



**You have downloaded a document from
RE-BUS
repository of the University of Silesia in Katowice**

Title: The Importance of Religiosity in the Formation of Populist Attitudes: the Case of Poland

Author: Agnieszka Turska-Kawa, Waldemar Wojtasik

Citation style: Turska-Kawa Agnieszka, Wojtasik Waldemar. (2020). The Importance of Religiosity in the Formation of Populist Attitudes: the Case of Poland. "Journal for the Study of Religions and Ideologies" Vol. 19, iss. 55 (2020), s. 34-52



Uznanie autorstwa - Użycie niekomercyjne - Bez utworów zależnych Polska - Licencja ta zezwala na rozpowszechnianie, przedstawianie i wykonywanie utworu jedynie w celach niekomercyjnych oraz pod warunkiem zachowania go w oryginalnej postaci (nie tworzenia utworów zależnych).



UNIWERSYTET ŚLĄSKI
W KATOWICACH



Biblioteka
Uniwersytetu Śląskiego



Ministerstwo Nauki
i Szkolnictwa Wyższego

AGNIESZKA TURSKA-KAWA

WALDEMAR WOJTASIK

THE IMPORTANCE OF RELIGIOSITY IN THE FORMATION OF
POPULIST ATTITUDES: THE CASE OF POLAND

Agnieszka Turska-Kawa

University of Silesia in Katowice, Institute of Political Science, Katowice, Poland.

Email: agnieszka.turska-kawa@us.edu.pl

Waldemar Wojtasik

University of Silesia in Katowice, Institute of Political Science, Katowice, Poland.

Email: waldemar.wojtasik@us.edu.pl

Abstract: The source literature shows two trends in research on social consequences of religious engagement. On the one hand, researchers argue that religiosity strengthens social competence and the mechanisms of communal activity; on the other hand, many studies show that religious activity reduces the level of social capital. The study presented in this article is an attempt of search for links between religiosity and populist attitudes. The concept of populism used in the study refers to an individual's social functioning and their perception of the sphere of politics. The search for the directions of correlation of populist attitudes and religiosity was based on an attempt to identify types of people with different (but internally homogeneous) relationships between the key variables. We found three homogeneous clusters and named them with reference to the elements prevailing in each one: *religious*, *moderate*, and *populist*. The analysis showed that religiosity is not a moderator of creating populist attitudes in Poland. To the contrary, by co-occurring with lower levels of populism, religiosity may serve as a kind of umbrella protecting people from populist attitudes. Our analysis supports the views of researchers who argue that religiosity is related to the pro-social element.

Key words: religion, religiosity, populism, thin-ideological concept of populism, Catholic Church.

1. The thin ideology of populism

Populism as a social phenomenon can be explained in various ways, both as regards its nature and components and as regards its effects. Sometimes, it is defined by researchers as a response to the crisis of political representation (Taggart 2004, 272-274) or the introduction of policies supported by a larger part by the population but ultimately detrimental to the economic interests of that same majority (Dornbush and Edwards 1991, 11). It may be described as an ideology (Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2017, 16) which opposes the dominant social values and whose assumption is that politics should reflect the general will of the people (Mudde 2004, 543). Especially recently, populism has been severely criticized as the source of anti-democratic tendencies in contemporary politics. Jan-Werner Müller (2017, 22) writes about it: "Populism arises with the introduction of representative democracy; it is its shadow", and Michael Freeden (2017, 6) even points out: "Populism is often seen as an ideology of the dispossessed, and it may indeed recruit them, but it is not articulating their political agenda". Some scholars point to quasi-religious connotations of populism, defining it as "*a political style that sets 'sacred' people against two enemies: 'elites' and 'others'.*" (DeHanas and Shterin 2018, 180). In our study we adopted the 'thin-ideological' concept of populism proposed by Ben Stanley (2008, 99), which includes four basic elements: (1) it assumes the existence of two homogeneous units of analysis: the 'people' and the 'elite' (2) it posits an antagonistic relationship between these two entities; (3) it gives normative priority to the popular will on the basis of the idea of popular sovereignty; (4) it adds a moral dimension to the political relationships identified above, valorising 'the people' as the genuine, authentic subject of politics while denigrating 'the elite' (Stanley and Cześnik 2019, 67-68). Drawing on Stanley's findings, Tim Deegan-Krause and Kevin Haughton (2009, 823) identify 6 universal components of populism: (1) homogeneity of the people; (2) homogeneity of the elite; (3) glorification of the people; (4) denigration of the elite; (5) unmediated leadership (as befits the sovereignty of the people); and (6) rejection of cooperation or compromise (as befits the friend/enemy dichotomy). This approach involves the specificity of populism in Central European countries and at the same time highlights the role of the factors that may lead to the development of populist attitudes, which is especially important in the study of the relationship between religiosity and populism in Poland.

