100.

of the interpretation that was by the spiritual master. “The question if criticism of reason should be metaphysical or anthropological has been an authentic unavoidable problem in the history of German philosophy since Kant. And the spirit of philosophy lives with problems.”⁵⁷ Thus, there is a problem about considering the essence of critical philosophy. If the matter was approached like this, then Fries could be perceived as one who was trying to develop Kant’s philosophy. However, the problem consists in the fact that earlier — in the sentence already mentioned — Fischer wrote that “Kant’s critique did not want to be anthropological one.”⁵⁸ At the same time he somehow neglected the relation between Kant and Fries and he gave Fries’s followers a strong argument in the discussion over the shape of critical philosophy.

2

Another important text that appears in the chronological order, and to which Nelson refers, is Wilhelm Windelband’s text of 1883, entitled *Critical or genetic method?*⁵⁹ The author addresses the problem of psychology already before although the text devoted to critical and genetic method is considered as the most important. “In 1876,” Hermann Glockner writes about Windelband, “he became a professor of philosophy in Zurich and in his opening speech he demanded for the first time the division between empirical psychology and a priori philosophy.”⁶⁰ Glockner means the text entitled *Pessimismus*

⁵⁷ Ibid., p. 101.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ W. Windelband: *Kritische oder genetische Methode?* In: *Idem: Präludien. Aufsätze und Reden zur Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte*. 9. Aufl. 2. Bd. Tübingen, 1924, pp. 99–135.

⁶⁰ H. Glockner: *Die europäische Philosophie von den Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart*. Stuttgart, 1958, p. 992.

und Wissenschaft.⁶¹ One year later Windelband was appointed at Freiburg im Breisgau University and gave a speech entitled *Über Denken und Nachdenken*.⁶² Obviously, it is not possible to take into account all of Windelband's works but it is worth paying attention to still another text in which he makes a famous distinction between the idiographic and nomothetic sciences. This is important from the point of view of the discussion about the subject of philosophy, although in this speech — I mean rector's speech which was given by Windelband in Strassburg in 1894 — Fries's name does not appear. I am referring to the text entitled *Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft*.⁶³ The analysis of articles devoted to the method mentioned by Nelson cannot omit the answer to the question: Why does the latter text, considering Windelband, refer first of all to a text that was devoted to critical and genetic method? Well, there are two reasons. Firstly, because Windelband had already mentioned Kant's opposition to psychologism in the first sentence of the article, which was not the common interpretation. "Since in *Critique of pure reason*, which as we know does not intend to be a system of philosophy but rather a 'treatise on method', Kant had been looking for a new approach to the task and the way of knowing philosophy which could be in opposition to modern psychologism, the question on the essence of his method did not disappear from the agenda of philosophy."⁶⁴ However, the problem is that Kant's science was not defined unequivocally and therefore it enables such interpretations as well. Secondly, because Fries's name appears in the context of psychologism. Windelband analyses modern trends and claims that all of them owe their popularity to Kant's philosophy. "At last psychologism," as represented by Fries and Beneke or in such a form as it was developed anew by a trend of popular psychology, "owes any advantage, which it certainly has over proper earlier theories,

⁶¹ W. Windelband: *Pessimismus und Wissenschaft*. In: *Idem: Präludien...*, Bd. 2, pp. 195–220.

⁶² W. Windelband: *Über Denken und Nachdenken*. In: *Idem: Präludien...*, Bd. 2, pp. 24–58.

⁶³ W. Windelband: *Geschichte und Naturwissenschaft*. In: *Idem: Präludien...*, Bd. 2, pp. 136–160.

⁶⁴ W. Windelband: *Kritische oder genetische Methode?*..., p. 99.

to joining a critical philosophy.”⁶⁵ Obviously, there is the problem of confusing the critical method with the metaphysical method, the same as considering transcendental dialectics as the core of critical philosophy is a problem as well. Windelband is convinced that the source of the misunderstanding around Kant’s notion of apriority lies in this. “Kant himself,” Windelband adds, “should be blamed for the fact that a new notion of apriority was very fast brought to the old psychological *prius* and at the same time he allowed to get to know the value of his discovery.”⁶⁶

Windelband points to the fact that the deductive method and the inductive method are not properly understood, and that their opposition is exaggerated. This is expressed in the statement that the deductive method uses only axioms in its proofs and inductive method — impressions. However, it is not the most important from the point of view of philosophy. “[...] the problem of philosophy,” Windelband writes, “is importance of axioms. The essence of axioms is that they cannot be proved. One cannot prove them in a deductive way because they determine the basis of any deduction themselves and also because that even more general and direct, and at the same time higher axioms should be indicated to such proof. They cannot be proved in an inductive way either because any induction assumes validity of axioms within some earlier defined domain. As it results, philosophy cannot make use of deductive method or inductive method which are something ordinary in other sciences.”⁶⁷ According to Windelband the aim of philosophy is, first of all, to prove direct obviousness of axioms. This is essential in the context of the following fragment: “There is no logical necessity which could prove importance of axioms. Therefore, there are only two possibilities: either one has to prove an actual importance, looking for the evidence that these axioms will be actually recognized as important ones in the real process of human representations, wishes and feelings, that they are binding, recognized principles in the empirical reality of spiritual life,

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 100.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 101.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 108.

or one has to prove that they are entitled to a different necessity, namely the o l o g i c a l n e c e s s i t y, and their importance has to be obligatorily recognized if other aims are to be realized.”⁶⁸ The problem of importance, as it is generally known, is essential for the philosophy of Baden School and was adopted from the considerations of Rudolph Hermann Lotze. With reference to these ideas, Lotze thinks that Plato separated existence from things, and in this context he emphasises the separation of two realities, namely “reality entitled to ideas and laws as i m p o r t a n c e from reality of a thing as b e i n g.”⁶⁹ This is where the most well-known Lotze formula appears: “being is and values are in force.” Windelband is convinced that one has to distinguish between two approaches of philosophy, namely the genetic approach from the critical approach. “For genetic method,” the founder of the Baden School writes, “axioms are actual ways of approach which were created in the course of development of human representations, feelings and will’s decisions and this is what provides them with importance. For critical method [...] axioms are norms which are important assuming that thinking in a commonly accepted way aims at realizing the purpose of being in truth, will — the purpose of being good, and feeling — the purpose of grasping beauty.”⁷⁰ In other words, the genetic method is a method of cognition that refers to the origin of cognition, while the critical method is based on the assumption that the validity of axioms has nothing to do with their origin.

The distinction between the genetic method and the critical method is certainly nothing new in the history of philosophy; just the opposite — one may consider it to be only a reminder of Kant’s approach towards the epistemological standpoints of contemporary times. As is widely known, reconciliation of dogmatism with skepticism is a very important issue in Kant’s philosophy. The thinker from Königsberg attributes merits to David Hume’s philosophy, which is emphasised in the introduction to *Prolegomena*. “I honestly admit: David Hume’s

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ H. L o t z e: *System der Philosophie*. Erster Theil: *Drei Bücher der Logik*. Leipzig, 1874, p. 507.

⁷⁰ W. W i n d e l b a n d: *Kritische oder genetische Methode?*..., p. 109.

reprimand was just this first signal which broke my dogmatic nap many years ago and put on a totally different direction of my investigation in the field of speculative philosophy.”⁷¹ However, the problem of Hume’s philosophy consists in the fact that in fighting against the dogmatism of the past metaphysics, it moved to the other extreme, namely into skepticism. So breaking a dogmatic nap consists in the necessity of finding a third way by Kant. Because, as was noticed by Hans-Michael Baumgartner, because Kant could not see the possibility of taking any indirect stand he turned to criticism.⁷² Regardless of the fact of how he solved the problem of cognition in the context of the disputes from previous times, the only important thing here is that fact that Windelband remains in an analogous situation, namely he has to consider the problem in confrontation with positivism and its varieties. One such danger is connected with psychologism. “To every such ‘theory’ there belongs a big, extensive material of either psychological cognitions or psychological and historical cognitions.”⁷³ In this context this can be understood as a reference to Fries although his name was mentioned only once in the article.

The problem is more complicated and deals with the way in which philosophy justifies its axioms. Windelband refers to Richard Avenarius and his “pure experience” though he underlines that it is impossible to reach anything but relativism on its basis. Because an absolute criterion cannot be found, there is no other way but to submit to the facts. This question has been discussed many time in post-Kantian philosophy. Klaus Ch. Köhnke points at the Reinhold’s disciple, and later the professor in Kiel, namely Johann Erich von Berger (1772—

⁷¹ I. K a n t: *Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können*. In: I d e m: *Gesammelte Schriften*. Bd. 4: *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (1. Aufl.), *Prolegomena, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*. Berlin, 1911, p. 260.

⁷² “Der Gegensatz Dogmatismus versus Skeptizismus führte Kant, da hier eine ausgleichende Vermittlung der Sache nach nicht möglich war, zur Ablehnung beider Alternativen und damit zu einer dritten philosophischen Position, zum transzendentalen *Kritizismus*.” H.-M. B a u m g a r t n e r: *Kants “Kritik der reinen Vernunft.” Anleitung zur Lektüre*. 4. Aufl. Freiburg—München, 1996, p. 21. More on this topic, see A.J. N o r a s: *Kant a neokantyzm badeński i marburski*. Katowice, 2005, pp. 94—95.

⁷³ W. W i n d e l b a n d: *Kritische oder genetische Methode?...*, p. 113.

1833)⁷⁴ who was one of the first to criticize philosophy and science introduced by one rule.⁷⁵ He did this in his four-volume work *Allgemeine Grundzüge zur Wissenschaft* (1817—1827) although it was von Berger, who though that the system might be deductive and a priori (Reinhold and Fichte), panlogic or methodical and encyclopaedic (Hegel) and romantic and connected with point of view, who typologised philosophical systems⁷⁶ because he believed that the problem of the system was connected with the desire to grasp the whole and that it was important to realise the impossibility of a holistic grasp of reality. The tendency to such understanding of philosophy was becoming clearer and this is reflected in the texts of Trendelenburg and later in the thought of Windelband. Mainly Karl Jaspers and Nicolai Hartmann followed this train of thought in the 20th century. It is interesting that Köhnke sees this as a symptom of romanticism. “This no- or no-longer a system of von Berger and Trendelenburg is what is romantic. This is a system of emphasising of scientific value of individual phenomena in relation to any thinking about principles (*Prinzipiendenken*) — this is a system of positive natural, historical, philological and historico-philosophical knowledge.”⁷⁷ It seems that the problem is more complex than Köhnke thinks but we cannot learn more about this question. “Philosophy,” as Windelband writes in this context, “is nothing else for this than psychological-cultural-historical consideration based on axioms. It is a ‘hopeless attempt’ of establishing in empirical theory something that constitutes itself an assumption of any theory.”⁷⁸ As we are talking about psychology, Fries’s followers might feel offended here. On the other hand, in another place, Windelband talks about two possible approaches in philosophy that deal with the starting point for criticism and thus concentrate on the self-cognition of human mind. Followers of the first one consider mental anthropology as a basis for

⁷⁴ Ludwig Noack informs that von Berger died in 1831 while he was a rector. See L. Noack: *Philosophie-geschichtliches Lexikon. Historisch-biographisches Handwörterbuch zur Geschichte der Philosophie*. Leipzig, 1879, p. 134.

⁷⁵ See K.Ch. Köhnke: *Entstehung und Aufstieg des Neukantianismus. Die deutsche Universitätsphilosophie zwischen Idealismus und Positivismus*. Frankfurt am Main, 1993, p. 25.

⁷⁶ See *ibid.*, p. 31.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

⁷⁸ W. Windelband: *Kritische oder genetische Methode?...*, p. 113.

investigating while the followers of the second one think that history is a tool of philosophy. “It is,” Windelband claims, “[...] an opposition of Fries’s anthropologism towards historical idealism of Hegel.”⁷⁹ Windelband does not support Fries in this question either, which aroused the opposition of Nelson.

3

Chronological order now requires a reference to Paul Natorp, co-founder of the Marburg School, who published an article entitled “Über objektive und subjektive Begründung der Erkenntnis” (On objective or subjective establishing of cognition) in 1887, in the magazine *Philosophische Monatshefte*. A year later Natorp published a very important book entitled *Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Methode*⁸⁰ and chapter fourteen of this book has a similar title, namely *Objective und subjective Begründung der Erkenntnis. Wahrheit und Schein des Idealismus*. In 1912 Natorp published another book on psychology that he entitled *Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode*. It was signed as the first book but second part never appeared.⁸¹ In the article mentioned above, Natorp poses the question of whether the establishment of the cognition that happens in logic should be objective or subjective. By the way there a problem with understanding of the role of psychology in the theory of cognition now appears.

The answer to the question of why Nelson refers to Natorp’s article is easy — because the latter one refers to Fries. “If — Natorp writes

⁷⁹ W. Windelband: *Die Geschichte der Philosophie*. In: Idem: *Die Philosophie im Beginn des zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts. Festschrift für Kuno Fischer*. Bd. 2. Heidelberg, 1905, p. 184.

⁸⁰ P. Natorp: *Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Methode*. Freiburg im Breisgau, 1888.

⁸¹ P. Natorp: *Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode*. Erstes Buch: *Objekt und Methode der Psychologie*. Tübingen, 1912.

in the article “On objective or subjective establishing of cognition,” — “we attribute cognition ‘objective’ importance, then [...] it has to be established in subjectivity of cognition; it must have its source in acting or subjective experiencing of cognition. The ‘act’ of cognition seems to be, out of necessity, what is the first one, while cognition — considered as a value — the result depending on this act or its creation. The ‘product’ might be called objective, ‘factors’ are subjective. Of course, in accordance with this view logic is becoming inevitably dependent on psychology — this is a conclusion which did not frighten consistent followers of subjective viewpoint. Kant — who appoints a historical starting point — represents an opposite standpoint with unambiguous resolution just in this question. But already one of his first and also the most loyal followers — Fries — was correcting Kant in this place, believing that he has to restore appropriate psychological bases to transcendental philosophy.”⁸² Yet, logic cannot depend on psychology on any account, and generally speaking, it cannot depend on any other detailed science. “All that believe in a possibility of such science,” Natorp continues, “would define it as science which is characterized by far more fundamental importance than any other. The science which according to the name and claims talks about cognition and its rules in general, cannot depend on any other scientific cognition (which can only be true in accordance with its laws) in its establishing. Quite opposite. It must be the basis of all sciences.”⁸³

In addition to Fries’s standpoint as defended by Nelson, one has to mention yet another question that Natorp treated very earnestly in the book, namely complexity of consciousness. “In the fact of consciousness,” Natorp explains in *Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Methode*, “there can be a lot of moments distinguished which are really inseparably connected but in consideration they have to be necessarily separated: firstly, the contents which one is aware of (contents of consciousness); secondly, its being aware [*Bewusst-sein*] or its reference to Me; this last one, on the way to farther abstraction might be distinguished, as the third moment of the fact of con-

⁸² P. Natorp: “Über objektive und subjektive Begründung der Erkenntnis...,” pp. 261—262.