Relationships between religiosity and populist attitudes are important for the general form of political processes in Poland and for many specific solutions affecting social relations. The former results from Poles' declared high level of religiosity as well as the past and present role

of the Catholic Church. Poland is highly homogeneous in social terms, especially as regards the national and religious structure. More than 90% citizens declare they are Polish and Roman Catholics (Turska-Kawa and Wojtasik 2017a, 192). This structure determines both the level and the direction of citizens' political engagement. For example, it has some impact on the content of political programs and the major subjects of election campaigns (i.e., the issues of compulsory religion lessons at school, public rights of people living in partnerships, acceptability of euthanasia and abortion etc.). Interestingly, the processes of system transformation had some consequences for the Catholic Church in Poland: the Polish society opened to the tendencies occurring in Western countries, including laicization and secularization (Norris and Inglehart 2011, 14). This resulted in some cracks in the previously coherent religious structure of Polish Catholics, gradually leading to the stratification of social and political attitudes (Turska-Kawa and Wojtasik 2017b, 61-67).

Regarding the role of religion in the processes of social relations development, the most important factor seems to be the character of Polish religiosity, which has the popular nature and involves the fusion of sacred and profane spheres in everyday life. The popular character means that it is dominated by non-liturgical elements. Popular religiosity involves anything that used to be called paraliturgy in classic theology. In other words, popular religiosity means religious feelings and behaviors regarding God or saints represented by Christians living in a certain culture (Prusowski 2009 184). Popular religiosity, although frequently considered to be immature, gives the person something meaningful and helps form their identity. In Poland, its fundamental features are the mass character (intensity of religious practices) and ceremonial character (observance of holidays and customs). Another expression of popular religiosity is the fact that it is closely connected with local customs and local tradition. It is not individualized but set in a particular community.

The aim of this article is to explore the relationship between religiosity and populist attitudes in Poland. The religious context of populism is determined by its specificity, especially in the situation in which some populist movements directly refer to religious values (Van Kessel 2016, 68), allowing to differentiate between what is "ours and good" and "foreign and bad" (Roy 2016, 186). Moreover, some religious institutions are able to mobilize the potential of populist movements (O'Brien 2015, 344) or even organize such activities themselves (Wysocka 2008, 65). In the study, religiosity will be defined as the level of religious practices and engagement (the frequency of prayers, participation in church services or living in accordance with religious rules). Populism will be conceptualized on the basis of dimensions of populism identified by Stanley and its components proposed by Deegan-Krause and Haughton. They were operationalized using two variables: *anti-elitism* and *the primacy of people's will*. Anti-elitism involves ordinary people's antagonistic attitude

to elites. In social awareness elites are only attributed particular intentions and instrumental use of people for their own interests. The primacy of people's will is understood as the attitude that attributes the priority to people's expectations in conflict with social or state interest. It assumes that socially significant choices should be made with consideration of social expectations, which differ from the interests of the authorities, political elites or international institutions. Due to the specificity of Polish religiosity, the analysis will involve the identification of types of people with different relationships between populist attitudes and religiosity, which can affect their socio-political functioning.

2. Populism in Poland

Researchers point out that populism in Central European countries is specific in comparison to consolidated democracies (Enyedi 2016, 11-13). It results from different historical, cultural and social references. The former ones are connected with the period of system transformation and a relatively shorter time of institutionalization of democratic processes (as compared to Western European countries). Their effect is e.g., the specific anti-establishment populism, directed against post-communist political elites (Učeň 2007, 58). In the case of cultural determinants, it is mostly the low level of political socialization of the members of the society that were born and raised in the authoritarian regime before 1989. Filip Kostelka (2014, 952) points to the very role of democratic change in the character of political socialization of societies in post-communist countries as compared to Western Europe. The specificity of social references involves the relative weakness of civic society and the low level of social capital (Rupnik 2016, 82). The fact that the civic society (which could canalize effectively the protest movements) is poorly established may be a factor supporting the generation of populist attitudes and tendencies in the society. These factors may contribute to the occurrence of specific sources of populism in countries such as Poland, where the classic patterns of populism are not relevant.

The process of actual party institutionalization of populism, understood as political parties gaining political relevance as a result of exceeding the threshold of parliamentary representation, began with the perspective of Poland's accession to the European Union. Opposing the plans of integration was the basic factor of the electoral success of Samoobrona [*Self-Defence*] and Liga Polskich Rodzin [*the League of Polish Families*] (Jasiewicz 2008, 9). These two parties overturned the logic of the post-communist division, which determined the genetic sources of parliamentary success of political parties in Poland at the end the 20th century. Not only did they only obtain parliamentary representation but after the next election (2005), they formed the cabinet together with

Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (PiS) [*Law and Justice*]. Apart from the subsequent early election in 2007, the following elections were successful for populist parties. The programs of those parties focused on the problems of social progressivism (Ruch Palikota [*Palikot Movement*] in 2011) or the criticism of political establishment (Kukiz'15 in 2015). Although the sources of their populism varied, the common characteristic of the parties was personalized leadership, reflected i.a., in using the name of the leader in the party names.