⁸³ *Ibid.*, p. 264.

consciousness, from the very reference.”⁸⁴ For this reason Natorp introduces the notion of “realisation” (*Bewusstheit*). In principle one can say that it is introduced by Natorp after Hermann Cohen who had done it for the first time in 1877 in the work *Kants Begründung der Ethik* in which he used this notion six times,⁸⁵ mostly in the polemics about the attitude of the physicist and astronomer, Johann Carl Friedrich Zöllner (1834—1882) who, in 1872, published the second edition of his work devoted to the notion of cognition.⁸⁶ It is essential to define realisation as used in this work because Cohen says: “[...] the fact of impression (that is r e a l i z a t i o n).”⁸⁷ Later he uses this term in *Das Princip der Infinitesimal-Methode und seine Geschichte* of 1883. “One should not also ask,” Cohen writes there, “h o w d o e s i t h a p p e n that there occurs such relation of the consciousness to what is given; for such a question exceeds the borders of scientific thirst for knowledge because it is not directed at conditions and kinds of scientific consciousness but at a possibility of natural consciousness, r e a l i s a t i o n. It is practically a t r a n s - c e n d e n t question.”⁸⁸ So when, two years later, Cohen published the second, considerably extended edition of *Kants Theorie der Erfahrung*, the notion of “realisation” appears there more often. One has to admit that from the perspective of the second edition, which was much more modest, this notion was not used by the author. “To reserve the unity of consciousness to a fundamental problem, as the most concise expression, there seems to be essential a distinction in the notion of consciousness, aiming at the direction that some extraordinary ways of psychological presentation of the unity of consciousness cannot be mistaken any more — also in the word in which the meaning of consciousness for critical and cognitive problem has been reserved. To prevent this I will use the notion not used by Kant r e a l i s a t i o n (*Bewusstheit*), as distinct from consciousness. Therefore, a question

⁸⁴ P. Natorp: *Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Methode...*, p. 11.

⁸⁵ See H. Cohen: *Kants Begründung der Ethik*. Berlin, 1877, pp. 46, 181, 182.

⁸⁶ J.C.F. Zöllner: *Über die Natur der Cometen. Geschichte und Theorie der Erkenntniss*. 2. Aufl. Leipzig, 1872.

⁸⁷ H. Cohen: *Kants Begründung der Ethik...*, p. 182.

⁸⁸ H. Cohen: *Das Princip der Infinitesimal-Methode und seine Geschichte. Ein Kapitel zur Grundlegung der Erkenntniskritik*. Berlin, 1883, p. 20.

‘how could this happen’ that space is created from impression is the question about realisation.”⁸⁹

If we take into consideration Natorp’s article, two issues are important. The first one is the understanding of cognition; the second one is the distinction between two ways of establishing of cognition. “If cognition is considered as a problem, analogously to an equation which we are to solve, the object is not defined yet, looked for but only a given described as x . This x is not just something unknown; but similarly like x in an equation it is defined by connection with already known quantities. The same is with the object of cognition — also before its solution — it has to be defined as for its meaning by definite reference to the data of cognition. Otherwise, the problem of getting to know the object would be both insolvable and incomprehensible.”⁹⁰ Such an understanding of cognition is based on an assumption that cognition is an interminable process of reaching truth and — with regard to the fact that Nicolai Hartmann later refers to it — it can be called the Marburg notion of cognition. Of course, the meaning that Marburg philosophers emphasised was its infinite character. Natorp underlines this in his program text of 1912 in which he writes: “‘Being actually given’ — is defining the character of a problem to be solved — just the problem of the source proof, the proof based on the unity of acting. This problem might appear to be infinite, it always counts as the last one, but that is why it is always a problem. It does not give, it cannot give what is given in the meaning of definite, closed, taken from the cognition that is still in proceeding ahead. Actually I emphasize the character of cognition p r o c e s s in the same meaning, its character as *fieri* and not motionless, isolated fact, that is just as becoming according to Plato: becoming the being, movement towards the being and not stopping at the resting being.”⁹¹ Cognition is perceived dynamically here, as a process and it was also perceived in this way by the most prominent — next to Ernst Cassirer — disciple of Marburgians, namely Nicolai Hartmann. “In the light of critical consideration,” he

⁸⁹ H. C o h e n: *Kants Theorie der Erfahrung*. 2. neubearb. Aufl. Berlin, 1885, p. 207. Cf. I d e m: *Kants Theorie der Erfahrung*. 3. Aufl. Berlin, 1918, p. 270.

⁹⁰ P. N a t o r p: “Über objektive und subjektive Begründung der Erkenntnis...,” p. 258.

⁹¹ P. N a t o r p: “Kant und die Marburger Schule.” *Kant-Studien* 1912, Bd. 17, p. 200.

writes in an article about the Marburg times, “there exists no system as a starting point, but only an aim, a demand. For philosophical cognition the system is not the beginning but the end. This end is never present, ready; for philosophical cognition is never ready.”⁹² After all Natorp wrote: “Before the result of cognition there is something given indeed; namely a problem. One may also say: the object is given as something still to define, as x and not a known quantity.”⁹³

As far as objectivity is concerned Natorp opposes it to the standpoint of psychologism which is represented, in his opinion, by Fries. “It is easy to notice,” Natorp writes in the answer to Fries’s attitude, “that our initial arrangements are rather aiming at opposite standpoint.”⁹⁴ In an opposing psychological understanding of cognition Natorp will underline that “objective importance must also be objectively established.”⁹⁵ Science has to be of an objective character and “objectivity to which science claims rights undoubtedly deals with importance which seriously — and not only apparently — overcomes subjectivity of consciousness.”⁹⁶ In connection with this Natorp opposes two standpoints. According to the first standpoint: “Objects exist in themselves, beyond and subjectivity, independently of it and without a source reference to it. It is true that it is represented to us by subjective presentation but it only represents (replaces or means) the object and it is not an object. Therefore objectivity is not abolished in subjectivity.”⁹⁷ The other way is a search in which the starting point does not have a connection with the object that is “at first one has to place oneself in the position of cognition and ask how the very cognition understands objectivity, how it receives it and what it means to the cognition that is opposes the object to itself as independent of subjectivity of cognition?”⁹⁸ Thus, the question of the objectivity of cognition is connected with, in Natorp’s opinion, the necessity of

⁹² N. Hartmann: *Systematische Methode*. In: *Ideem: Kleinere Schriften*. Bd. 3: *Vom Neukantianismus zur Ontologie*. Berlin, 1958, p. 23.

⁹³ P. Natorp: “Über objektive und subjektive Begründung der Erkenntnis...,” p. 283.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 262.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 265.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 265—266.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 267—268.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 268.

its justifying the way leading from consciousness. “At the beginning this way seems to lead to the aim.”⁹⁹ However, in what way does it lead to the aim? “Therefore,” Natorp writes, “in general the relation of what is subjective to what is objective in cognition should be explained with the relation of what is individual to what is general.”¹⁰⁰ In any case, Natorp regards this opposition as an antagonism to the standpoints of Aristotle and Plato and underlines the fact that the question of relation between subjectivity and objectivity is not easy but is rather complex to the highest degree. “What is subjective is the first one when the problem of cognition is earlier posed than solved; but as given it cannot mean being given for cognition. Real beginnings and bases of cognition are rather always final objective unities,”¹⁰¹ what is supposed to constitute an advantage of objective establishing over subjective establishing. Therefore Natorp states: “Science not only should but cannot start from anything else but from objective unities; there is no other possible beginning of cognition.”¹⁰²

4

In 1892, Carl Stumpf, who was a disciple of Rudolph Hermann Lotze and Franz Brentan, published an article on relation between psychology and theory of cognition¹⁰³ in *Abhandlungen der philosophisch-philologischen Classe der Königlich Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften*. Stumpf made Eduard Zeller’s speech of 1862 the starting point of the consideration discussed in the article, and he

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p. 275.

¹⁰¹ Ibid., p. 284.

¹⁰² Ibid., pp. 284—285.