Currently, one of the important aspects of populism in Poland is the role of religious institutions in creating political competition processes. It results from two reasons. The first one is a high level of Poles' declared religiosity and a high level of homogeneity of that religiosity. The other reason is determined by political functions of the Catholic Church: since the time of communism, it has been influencing politics and political parties. But in the 21st century, this involvement became institutionalized in the form of media connected with the Redemptorist priest Tadeusz Rydzyk. He began his activity with establishing the radio station "Radio Maryja", later supplemented with the TV station "Trwam", the newspaper "Nasz Dziennik" and a higher school. The program of priest Rydzyk's media is a mix of populism directed at excluded social groups, criticism of political elites and arousing the sense of community based on strong nationalism. He supports particular politicians, from their media promotion up to providing support in election campaigns (Wysocka 2009). The example of Radio Maryja and the related media shows that the religious factor is a significant factor of creating populist tendencies in Polish politics with sources in religion.

3. Research model

On the one hand, researchers prove that religious engagement strengthens social and communal competence. The religious factor plays an important role in linking religious axiology with social values (Leege 1993, 13) and in socialization functions of religious institutions (Greenberg 2000: 386; Jones-Correa and Leal 2001: 756). Research results show that religion mobilizes people to engage in social and political activity, determining their engagement and ways of its expression (Musick and Wilson 2008, 279; Aghazadeh and Mahmoudoghli 2017, 4). In the USA, religiosity and regular participation in church services correlated with higher indices of voter turnout (Wuthnow 2003, 429), political interests, voluntary membership in organizations (Ruiter and DeGraaf 2006, 197), or voluntary and charity activity (Greeley 2001, 146; Ruiter and DeGraff 2006, 202). In addition, active participation in church community contributed to the improvement of individual social competence, communication and organizational skills (Putnam and Campbell 2012, 137). A Canadian study,

proves stronger relations between religiosity and regular participation in church services and activity in voluntary organizations, charity work and voluntary work (Reed and Selbee 2000, 582; Bowen 2004, 71). In Poland research carried out as part of the General Polish Electoral Study quite consistently shows positive relationships between participation in religious practices and the likelihood of taking part in elections (Cześnik 2009, 26).

The opposite view stresses the possibility that religious activity may reduce the level of social openness (Wuthenow 1999, 339), the competitive character of citizens' trust in their own religious group at the expense of general social capital (Daniels and der Ruhr 2010, 174; Storm 2014, 16), or even the fact that religious activity lowers citizens' knowledge and social competence (Scheufele, Nisbet and Brossard 2003, 315). Two kinds of relationship can be identified within the demobilization role of religion for social participation (Turska-Kawa and Wojtasik 2014: 16). First, the sphere of religion will always be competitive to social activity, including political activity, and as a result, it will shift religious individuals' interest towards religious issues. This will happen because of a limited amount of resources the citizens can allocate to their activity, and engagement in the life of the Church will reduce the possibility of activity on other planes of social activity (Wuthnow 2003, 419). In addition, high trust in religious institutions may lower trust in other institutions, and thus also the general social capital (Putnam and Campbell 2012, 118). The other direction of the analysis refers to the level of individuals' religious engagement, on its basis formulating conclusions about a negative influence of extreme engagement on social participation. On the one hand, this results from the relationship between extreme religious engagement and the frequency of participating in religious rites, and on the other hand, from the negative influence of membership in Church institutions on engaging in secular institutions activity (Scheufele, Nisbet and Brossard 2003: 318-319). Dietram A. Scheufele, Matthew C. Nisbet and Dominique Brossard (Ibidem: 319) point out that strong religious engagement co-occurs with lower political competence and sense of efficacy in this area.

Research also shows that religiosity may generate contradictory attitudes at the same time. On the one hand, it generates pro-social attitudes (Norenzayan and Shariff 2008, 59; Preston, Salomon and Ritter 2013, 164), mainly directed at the members of one's own religious group and aggressive towards "outgroups", especially those that really or symbolically threaten religious and moral values (Batson, Floyd, Meyer and Winner 1999, 451). At the same time, some data demonstrates that in the case of negative attitudes towards out groups religion can be a factor preventing actual aggression by referring to values such as e.g., the need of self-control regarding negative emotions or impulsive acts (McCullough and Willoughby 2009, 78).

Paris Aslanidis (2018, 5) points to religion (beside skin pigment, language, ethnicity and sex) as a visible social marker that can grow into a politically relevant social identity. Being so vivid, such an identity may become an easier object of political mobilization and coexist with populist attitudes. Taking into consideration the above-mentioned directions of studies on the influence of religiosity on individuals' social and political attitudes described in literature, the authors intend to verify the relationships between religiosity and the potential of political populism in Poland. We may conjecture that, on the one hand, the level of religiosity can be a factor that prevents the development of populist attitudes in the political sphere by strengthening social bonds, stability of values and stabilization of party identification. What is more, the engagement and interest in the public sphere displayed by people with a high level of religiosity, which have been diagnosed in different studies, may generate the desire to search for information and prevent one from accepting simple messages. The other potential viewpoint stresses the possibility of reducing the level of broadly understood social openness by religious engagement. This means that religion can strengthen populist attitudes based on individual's weakness and close-minded attitude. Then, individual political identities can have a labile character and lead to the instability of both party entities and the whole party system. One of the political consequences of this situation can be greater attractiveness of populism as a factor determining political engagement. If both views are probable, it is an interesting research task to show the context factors that may contribute to the inclusive or exclusive character of religion's influence.

The aim of the presented study is to identify types of people with different relationships between religiosity and populist attitudes. We are interested in the schemes of correlation of religiosity and populist attitudes, the direction and strength of these relationships. Consequently, we want to indirectly find the answer to the question whether religiosity is a factor that tends to rationalize and protect from populism or whether it is just the opposite: the religiosity declared by Poles is a factor that stimulates populist attitudes.

4. Methods

The study was carried out between December 2018 and February 2019 as part of a nationwide research project "Political Preferences: Attitudes, Identifications, Behaviors". The nationwide sample was selected using quota stratified sampling. Distinct strata were voivodeships (N=16), and quota control referred to variables such as sex, age and place of residence (town or village). The research team was made up of 16 trained coordinators of voivodeship studies, who were responsible for executing

the study in their region. The survey questionnaire method was used in the research.

The sample included 950 persons: 501 (52.7%) women and 449 (47.3%) men. The youngest people (up to 24 years of age) were the smallest group (N=103; 10.8%), whereas the largest group (N=191; 20.1%) was made up of the oldest respondents, 65+. The other age groups were, respectively: 25-34 (N=179; 18.8%), 35-44 (N=178; 18.7%), 45-54 (N=148; 15.6%) and 55-64 (N=151; 15.9%). 361 participants were rural residents (38.0%). Regarding towns, the groups included: towns up to 20 thousand residents (N=100; 10.5%), 20-100 thousand residents (N=168; 17.7%), 100-200 thousand residents (N=121; 12.7%) and more than 200 thousand residents (N=200; 21.1%).

The research model involves three variables. The first one is *religiosity*. The respondents were asked to express their opinions on four statements making the indicator: the regularity of participation in religious practices, the depth of faith, the frequency of prayer, and the observance of religious rules. They could use a five-point cafeteria of responses (definitely not, rather not, hard to say, rather yes, definitely yes). The reliability of the scale determined with Cronbach's alpha coefficient was 0.76. The other two variables – indicators of populist attitudes – were conceptualized on the basis of the theoretical model by Ben Stanley. *Anti-elitism* was based on four statements: perceiving politics as an instrument of dominance of a minority over the majority, the desire of power as the basic motivation of engaging in politics, the possibility of revoking all politicians elected in universal elections through the recall procedure, and the declared level of trust in the most important politicians. The reliability of the scale was 0.67. *The primacy of people's will* was diagnosed on the basis of respondents' opinions on five statements: acceptability of making compromises with people with different views, supporting broad public constitutions and the binding character of their results, justification of politicians' mediation in political decision-making, the attitude to a referendum as a collective way of decision-making, and the necessity to make any changes to the constitution by way of referendum. The reliability of the scale was 0.73. In the case of statements expressing populism, the respondents could also use a five-point cafeteria (I strongly disagree, I disagree, hard to say, I agree, I strongly agree).


5. Results

In the first stage, we applied the exploratory procedure of two-step grouping, whose aim was to identify natural clusters based on the three analyzed variables. The analysis produced three internally homogeneous clusters, gathering 334, 380 and 236 observations, respectively. The values of the analyzed variables converted into standard ten scale in each cluster are shown in table.


Table 1. Standard ten values of the identified clusters.

	1st cluster	2nd cluster	3rd cluster
Religiosity	7.5	4.3	4.8
Primacy of people's will	5.0	4.6	7.6
Anti-elitism	5.3	4.3	7.7


Then, we carried out qualitative analysis of cluster content with reference to individual variables, which allowed to attribute relevant names to each group of people. The first cluster gathers individuals with higher than average level of religiosity and mean values of *anti-elitism* and the *primacy of people's will*. These are people who display high indices of religious engagement, both in the sphere of regular religious practices (including prayer) and internal faith or living in accordance with the rules proposed by the religion. In addition, they manifest moderate populist tendencies in their attitudes. Due to the dominant factor, this group was called *religious*.

Chart 1. Distribution of religiosity of people from cluster 1 (religious).

The second cluster gathers people with average levels of all variables: *religiosity*, *primacy of people's will* and *anti-elitism*. The level of the studied variables in this group is slightly below the average, not indicating the direction of the relationship between the average level of religiosity with variables referring to the level of populism. Neither the religious factor nor the populist factor is a significant point of reference for them in defining social reality. The lack of a clear factor allows us to call this group *moderate*.

Chart 2. Distribution of religiosity of people from cluster 2 (moderate).

The third cluster includes people with an average level of *religiosity* and higher than average values of *anti-elitism* and the *primacy of people's will*. This cluster represents people with the most populist attitudes, opting for the primacy of the community and against the hierarchical model of the social structure. Reference to two clear factors results in the name *populist*.

Chart 3. Distribution of religiosity of individuals from cluster 3 (populist).