¹⁰³ C. S t u m p f: “Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie”....

said that this speech indicated the aim of the investigations of the theory of cognition, namely the source and truth of our cognition; however, it did not directly emphasise the meaning of psychology.¹⁰⁴ Stumpf underlines that Zeller only made it in 1877 and points to the second edition *Über Bedeutung und Aufgabe der Erkenntnistheorie*, which was completed with *Supplements*.¹⁰⁵ At that time Zeller's view was not the common one because as Stumpf was convinced that there were a variety of standpoints in the "Neo-Kantianist School" as he calls the views that refer to Kant.¹⁰⁶ Stumpf pays attention to two opposite standpoints simultaneously: criticism and psychologism, while he clearly announces that intends to cause a confrontation. At the same time he underlines that Windelband considered Kant's attitude to psychology in the text of 1877¹⁰⁷ and came to the conclusion that Kant did not present his criticism in its full form because in his understanding, it still remained dependent on psychology, which cannot surprise any expert on Neo-Kantianism. "This dependence," Windelband writes, "of criticism on psychological theory of its author, which cannot be covered by all his opposite statements, is already marked in the opening treatise [...]." ¹⁰⁸ At that moment Windelband mentions Hermann Cohen's book, *Kants Theorie der Erfahrung*, which, in his opinion, liberated Kant's theory of cognition from psychology.

Stumpf assumes the conviction that Kant's study should be completed, especially as far as schematism and transcendental deduction are concerned, as the starting point. Transcendental deduction, in his opinion, leads to understanding that "in nature and aspiring of our cognition there lies an introduction of the relation to the world

¹⁰⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 467.

¹⁰⁵ E. Zeller: *Zusätze (1877)*; *Idem: Über Bedeutung und Aufgabe der Erkenntnistheorie*. 2. Aufl. In: *Idem: Vorträge und Abhandlungen. Zweite Sammlung*. Leipzig, 1877, pp. 496—526.

¹⁰⁶ See C. Stumpf: "Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie...", p. 467.

¹⁰⁷ W. Windelband: "Über die verschiedenen Phasen der Kantischen Lehre vom Ding-an-sich." In: *Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie*. Unter Mitwirkung von C. Göring, M. Heinze, W. Wundt herausgegeben von R. Avenarius. 1. Jahrgang. Leipzig, 1877, pp. 224—266.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 237.

of phenomena but not to understanding that the world of phenomena must submit to it.”¹⁰⁹ The problem is simply caused by our understanding of transcendental apperception and Stumpf refers to the distinction between consciousness and realisation, but — in accordance with what was stated earlier — he falsely attributes this distinction to Natorp.¹¹⁰ Indeed, not referring to Cohen, Natorp says in *Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Methode*, that the psychological understanding of consciousness is divided into two elements, that is, realisation and content.¹¹¹ Realisation alone is too little to constitute the unity of the law and at the same time the unity of an object because it means “rather the most appropriate expression for defining subjectivity of coming to light, the character of a phenomenon as mental data [*Datum*].”¹¹²

In this context the problem of psychology returns once again — the more so in that Stumpf pays attention to Hermann Cohen’s reservations concerning his book of 1873.¹¹³ Cohen means that Stumpf, who he sees as a psychologist, thinks that one can reject qualities, but that there is no way to reject space. The author of *Kants Theorie der Erfahrung* claims that it is simple to refute this view because “one cannot imagine the space without quality.”¹¹⁴ The reader might be struck by the fact that Hermann Cohen regarded Carl Stumpf as a psychologist but one cannot forget that it was Stumpf who professed that “psychological investigations are indispensable for theoretician of cognition.”¹¹⁵ However, it seems that it is all about something else here. No mentally healthy person questions the importance of psychological research, and thus psychology, for the theory of cognition. Mentioned Paul Natorp spoke clearly about the opposition and the mutual reference of the subjective and objective establishment of cognition and thus psychology and the critique of cognition. One has to quote a longer fragment that shows the whole

¹⁰⁹ C. S t u m p f: “Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie...,” p. 478.

¹¹⁰ See *ibid.*, p. 480.

¹¹¹ See P. N a t o r p: *Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Methode...*, p. 112.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ C. S t u m p f: *Über den psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung*. Leipzig, 1873.

¹¹⁴ H. C o h e n: *Kants Theorie der Erfahrung*. 2. neubearb. Aufl. ..., p. 105.

¹¹⁵ C. S t u m p f: “Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie...,” p. 490.

complexity of discussed relation between critique of cognition and psychology. “As we had to define subjective and psychological method as well as objective and critical one as an opposite relation, they both at the same time appeared to tightly create the whole and correspond to each other and even cover each other [*zusammenfallend*] in the whole area of their application and in the same meaning in which opposite movements A to B and B to A cover each other. In this way it is clear how the problem of critique of cognition seemed for many people solved in the psychology of cognition and how, on the other hand — when the objective character of critical method was explained — quite opposite, psychological problem seemed to be solved till the end in the critical problem. Both views turned out to be erroneous. Both problems, the problem of objective and subjective establishing, tightly correspond to each other, however they remain different from each other and even opposite.”¹¹⁶ This fragment from Natorp’s book shows that the question is not unequivocal and requires that the right distinctions be made.

Stumpf’s considerations were aimed in a direction other than those of Cohen and Natorp though. It was Willy Moog (1888—1935), who regarded Stumpf as a psychologist placed between psychology and theory of cognition. For this reason Stumpf is the one who emphasised the meaning of psychology for philosophy. “Psychology has got a fundamental meaning for Stumpf; also his theory of cognition is in an essential way psychologically oriented, while it does not assess logic in a fair way as it includes it to practical sciences.”¹¹⁷ Moog’s standpoint is confirmed by Gerhard Lahmann, who pointed out the close relationship between philosophy and psychology. “Stumpf,” he writes in his controversial book, “did not have to be a philosopher who he was, he did not have to start from ‘descriptive’ psychology of Brentan to know that ‘psychology’ includes the essence of purely philosophical problems. In this way he establishes psychology, logic, theory of cognition in the relationship in which psychology is not to a lesser extent in charge of ‘the source of notions’, origin of cognition

¹¹⁶ See P. Natorp: *Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Methode...*, p. 121.

¹¹⁷ W. Moog: *Die deutsche Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts in ihren Hauptrichtungen und ihren Grundproblemen*. Stuttgart, 1922, p. 161.

[...]. Also for him psychology is not a natural science but it belongs to the humanities.”¹¹⁸

“As a positive task in the service of theory of cognition — Stumpf writes — psychology is to explain more exactly the origins of time and space presentations, especially presentations of relations [*Verhältnissvorstellungen*].”¹¹⁹ Thus, Stumpf was convinced that psychology is a fundamental science, although he did emphasise the close relation between psychology and philosophy. Therefore, he considered Johann Nicolaus Tetens (1738—1807)¹²⁰ to be a thinker who investigated the relations of representations in the most decisive way and said that he was a psychologist and would make a clear distinction between his standpoint and Kant’s criticism. Stumpf underlined that criticism aims at showing forms of eyewitnessing and categories that are independent of psychology, although he, as a philosopher, was not convinced about this possibility. According to Stumpf, there is a very strong relation between psychology and the theory of cognition. “Kant expressed and wanted to express any statement of psychological source of eyewitnessing and forms of thinking in ‘a priori’; not only statement on their significance for cognition. He wanted to say and he says this often enough that they are not possible to be analysed as a priori notions and are not given sensuously as impressive contents. This negation of possibilities to analyse is also a psychological statement [...]”¹²¹ Stumpf refers to Hermann Cohen in this context, stating that he also considers the significance of psychology for the theory of cognition. “These investigations,” the author of *Kants Theorie der Erfahrung* writes, “of facts of consciousness in cognition, which he establishes as unavailable in psychological analysis, that is considered as a priori elements of consciousness, are called ‘metaphysical periphrasis’ by Kant. And this is an indispensable initial condition of transcendental periphrasis.”¹²²

¹¹⁸ G. Lehmann: *Die deutsche Philosophie der Gegenwart*. Stuttgart, 1942, pp. 109—110.

¹¹⁹ C. Stumpf: “Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie...,” p. 490.

¹²⁰ See J.N. Tetens: *Philosophische Versuche über die menschliche Natur und ihre Entwicklung*. Bd. 1—2. Leipzig, 1777.

¹²¹ C. Stumpf: “Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie...,” p. 493.

¹²² H. Cohen: *Kants Theorie der Erfahrung*. 2. neubearb. Aufl..., p. 74.

The problem is not the fact that there is no psychology in Kant's and Cohen's texts but its definition. One can agree with the thesis that was proposed by Stumpf with reference to psychology. "Negligence of psychology," he writes, "is not, as it is presented quite often, involuntary and unimportant feature but it constitutes a fundamental detriment of Kant's philosophizing."¹²³ All of the followers of Jakob Friedrich Fries would support this thesis, including Jürgen Bona Meyer, Hans Cornelius and Leonard Nelson. However, the way to define psychology still remained a problem. The fact that Stumpf refers to Christoph Sigwart (1830—1904) is not laudable to him because *Logic*¹²⁴ of the latter one is considered to be one of the most important works belonging to psychologism. In this context Edmund Husserl in the first volume of *Logical Investigations* talks about logic of Friedrich Eduard Beneke (1798—1854), John Stuart Mill (1806—1873) and Sigwart, considering them to be representatives of psychologism.¹²⁵ Stumpf goes even further, for he emphasised that it was Fichte who introduced the notion of "consciousness in general" and referring to German positivist Ernst Laas (1837—1885)¹²⁶ and he claims that this did not happen in Kant's philosophy.

The question of understanding psychology causes us to refer to phenomenology. Firstly, because Brentano, one of Stumpf's teacher, also worked on psychology as an empirical science, and in drawing a distinction between genetic and descriptive psychology he described his psychology as descriptive psychology. Secondly, because Husserl refers to Stumpf, to whom he dedicated the first volume of his *Logical Investigations*, which was the result of the fact that Husserl presented his postdoctoral dissertation *Über den Begriff der Zahl*¹²⁷ at Stumpf's. Moreover, when he published the first volume of *Logical Investigations* in 1900, he also referred to Stumpf. "It would therefore be," Husserl writes, "circular to try to give logic

¹²³ C. Stumpf: "Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie...", p. 493.

¹²⁴ Ch. Sigwart: *Logik*. Bd. 1: *Die Lehre vom Urteil, vom Begriff und vom Schluss*; Bd. 2: *Die Methodenlehre*. Tübingen, 1873—1878.

¹²⁵ See E. Husserl: *Logical Investigations*. Vol. 1..., p. 90.

¹²⁶ E. Laas: *Kants Analogien der Erfahrung. Eine kritische Studie über die Grundlagen der theoretischen Philosophie*. Berlin, 1876.

¹²⁷ E. Husserl: *Über den Begriff der Zahl. Psychologische Analysen*. Halle, 1887.

a first foundation in psychology.”¹²⁸ In this context he refers to three philosophers, two whom presented the same opinion, namely they share Husserl’s anti-psychologism and the third one who had quite an opposite opinion. The “Allies” of Husserl were Rudolph Hermann Lotze and Paul Natorp and the one that had a different opinion is Carl Stumpf. At first Husserl indicates § 332 of the second edition of Lotze’s *Logic* (although he cites the wrong pages), in which he rejects the possibility of justifying thinking laws on the way of referring to the psychological processes that happen in the human mind.¹²⁹ Then Husserl refers to the text of Natorp that is analyzed here, which was devoted to the difference between objective and subjective establishment of cognition. “Ascertainment that all sense of logic as general and establishing truth of theory of cognition will be abolished when we only allow to make it dependent on the rules of some special science, namely psychology [...] makes subjective approach impossible to accept.”¹³⁰ Natorp’s anti-psychologism appeared at the same time, which certainly did not arouse any doubts among the experts of Marburg Neo-Kantianism. Iso Kern was also a thinker who particularly emphasised the importance of Natorp and his text for Husserl’s anti-psychologism, even at the expense of the importance of Gottlob Frege’s output.¹³¹

The thinker whose attitude was not accepted by Husserl was, as has already been mentioned, Carl Stumpf. In other words Husserl, a disciple of Brentan, did not accept the way in which Carl Stumpf, the other (older) disciple of Brentan, understood psychology. For it was not possible for Husserl to agree with Stumpf’s thesis that stated: “Investigating the source of n o t i o n s, not only those of absolute but also of relative contents is the old task of psychology. [...] While looking for the most general, immediately convincing t r u t h s

¹²⁸ E. Husserl: *Logical Investigations*. Vol. 1..., p. 95.

¹²⁹ See H. Lotze: *System der Philosophie*. Theil 1: *Drei Bücher der Logik*. Leipzig, 1874, pp. 530—532.

¹³⁰ P. Natorp: “Über objektive und subjektive Begründung der Erkenntnis...,” p. 264.

¹³¹ See I. Kern: *Husserl und Kant: Eine Untersuchung über Husserls Verhältnis zu Kant und zum Neukantianismus*. Den Haag, 1964. See also J. Sidorek: *Słowo wstępne*. In: E. Husserl: *Badania logiczne*. T. 1: *Prolegomena do czystej logiki*. Tłum. J. Sidorek. Przejrzał A. Póltawski, Warszawa, 2006 pp. IX—XXXVI.

is a matter of the theory of cognition.”¹³² This statement shows the close relation between psychology and the theory of cognition but by no means in the meaning that was given to psychology by Brentano, Husserl or Natorp. The last one proved that one of the most important tasks of psychology is the reconstruction of what is direct, what is just given to consciousness¹³³ and at the same time — referring to Kant — he underlined the close relation of psychology understood in this way and the criticism of cognition. He also pointed out the necessity of drawing a distinction between “pure” philosophical psychology and “empirical” psychology.¹³⁴ After all the co-founder of the Marburg School wrote in another place: “The first basic philosophical domain is the science of basic principles of not only formal but also material or objective [*gegenständlichen*] truth of cognition: logic or criticism of cognition.”¹³⁵ Nevertheless Stumpf understands psychology in a quite different way. “Psychology has a completely other task, on account of our conviction about the outer world and our presentations of its features. It does not have to excuse scientific assumptions in this respect but it is supposed to explain general direct trust in the outer world, no matter if it is true or false; I mean in the outer world as it appears for us: colourful humming and uproarious, fragrant and tasty, introducing only some corrections which is brought by an ordinary consciousness trained by experience of many sensual illusions. If also here the beginnings of scientific cognition are shining through the same as in the indicated reference, then psychology considers them only as forces cooperating with other forces.”¹³⁶ However, Stumpf was conscious of the fact that psychologism does not constitute an

¹³² C. Stumpf: “Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie...,” p. 501.

¹³³ See P. Natorp: *Einleitung in die Psychologie nach kritischer Methode...*, p. 88.

¹³⁴ See *ibid.*, p. 120.

¹³⁵ P. Natorp: *Philosophische Propädeutik (Allgemeine Einleitung in die Philosophie und Anfangsgründe der Logik, Ethik und Psychologie) in Leitsätzen zu akademischen Vorlesungen*. 2. Aufl. Marburg, 1905, p. 10. It is worth mentioning here that it is Cohen who talks about the criticism of cognition in *Das Princip der Infinitesimal-Methode und seine Geschichte. Ein Kapitel zur Grundlegung der Erkenntniskritik* (Berlin, 1883), but this notion was used for the first time by Otto Liebmann in the book *Zur Analysis der Wirklichkeit. Philosophische Untersuchungen* (Straßburg, 1876).

¹³⁶ C. Stumpf: “Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie...,” pp. 506—507.

alternative to criticism, and therefore, he offered an indirect way that consists in the close cooperation of these two attitudes.