The three identified types differ significantly in terms of socio-demographic variables: sex ($H = 11.423$; $df = 2$; $p = 0.003$), education level ($H = 67.581$; $df = 2$; $p < 0.001$), age ($H = 23.549$; $df = 2$; $p < 0.001$), place of residence ($H = 24.782$; $df = 2$; $p < 0.001$) and financial standing ($H = 23.450$;

df = 2; $p < 0.001$). Cluster 1 includes significantly more women than cluster 2 ($U=55,520$; $p=0.001$) and 3 ($U=36,019$; $p=0.04$). The second cluster includes more people with a higher level of education than cluster 1 ($U=52,786$; $p<0.001$) and 3 ($U=28,493$; $p<0.001$). Cluster 1 includes significantly more elderly people than cluster 2 ($U=50,543$; $p<0.001$) and 3 ($U=33,663$; $p=0.003$). Cluster 2 includes more people from bigger towns than cluster 1 ($U=50,284$; $p<0.001$) and 3 ($U=39,666$; $p=0.013$). Better financial standing is declared by people representing type 2 than type 3 ($U=36,886$; $p<0.001$) and 1 ($U=52,989$; $p<0.001$).

6. Discussion and Conclusion

On the basis of source literature and previous studies, we made the thesis that there are some relationships between populism and religiosity. The search for the directions of correlation of populism and religiosity was based on an attempt to identify types of people with different (but internally homogeneous) relationships between the variables. During the research procedure, we identified three coherent clusters: *religious*, *moderate*, and *populist*. They were given names referring to the dominant level of the analyzed variables. The *religious* ones have a higher than average level of religiosity and moderate levels of populism. The *moderate* ones display average values of all the variables. The *populist* ones have higher than average levels of populism and an average level of religiosity.

The presented cluster analysis shows that religiosity is not a factor of creating populist attitudes in Poland. In the group of people with the highest declared religiosity we did not find a tendency for the correlation of components characteristic of populist political attitudes. This means that religious people significantly less often display the tendency to antagonize the relationships between ordinary people and elites. They do not attribute particular interests to the latter group. Besides, they do not manifest a clear priority of the needs of average people versus the views of social and political elites. Actually, the presented study suggests an opposite tendency: religiosity coexisting with lower levels of populism may serve as a kind of umbrella protecting from populist attitudes. Our analysis will rather support the views of those researchers who argue that religiosity is connected with prosocial attitudes, behaviors oriented at the good of other people, or values and emotions that promote such behaviors (e.g., Norenzayan and Shariff 2008, 61; Preston, Salomon and Ritter 2013, 175).

Socio-demographic references of the identified types are interesting. Among the *religious* ones, women and elderly people prevail. They are also more often the inhabitants of villages or small towns than big agglomerations. Such characteristics of the religious group agree with the previous findings in this regard. This may result from the generally longer

lifespan of women in Poland and their greater declared religiosity and more frequent participation in religious practices. This finding may also have its source in the sector influence of secularization tendencies, which have a greater impact on people who are less educated and live out of big cities.

The *moderate* ones display significantly highest level of education, live in bigger towns and have better financial standing. These characteristics refer to people with higher ambitions, focusing on the achievement of their own life goals and thus being less exposed to the sphere of politics. The lack of stronger political stimulation may lead to them displaying average values of both, the components of religiosity and the populist attitude. The former ones may be connected with stronger influence of secularization processes than in the group of *religious* ones, corresponding to residing in bigger towns and higher level of education. Average values of components of the populist attitude may be connected with the relatively higher income level. In that situation, individuals do not have the strong need of political redistribution of income, associated with populist postulates to transfer income from the rich to the poor.

The *populist* ones are people with lower levels of education, more often middle-aged, with medium income. In comparison to the group of moderate ones (who have similar values of religiosity), this may indicate that the determinants creating populist attitudes are socio-economic factors, not religiosity. Better education and higher income seem to protect people from populist attitudes. This conclusion is justified because it agrees with the observed tendencies of supporting politicians and populist movements by people who have lower material resources and civic competence. In this approach, populism is a mechanism of generating demands by people it represents (DeHanas and Shterin 2018, 183).

The obtained results may also be explained by the relationship between religiosity and the form of Polish party system, in which the two dominant political parties, PiS and Platforma Obywatelska (PO) [Civic Platform], refer to Christian values while being mainstream parties, not based on populist catchphrases. This division makes a special type of common ground: an agonistic common ground (Stavrakakis 2018, 49). Within it, there exist functional divisions, canalizing radical and populist political movements in democratic processes. In the latest parliamentary election, PO and PiS generated a total of over 2/3 support, which shows a high level of voters' concentration on parties referring to the traditional, conservative values. This strong party polarization is a barrier for radical parties, for which it is hard to force their postulates and gain social support. It may also be a shield protecting Polish politics from populist movements. Both parties fall into the category of classical Christian/democratic formations from the right side of the left-right continuum. Significant differences between them occur in terms of

economic postulates: PO is a free market party, while PiS postulates a more redistributive role of the state. Only this latter element can justify analyzing a part of the political program of PiS in categories of populist references. The respect for the basic principles of the social teaching of the Catholic Church, declared by the two biggest political parties, may satisfy the social need of exposing religious values in the sphere of politics displayed by at least some supporters of both parties. This factor may also reduce the citizens' need to engage in populist movements.