Stumpf underlines the importance of psychology in philosophical investigations in *Supplement*¹³⁷ which is at the end of the article, when he specifically refers again to Tetens who — as Stumpf noted — is called the “German Locke” by Karl Rosenkranz.¹³⁸ Stumpf emphasised that it was Jürgen Bona Meyer who had mentioned Johann Eduard Erdmann (1805—1892), because the latter stressed the importance of Tetens to Kant’s understanding psychology.¹³⁹ Erdmann says that — in accordance with Johann Georg Hamann’s opinion — Tetens’s book was supposed to lie on Kant’s desk. “In logic,” Erdmann writes about Kant, “Wolff and his school were his authorities, while in psychology — Tetens specially.”¹⁴⁰ “Erdmann is also important for the other reason, namely because,” as Rudolf Eisler claims, “he is the author of the notion “psychologism.”¹⁴¹ Stumpf devotes all of his *Supplement* to emphasising the importance of Tetens for the development of psychology because he thinks that Tetens refers to psychology when it is necessary. This is probably the most important argument of all of the followers of psychology. The problem in the dispute on psychologism is not to eradicate psychology from the investigation but to set limits on it. “Inclination to psychologism,” as Stumpf writes with reference to Tetens’s science, “only appears in the science on necessity.”¹⁴² These analyses prove — in the eyes of Stumpf — that Tetens was not free from psychologism.

¹³⁷ C. Stumpf: *Anhang*. In: *Ide m: Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie...*, pp. 509—516.

¹³⁸ Rosenkranz was supposed to make it in the final twelfth volume of Kant’s works. See K. Rosenkranz: “Geschichte der Kant’schen Philosophie.” In: *Immanuel Kant’s sämtliche Werke*. Hrsg. von K. Rosenkranz, F.W. Schubert. Teil 12: *Geschichte der Kant’schen Philosophie*. Leipzig, 1842, p. 65.

¹³⁹ See J. Bona Meyer: *Kants Psychologie...*, p. 60.

¹⁴⁰ J.E. Erdmann: *Versuch einer wissenschaftlichen Darstellung der Geschichte der neuern Philosophie*. Bd. 3. Abth. 1: *Die Entwicklung der deutschen Speculation seit Kant. Erster Theil*. Leipzig, 1848, p. 196.

¹⁴¹ See R. Eisler: *Wörterbuch der Philosophischen Begriffe. Historisch-quellenmässig bearbeitet*. Bd. 2: *O—Z*. 2. Aufl. Berlin, 1904, p. 164.

¹⁴² C. Stumpf: *Anhang...*, p. 514.

5

The last text that Leonard Nelson referred to is the postdoctoral dissertation of Max Scheler from 1900 entitled *Die transszendentale und die psychologische Methode* which was published for the second time in 1922.¹⁴³ This text was created in Jena where Scheler presented his postdoctoral dissertation, and when more than twenty years later he was preparing the second edition he considered two purposes. Firstly, to explain some of the questions for since he initially did not know Husserl's *Logical Investigations* and secondly, as a defence against the criticism that he experienced from the representatives of the Marburg School and psychologism.¹⁴⁴ Scheler emphasised the necessity of making investigations concerning the method because — in his opinion — there are no purely philosophical considerations, and moreover, as he noted that “philosophy is characterized by much more intimate dependence on its method than other sciences.”¹⁴⁵ It is true that, as Scheler continues, this problem is considered here as was done by Hans Vaihinger in his comments on Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*,¹⁴⁶ but the problem is not Windelband's motto to unite Neo-Kantianists “to understand Kant is to go beyond him” but his instruction about “how to go beyond him.”¹⁴⁷ It requires a comment because there is still another issue, namely the anti-Kantianist character of Scheler's text. When Wilhelm Windelband in the preface to *Präludien* stated that “to understand Kant is to go beyond him”¹⁴⁸ in the preface to *Präludien* in no way did he mean to break with Kant's thought. The inten-

¹⁴³ M. Scheler: *Die transszendentale und die psychologische Methode. Eine grundsätzliche Erörterung zur philosophischen Methodik*. 2. Aufl. Leipzig, 1922 (further citation from this edition).

¹⁴⁴ See *ibid.*, p. V.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

¹⁴⁶ H. Vaihinger: *Commentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft. Zum hundertjährigen Jubiläum derselben*. Bd. 1—2. Stuttgart, 1881, Stuttgart—Berlin—Leipzig, 1892.

¹⁴⁷ M. Scheler: *Die transszendentale und die psychologische Methode...*, p. 3.

¹⁴⁸ W. Windelband: *Präludien. Aufsätze und Reden zur Einführung in die Philosophie*. Bd. 1. 4. Aufl. Tübingen, 1911, p. IV.

tion of Windelband, the main representative of Neo-Kantianism, was totally different. He did not mean to go beyond him; he rather meant going beyond the literal meaning of his philosophy, which was characteristic of early Neo-Kantianism (so-called Kant's philology) unlike Scheler who was anti-Kantianist which is shown, among others, in the analysed text. It also distinguishes Max Scheler's postdoctoral dissertation, the book that is only occasionally referred to, in contrast to other texts that are analysed here. The author of *Die transszendentale und die psychologische Methode*, unlike other investigators that are analysed, did not protect transcendentalism against Fries's "psychologism" or the other way round — he did not protect Fries's attitude towards criticism of Neo-Kantianists, nor did he recognise the necessity of combining these two attitudes. If one is to assume that Kantianism is the third attitude, situated between the two extremes of modern philosophy, that is, dogmatism and skepticism, then Scheler's standpoint is a Kantianist one. For Scheler, in criticising both the transcendental and psychological methods, wants to establish a new method of philosophy.

Scheler emphasised the philosophical character of analyses concerning the method, which is worth taking into account when we analyse his output. It is more important because Neo-Kantianists seemed to set the tone for methodological considerations, which are nowadays very often called metaphilosophical considerations. Fortunately, Scheler is a thinker of the 20th century and shares the classical opinion that meta-philosophy constitutes an integral part of philosophy. "It is clear," he notes in a footnote, "that every representative of detailed science is right establishing methodical research. But he does it 'as a philosopher'. He is just a philosopher when he does it correctly."¹⁴⁹ His initial remark concerning psychology is equally important, especially in the context of problem being analysed, although Fries's name does not appear here, and it concerns problems with its understanding. "Psychology," Scheler writes, "is once defined as natural science (for example M ü n s t e r b e r g, R i c k e r t, W i n d e l b a n d) and it is denied any meaning for the hu-

¹⁴⁹ M. Scheler: *Die transszendentale und die psychologische Methode...*, p. 9.

manities, and once it is explained as the basis of all the humanities (Wundt).”¹⁵⁰ Such methodological arbitrariness requires decisiveness especially in that, on the one hand this is arbitrariness of detailed sciences, while on the other hand, the sources of such arbitrariness are seen by Scheler in Hegel’s output, which provides evidence that detailed sciences have been absorbed by philosophy. Scheler tackles the problem of the method because he thinks it is essential to get out of the situation in which the detailed sciences argue over the method and philosophy remains indifferent towards it.

Scheler’s text is the most extensive of those pointed out by Nelson, and therefore it has to be treated the shortest way now. The author of *Die transszendentale und die psychologische Methode* was looking for the answer to the question about the method in modern philosophy and states that three features differentiate it from the understanding of the method in the past: independence, exclusivity and creative power.¹⁵¹ Scheler analyses two methods more closely, namely the transcendental and psychological methods. First of all, he analyses the transcendental method taking two assumptions. The first is the conviction that Kant did not use the transcendental method in his philosophy; the second is that the necessity of accepting that the transcendental method is subject to modifications according to the attitudes of different philosophers — the ones who refer to Kant — while Scheler only mentions Cohen, Alois Riehl and Windelband. Scheler thinks that the transcendental method is characterised by:

- a) its reductive character, which means that it has to find arguments to fir existing facts;
- b) a conviction that judgments constitute both a starting point as well as a finishing one (the objective and logical character of this reduction appears in this);
- c) concentrating on the attempt to elaborate a critical criterion of any cognitions (so he shows a claim to be the criticism of cognition);
- d) leading to cognitive principles that are of a formal character;

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 11.

¹⁵¹ See *ibid.*, p. 17.

e) including the principles detected into the notion of scientific judgment.¹⁵²

Scheler then makes a detailed criticism of such an understanding of the transcendental method that he mentioned in his dissertation, which also dealt with the problem of principles.¹⁵³ Later he takes up the problem of the psychological method while he emphasises that he does not mean the psychological method but rather the psychological method in philosophy, so those directions which “more adequately describe psychology as a basic science for all philosophical disciplines or, more radically, they describe it as one scientific philosophy in general.”¹⁵⁴ He associates the psychological method with, among others, such thinkers as: Theodor Lipps (1851—1914), Ernst Laas, William James (1842—1910), Richard Avenarius and Hans Cornelius.

Why does Scheler criticise both the transcendental and psychological methods? Because he thinks that this view — at least at the time when he wrote his postdoctoral dissertation — that like his teacher, Rudolf Eucken (1846—1926) he accepted that the proper method of philosophy is the noologic method.¹⁵⁵ The reverend Jan Krokos — when referring to *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* — stated that these notions were used for the first time by Eucken in his work of 1888.¹⁵⁶ “Therefore science,” Eucken wrote there, “has to put noological method before psychological method to investigate spiritual reality.”¹⁵⁷ However, the problem lies in the fact that already in 1885 Eucken published the *Prolegomena* to the book of 1888 in which he talked about noological proceedings. “So as,” Eucken wrote, “we do not deal with the soul but with the spirit not with ψυχή, but with νοῦς, therefore we are choosing the

¹⁵² See *ibid.*, pp. 37—41. Cf. J. Krokos: *Fenomenologia Edmunda Husserla, Aleksandra Pfändera, Maxa Schelera*. Warszawa, 1992, p. 145. [Edmund Husserl's, Aleksander Pfänder's, Max Scheler's Phenomenology].

¹⁵³ M. Scheler: *Beiträge zur Feststellung der Beziehungen zwischen den logischen und ethischen Prinzipien*. Jena, 1899.

¹⁵⁴ M. Scheler: *Die transszendentale und die psychologische Methode...*, p. 144.

¹⁵⁵ See *ibid.*, p. 179.

¹⁵⁶ See J. Krokos: *Fenomenologia Edmunda Husserla...*, p. 168.

¹⁵⁷ R. Eucken: *Die Einheit des Geisteslebens in Bewusstsein und That der Menschheit*. Leipzig, 1888, p. 451

expression: noological proceedings.”¹⁵⁸ Scheler follows his master and at the end of his book he gives twelve theses that in his opinion characterise philosophy and its method.¹⁵⁹ According to these, neither the transcendental method nor the psychological method is the proper method in philosophy. The noologic method should be the method of philosophy, which he adopted from his master. Reverend Krokos referred to the book of citizen of Katowice Erich Przywara SJ (1889—1972) who treats *Die transszendentale und die psychologische Methode* as the first appearance of “phenomenological” method.¹⁶⁰ Indeed, in 1900 it was still unknown but later an awareness of the distinction between Kantianism and Neo-Kantianism was surely much clearer.

There is still another problem Scheler paid attention to, and that is the understanding of psychology in philosophy and thus defining its place within the frames of transcendentalism because — referring to Hans Vaihinger — he says that “so called ‘transcendental and psychological’ method constitutes substantially a completely necessary element of Kant’s reasoning.”¹⁶¹ What is more, Scheler supports himself here with the authority of Vaihinger who rightly claims that one cannot simply ignore the psychological aspect of cognition, as if it did not exist and as if there was not a problem of psychology in the theory of cognition. Meanwhile, such a view is presented by, for example, Alois Riehl, who criticised both Fries and Herbart, and their philosophy saying that they both constitute of “psychological superstition.”¹⁶² At the beginning of his book Riehl speaks openly: “Critical Kant’s philosophy does not know any psychology.”¹⁶³ It is worth referring to the very Vaihinger

¹⁵⁸ R. Eucken: *Prolegomena zu Forschungen über die Einheit des Geisteslebens in Bewusstsein und That der Menschheit*. Leipzig, 1885, p. 99.

¹⁵⁹ See M. Scheler: *Die transszendentale und die psychologische Methode...*, pp. 179—181. See *Supplement* at the end of the article.

¹⁶⁰ E. Przywara SJ: *Religionsbegründung. Max Scheler — J.H. Newman*. Freiburg im Breisgau, 1923, p. 7. Cf. J. Krokos: *Fenomenologia Edmunda Husserla...*, p. 168.

¹⁶¹ M. Scheler: *Die transszendentale und die psychologische Methode...*, p. 27.

¹⁶² See A. Riehl: *Der philosophische Kriticismus und seine Bedeutung für die positive Wissenschaft*. Bd. 1: *Geschichte und Methode des philosophischen Kriticismus*. Leipzig, 1876, p. 294.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

because essence of the matter is included in his statement. “If,” he writes in *Comments to “Critique of pure reason,”* “purely psychological attitude is a bigger mistake than the one which is purely concerning theory of cognition, psychological side does not have to be ignored at all. [...] The question about possibility is generally a question of c o n d i t i o n s and they are here partially psychological and partially purely concerning the theory.”¹⁶⁴ Of course, it is important that the question about psychology does not reduce itself to the question about empirical psychology. For this one, as Vaihinger notices, was rejected by Kant. Nevertheless, it is a question about “transcendental psychology.” Scheler is aware of this. “What Kant actually rejected is not every psychological and genetic method in general but exclusively empirical and psychological method, which we knew long before *Nouveaux Essais* by Leibniz, and which was specifically presented by L o c k e .”¹⁶⁵

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Leonard Nelson pointed to these briefly analysed texts in his article “Jakob Friedrich Fries und seine jüngsten Kritiker,” which was printed in 1905. Thus Nelson could not have known about some important texts, although it has to be mentioned that he does not systematically refer to the main representative of the German psychologism, Theodor Lipps (1851—1914). Nelson must have known two of the books that had been written by Lipps, namely *Grundtatsachen des Seelenlebens*¹⁶⁶ and *Leitfaden der Psychologie*¹⁶⁷ al-

¹⁶⁴ H. V a i h i n g e r: *Commentar zu Kants “Kritik der reinen Vernunft.” Zum hundertjährigen Jubiläum derselben.* Bd. 1. Stuttgart, 1881, pp. 323—324.

¹⁶⁵ M. S c h e l e r: *Die transszendentale und die psychologische Methode...*, p. 29.

¹⁶⁶ T. L i p p s: *Grundtatsachen des Seelenlebens.* Bonn, 1883.

¹⁶⁷ T. L i p p s: *Leitfaden der Psychologie.* Leipzig, 1903.

though he did not refer to them. Which texts did Nelson not know? Obviously, there is no way to count them all but it is worth pointing out that a few years later two important Neo-Kantianist texts appeared, one which was delivered and printed in 1909 and the second one in the same year. I am referring to the texts of Emil Lask¹⁶⁸ and Heinrich Rickert.¹⁶⁹ These texts are extremely important for understanding Neo-Kantianism and transcendentalism at the Baden School.

Analyses showed that a fundamental problem of transcendental philosophy is its understanding of psychology, which at the same time complicates the whole question, because one should in fact admit that an understanding of psychology constitutes a determinant to the attitudes presented here. It is not the fact that psychology was awarded a place in the system of sciences but the fact that Kant was not innocent here by admitting only empirical psychology. “Metaphysics of thinking nature,” he writes in the final parts of *Critique of Pure Reason*, “is called psychology [...]”¹⁷⁰ The thinker from Königsberg poses a question about the place of psychology in philosophy and he states that it belongs to applied philosophy. “One has to send empirical psychology to the exile from metaphysics.”¹⁷¹ In this way one can — obviously only with a draft-point at some trends in the understanding of psychology. The first one includes all of those thinkers who will began their attempt of looking for its place and justifying of it in relation to empirical psychology. Jakob Friedrich Fries, who proposed that there are three sciences

¹⁶⁸ E. L a s k: *Gibt es einen “Primat der praktischen Vernunft” in der Logik?* In: *Bericht über den III. internationalen Kongreß für Philosophie zu Heidelberg. 1. bis 5. September 1908.* Hrsg. von Th. E l s e n h a n s. Heidelberg, 1909, pp. 671—679, and then in: E. L a s k: *Gesammelte Schriften.* Hrsg. von E. H e r r i g e l. Bd. 1. Tübingen, 1923, pp. 347—356. Polish translation: *Czy istnieje „prymat rozumu praktycznego” w logice?* Trans. A. J. N o r a s. In: *Neokantyzm badeński i marburski. Antologia tekstów...*, pp. 153—159.