Another religious factor that may protect Polish politics from populism is the popular character of Polish religiosity. The concept of popular religiosity refers to the occurrence of its two zones: central and subsidiary. The former includes religious traditions, symbols, values, and beliefs. Subsidiary zone is connected with popular religiosity. It is made up of beliefs which people use to make their lives meaningful (Lippy 1994, 10). The popular character of religion also involves celebrating religiosity through participation in collective practices being a manifestation of their faith and generating the sense of community with other people who refer to similar values (Sutcliffe 2013, 20). Thanks to this type of religiosity, people can gain the meaning of their lives but also explain their individual significance through the prism of collective interest of their fellow believers. The described mechanism can protect one from exposing extremism and radicalism, especially if their basis is postulates opposite to the principles of the practiced religion and if it required individuals to manifest this opposite attitude publicly. The latter reference may refer to the concept of competition of activity resulting from the expressions of practicing religion and other social activities. The moderation function of religious practices also plays a role, as other kinds of engagement are evaluated from the perspective of those practices. Popular religiosity provides the individual a kind of cognitive background, allowing to combine the upheld religious rules with the current sphere of politics. Yet, to do so, they must be at least partially coincident. Populism, which usually contests the traditional rules and the developed values, will not be attractive for religious people either cognitively or socially. Thus, the strong roots of Christianity in the Polish society and its influence on the sphere of political choices of religiously professed people may explain why religiosity protects from populism.

Another factor connected with religiosity that can lead to the reduction of populist perspectives in Polish politics is the Catholic Church functioning in the institutional format, which assumes a close hierarchy of the structure. Believers who are religiously socialized within such a structure form their attitude on the basis of observing the principles of their religion and their priests (Nooney and Woodrum 2002, 361-363). Thus, they can use the acquired patterns of social activity in their political attributions and choices. Populism as a political attitude is at least partially based on resistance to someone or something, and the vast

majority of religious Poles are Catholics. Both in religious rules and in the ways of action, the Catholic Church refers to dialogue, compromise and creating non-confrontational attitudes. Therefore, it is more difficult for people with higher religiosity level to engage in activities that are contrary to their attitude in the religious sphere. They may prefer to use the patterns associated with religious engagement, and these support community attitudes and activities oriented at the common good. Obviously, populist postulates can also stress community, but their confrontational character will contradict the Christian search for solutions based on compromise.

Significantly, in the presented study religiosity was not only approached as participation in religious services. Instead, we tried to refer to individuals' real spiritual engagement, which cannot be externally evaluated: the frequency of prayers or living in accordance with the upheld religious values. It is important for our interpretation, because religiosity understood this way is similar in character to the described components of the populist attitude. The latter is defined, not on the basis of the individual's self-declaration of political attitude, but as a set of views and beliefs, just like in the case of our approach to religiosity. This means that both studied phenomena are coherent and the analyses and conclusions can be applied. Whereas the cited literature proves the relationship between the Catholic Church and populist movements in Poland (Wysocka 2009; Stanley and Czeński 2018, 82), so far there have been no studies to explore the relationships between religiosity as a social attitude and populist attitudes of Poles. Our findings allow us to create a dichotomous model of the relationship between religion and populism as a social attitude in Poland. In one approach, the most important is the relationship between the institutional dimension of religion and populist political movements. In the other one, the individualized dimension of religion in the form of religiosity prevents the creation of populist attitudes.

Annex:

Quantitative and percentage-wise distribution of respondents' sociodemographic characteristics

	1 cluster		2 cluster		3 cluster	
	number	percent	number	percent	number	percent
Sex						
Woman	200	59.9	180	47.4	121	51.3
Male	134	40.1	200	52.6	115	48.7
Education						
no education	3	.9	5	1.3	6	2.6
elementary/lower secondary	18	5.4	4	1.1	19	8.1
vocational	48	14.4	23	6.1	56	23.7

secondary/post-secondary	131	39.2	150	39.5	94	39.8
higher	134	40.1	198	52.1	61	25.8
Age						
18-24.	28	8.4	58	15.3	17	7.2
25-34.	49	14.7	68	17.9	62	26.3
35-44.	51	15.3	81	21.3	46	19.5
45-54.	58	17.4	60	15.8	30	12.7
55-64.	58	17.4	57	15.0	36	15.3
over 65	90	26.9	56	14.7	45	19.1
Place of residence						
village	153	45.8	113	29.7	95	40.3
town up to 20 thousand residents	42	12.6	38	10.0	20	8.5
town 20-100 thousand residents	49	14.7	78	20.5	41	17.4
town 100-200 thousand residents	38	11.4	50	13.2	33	14.0
town over 200 thousand residents	52	15.6	101	26.6	47	19.9
Financial standing						
I'm very poor – I don't have enough money even to satisfy my basic needs	4	1.2	2	.5	6	2.5
I live frugally – I need to be very careful with money every day	42	12.6	24	6.3	36	15.3
I'm medium wealthy – I have enough to satisfy my basic needs but I have to save for more expensive purchases	176	52.7	174	45.8	112	47.5
I live comfortably – I can afford a lot without saving for it	93	27.8	150	39.5	69	29.2
I live very comfortably – I can buy whatever I want	19	5.7	30	7.9	13	5.5