¹⁶⁹ H. R i c k e r t: “Zwei Wege der Erkenntnistheorie. Transscendentalpsychologie und Transscendentallogik.” *Kant-Studien* 1909, Bd. 14, p. 169—228. Polish translation: “Dwie drogi teorii poznania. Psychologia transcendentalna i logika transcendentalna.” Trans. T. K u b a l i c a. In: *Neokantyzm badeński i marburski. Antologia tekstów...*, pp. 73—119.

¹⁷⁰ “Die Metaphysik **der denkenden Natur** [emphasis mine — A.J.N.] heißt Psychologie [...]” I. K a n t: *Kritik der reinen Vernunft.* B 874.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, B 876.

that investigate the nature of the man, namely the physiology of human body, mental anthropology and comparative anthropology, belongs in this group. “Psychological anthropology, also called psychology, which explores the nature of human spirit according to inner spiritual self-cognition.”¹⁷² All of those who follow the psychological trend will refer to him. The second trend attracts those thinkers who agree to go beyond this understanding of consciousness, and therefore they try to grasp psychology in a transcendental way, by asking about the conditions of consciousness and not about its actual course. It has been said that Hermann Cohen contrasted consciousness with realisation in order to avoid being suspected of psychologism. Attempts of representatives of both the Marburg School as well those of the Baden School will serve the presentation of transcendental consciousness, free of empiricism. Scheler, who resigned from both the empirical and transcendental understanding of psychology, belong to the third trend — one can say that they are for understanding of consciousness that is characteristic to phenomenology. Descriptive psychology, starting from Franz Brentan, which assumes non-associationistic understanding of the consciousness is characterised by William James, Henry Bergson and Edmund Husserl.

¹⁷² J.F. Fries: *Handbuch der psychischen Anthropologie oder der Lehre von der Natur des menschlichen Geistes*. Bd. 1. Jena, 1820, p. 2.

Supplement: Theses*

1. No absolute constant (except from principles of formal logic) or obvious data [*Datum*] exists from which philosophy may start, either as metaphysics, the theory of cognition, ethics or aesthetics. Neither mathematics axioms or natural history theorems nor “experience” (in the transcendental meaning) or momentary impressions or any intuitive, primary certainty of moral kind¹ can lay justified claims to the value of such data [*Datums*].

2. Philosophy is the science of the spirit. The theory of cognition, ethics and aesthetics are fairly independent and detailed disciplines [*Spezialdisziplinen*] of philosophy.² They tell us how the spirit is really defined (and not how it “should” be defined) because of the immanent aims in its essence, which are real cognition, morally good acting and experiencing beauty. However, basic philosophical science remains superior to these detailed disciplines (substantially, if not also genetically η πρώτη φιλοσοφία), which looks to define the spirit as homogeneous potency (if not even a “simple one”). This basic science might be called “critical metaphysics,” without changing the traditional meaning of this word.

3. The transcendental method cannot cope with the problems of philosophy.

4. The psychological method cannot do it either.

5. The noologic method is an attempt to combine the methods of transcendental philosophy and transcendental psychology, which are partially too little separated in Kant’s view and partially fall into contradiction with each other.

6. Its basic notions are: “the world of work” and “the spiritual life-style” [*Lebensform*].

* Basis of translation: M. Scheleer: *Die transszendentale und die psychologische Methode. Eine grundsätzliche Erörterung zur philosophischen Methodik*. 2. Aufl. Leipzig, 1922, pp. 179—181.

¹ For example in the meaning of J.G. Fichte or (apart from other contrasts) J.F. Herbart.

² Independent “philosophy of nature” if it was meant to be something more than an investigation referring to the cognitive principles and cognitive methods of natural history (it constituted a part of theory of cognition as such), after separating those disciplines from philosophy, which is described as “natural philosophy” by Newton and also today by Englishmen, might also be something that can hardly be separated. The philosophy of religion coincides with our notion of “religion.”

7. No content, while existing and combining claim to importance with indissoluble unity is a “mental fact” which might be scientifically known in the course of introspection.

8. “Importance,” which would not be the “importance” of something real, is impossible to think of.

9. A spiritual lifestyle cannot be understood as a product of the development mental facts.

10. We understand the “world of work” to be the generally recognised causative relations [*Werkzusammenhänge*] of human culture. There is not any obvious data [*Datum*] in itself although it is a “well-established phenomenon.” One should not ask about the logical possibility of definite scientific results of detailed disciplines [*Einzeldisziplinen*], resp. about the possibility of ambiguous “experience” but about the real possibility (at first as an attempt) of a described world of work.

11. Spirit (at the same time its element — the mind), ignoring the principles of formal logic, has been a problematic notion as to its content since the beginning of investigations. It is (ignoring its form of realisation that is originally meant to happen) this x which was enabled by the world of work. As the world of work becomes richer and richer through the course of human history, it is not possible to definitely define the content of the notion of the spirit. It is impossible to systematically introduce *a priori* principles for any “possible experience.” Formal principles have too much content because of the importance of any possible (historical) experience, and taking into account its more energetic uses in a historically defined culture — too little content.

12. The only property of the notion of spirit, which is legally valid for a given state of human life, consists in the fact that owing to it the world of work, which was invented as a result of its causative reduction, is becoming closed, and at the same time, that differently expressed, the spiritual deed that caused the choice of the world of work out of all that “was” [*Gewesenen*] turns out to be identical to this spiritual deed by which the world of work was possible.

Andrzej J. Noras

The debate on the method of philosophy
at the turn of the 19th and the 20th centuries

Keywords: Max Scheler, Leonard Nelson, method, Neo-kantianism, criticism

S u m m a r y

The starting point of the analysis provided in this paper is a discussion of how philosophical method is understood by Leonard Nelson who draws upon the lines of Jakob Friedrich Fries. From this perspective Nelson points out two ways of argumentation, two methods or standpoints: metaphysical and anthropological, objective one and subjective one, critical and genetic, epistemological and psychological or transcendental and psychological. These distinctions find their justification in concepts by philosophers with which Nelson polemicalizes defending Fries' standpoint: Kuno Fischer, Paul Natorp, Wilhelm Windelband, Carl Stumpf and Max Scheler. On the ground of analysis of their conceptions Nelson argues that admittedly they follow Kant, yet Kant — unlike Fries — has not included the psychological aspect of cognition.

Andrzej J. Noras

Der Streit um Methode der Philosophie
um die Wende des 19. zum 20. Jh.

Schlüsselwörter: Max Scheler, Leonard Nelson, Methode, Neukantianismus, Kritizismus

Z u s a m m e n f a s s u n g

Der Ausgangspunkt für diese Erwägungen ist die philosophische Methode von Leonard Nelson, der in seiner Philosophie an Jakob Friedrich Fries anknüpft. Aus dieser Perspektive bestätigt er das Vorhandensein von zwei Hauptmethoden der Argumentation.

Es sind: metaphysische und anthropologische, objektive und subjektive, kritische und genetische, erkenntnistheoretische und psychologische oder transzendente und psychologische Methoden. Solche Unterscheidungen haben ihre Berechtigung in der Lehre von den Philosophen, gegen welche Nelson, den Standpunkt von Fries verteidigend, polemisiert. Zu diesen Denkern gehören: Kuno Fischer, Paul Natorp, Wilhelm Windelband, Carl Stumpf und Max Scheler. Nelson analysiert ihre Lehren angesichts der genannten Methoden und kommt zur Überzeugung, dass sie zwar in die Fußtapfen von Kant treten, doch im Gegensatz zu Fries die psychologische Seite der Erkenntnis nicht in Rücksicht nehmen.