References

- Aghazadeh, Jafar and Reza Mahmoudoghli. 2017. "Religion and political engagement.", *Cogent Social Sciences* 3 no. 1: 1-8.
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/23311886.2017.1368109>
- Aslanidis, Paris. 2018. "The Social Psychology of Populism." Draft paper, prepared for ASU Populism Workshop,
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/322702926_The_Social_Psychology_of_Populism
- Batson, Daniel C., Randy B. Floyd, Julie M. Meyer, Alana L. Winner. 1999. "And Who is My Neighbor?: Intrinsic Religion as a Source of Universal Compassion." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 384: 445-57. <http://dx.doi.org/10.2307/1387605>
- Bowen, Kurt. 2004. *Christians in a secular world: The Canadian experience*. Montreal: McGill-Queen's Press-MQUP.
- Czeńnik, Mikołaj. 2009. *Partycypacja wyborcza Polaków*. Warszawa: Instytut Spraw Publicznych.
- Daniels, Joseph P., and Marc Von Der Ruhr. 2010. "Trust in others: Does religion matter?." *Review of Social Economy* 68 no. 2: 163-186.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/00346760902968447>
- Deegan-Krause, Kevin, and Tim Haughton. 2009. "Toward a more useful conceptualization of populism: Types and degrees of populist appeals in the case of Slovakia." *Politics & Policy* 37 no. 4: 821-841. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2009.00200.x>
- DeHanas Daniel Nilsson and Marat Shterin. 2018. "Religion and the rise of populism." *Religion, State and Society* 46 no. 3: 177-185.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2018.1502911>
- Dornbush, Rudiger, and Sebastian Edwards. 1991. "The Macroeconomics of Populism." In *The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America*, edited by Rudiger Dornbush, and Sebastian Edwards, 7-14. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Enyedi, Zsolt. 2016. "Paternalist populism and illiberal elitism in Central Europe." *Journal of Political Ideologies* 21 no. 1: 9-25.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2016.1105402>
- Freedon, Michael. 2017. "After the Brexit referendum: revisiting populism as an ideology." *Journal of Political Ideologies* 22 no. 1: 1-11.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/13569317.2016.1260813>
- Greeley, Andrew. 2000. *The Catholic Imagination*. Berkeley, University of California Press.
- Greenberg, Anna. 2000. "The Church and the Revitalization of Politics and the Community". *Political Science Quarterly* 115 no. 3: 377-394.
<https://www.jstor.org/stable/2658124>
- Jasiewicz, Krzysztof. 2008. "The new populism in Poland: The usual suspects?" *Problems of Post-communism* 55 no. 3: 7-25.
<https://doi.org/10.2753/PPC1075-8216550302>

- Jones-Correa, Michael A., and David L. Leal. 2001. "Political participation: Does religion matter?." *Political Research Quarterly* 54 no 4: 751-770.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/106591290105400404>
- Kostelka, Filip. 2014. "The state of political participation in post-communist democracies: Low but surprisingly little biased citizen engagement." *Europe-Asia Studies* 66 no.6: 945-968. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2014.905386>
- Leege, David C. 1993. "Religion and politics in theoretical perspective." In *Rediscovering the religious factor in American politics*, edited by David C. Leege, Lyman A. Kellstedt, 3-25. New York: M.E. Sharpe.
- Lippy, Charles H. 1994. *Being religious, American style: A history of popular religiosity in the United States*. Westport – London: Greenwood Publishing Group.
- McCullough, Michael E., and Brian L.B. Willoughby. 2009. "Religion, self-regulation, and self-control: Associations, explanations, and implications." *Psychological bulletin* 135 no. 1: 69-93.
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0014213>
- Mudde, Cas, and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser. 2017. *Populism: A very short introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Mudde, Cas. 2004. "The populist zeitgeist." *Government and opposition* 39 no. 4: 541-563. <https://ams.hi.is/wp-content/uploads/old/Jungar%20-%20The%20Populist%20Zeitgeist.pdf>
- Müller, Jan-Werner. 2017. *What is populism?*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Musick, Marc A., and John Wilson. 2007. *Volunteers: A social profile*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Nooney, Jennifer, and Eric Woodrum. 2002. "Religious coping and church-based social support as predictors of mental health outcomes: Testing a conceptual model." *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion* 41 no 2: 359-368.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-5906.00122>
- Norenzayan, Ara, and Azim F. Shariff. 2008. "The origin and evolution of religious prosociality." *Science* 322. No. 5898: 58-62. DOI: 10.1126/science.1158757
- Norris, Pippa, and Roland Inglehart. 2011. *Sacred and secular: Religion and politics worldwide*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- O'Brien, Thomas. 2015. "Populism, protest and democracy in the twenty-first century." *Contemporary Social Science* 10 no. 4: 337-348.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/21582041.2016.1237438>
- Preston, Jesse Lee, Erika Salomon, and Ryan S. Ritter. 2013. "Religious prosociality: Personal, cognitive, and social factors." In *Religion, personality, and social behavior*, edited by Vassilis Saroglou, 159-179. New York: Psychology Press.
- Prusowski, Wojciech. 2009. "Najbardziej charakterystyczne cechy polskiej religijności - analiza pastoralna." *Warszawskie Studia Pastoralne* 7: 182-201.
http://mazowsze.hist.pl/27/Warszawskie_Studia_Pastoralne/623/2008/22647/
- Putnam, Robert D., and David E. Campbell. 2012. *American grace: How religion divides and unites us*. New York: Simon and Schuster.

- Reed, Paul B., and L. Kevin Selbee. 2000. "Distinguishing characteristics of active volunteers in Canada." *Nonprofit and voluntary sector quarterly* 29 no. 4: 571-592. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764000294006>
- Roy, Olivier. 2016. "Beyond Populism: The Conservative Right, the Courts, the Churches and the Concept of a Christian Europe." In *Saving the People: How Populists Hijack Religion*, edited by Marzouki, Nadia, Duncan McDonnell, and Olivier Roy, 185-202. London: Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd.
- Ruiter, Stijn, and Nan Dirk De Graaf. 2006. "National context, religiosity, and volunteering: Results from 53 countries." *American Sociological Review* 71 no. 2: 191-210. <https://doi.org/10.1177/000312240607100202>
- Rupnik, Jacques. 2016. "Surging illiberalism in the east." *Journal of Democracy* 27 no.4: 77-87. <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/633754/summary>
- Scheufele, Dietram A., Matthew C. Nisbet, and Dominique Brossard. 2003. "Pathways to political participation? Religion, communication contexts, and mass media." *International Journal of Public Opinion Research* 15 no. 3: 300-324. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ijpor/15.3.300>
- Stanley, Ben, and Mikołaj Cześnik. 2018. "Populism in Poland." In *Populism Around the World*, edited by Daniel Stockemer, 67-87. Cham: Springer.
- Stanley, Ben. 2008. "The thin ideology of populism." *Journal of Political Ideologies* 13 no. 1: 95-110. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13569310701822289>
- Stavrakakis, Yannis. 2018. "Paradoxes of polarization: Democracy's inherent division and the (anti-) populist challenge." *American Behavioral Scientist* 62 no. 1: 43-58. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0002764218756924>
- Storm, Ingrid. 2014. "Civic engagement in Britain: The role of Religion and inclusive values." *European Sociological Review* 31 no. 1: 14-29.
- Sutcliffe, Steven J. 2013. "New Age, world religions and elementary forms." In *New Age Spirituality: Rethinking Religion*, edited by Steven J. Sutcliffe and Ingvild S. Gilhus, 17-34. New York: Acumen.
- Taggart, Paul. 2004. "Populism and representative politics in contemporary Europe." *Journal of political ideologies* 9, no 3: 269-288. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1356931042000263528>
- Turska-Kawa, Agnieszka and Waldemar Wojtasik. 2014. "Religiosity and electoral participation : the case of Poland." *Studia Methodologica* 38: 6-23.
- Turska-Kawa, Agnieszka, and Waldemar Wojtasik. 2017a. "'Directiveness' as a Predictor of Religious Attitudes." *Polish Sociological Review* 198 no. 2: 189-201. <http://polish-sociological-review.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/PSR198-04.pdf>
- Turska-Kawa, Agnieszka, and Waldemar Wojtasik. 2017b. "Diversity of Roman Catholics in Poland and Their Socio-Institutional Preferences." *Religio* 25 no.1: 43-68. <http://hdl.handle.net/11222.digilib/137284>

Učeň, Peter. 2007. "Parties, populism, and anti-establishment politics in East Central Europe." *SAIS Review of International Affairs* 27 no. 1: 49-62. <https://muse.jhu.edu/article/212485/summary>

Van Kessel, Stijn. 2016. "Using Faith to Exclude: The Role of Religion in Dutch Populism". In *Saving the People: How Populists Hijack Religion*, edited by Marzouki, Nadia, Duncan McDonnell, and Olivier Roy, 61-77. London: Hurst & Co Publishers Ltd.

Wuthnow, Robert. 1999. "Mobilizing civic engagement: The changing impact of religious involvement". In *Civic engagement in American democracy*, edited by Theda Skocpol and Morris P. Fiorina, 331-336. Washington: Brookings Institution Press/Russell Sage Foundation.

Wuthnow, Robert. 2003. "Overcoming Status Distinctions? Religious Involvement, Social Class, Race and Ethnicity in Friendship Patterns." *Sociology of Religion* 64 no. 4: 423-442. <https://doi.org/10.2307/3712334>

Wysocka, Olga. 2008. "Populizm i Radio Maryja." *Znak* 640 no.9: 61-74.

Wysocka, Olga. 2009. "Populism in Poland: In/visible Exclusion." In *In/visibility: Perspectives on Inclusion and Exclusion*, edited by L. Freeman. Vienna: IWM Junior Visiting Fellows' Conferences, Vol. 26. <https://www.iwm.at/publications/5-junior-visiting-fellows-conferences/vol-xxvi/populism-in-poland/>