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Emotional Culture as a Context of Education: Why Emotional Culture is Important for Pedagogy?

ABSTRACT

In the article, I search for the connection between emotions culture and education by examining the affective reproduction of culture. Building on the tradition of Émile Durkheim, in the works by Arlie Russell Hochschild and Steven Gordon the concept of emotional culture is (re)constructed. Emotional culture is understood as the specific complex of emotion vocabularies, feeling rules, and beliefs about emotions. Emotions and their meaning provide a socio-psychological mechanism that controls/develops individuals and groups. In the text, it is argued that the concept of emotional culture adds a distinctive conceptual tool for studying different educational contexts and environments. To examine this argument, the article is divided into three parts. First, an overview of the concepts and theories that underlie the term of emotional culture is given. In the second part, the concept is analyzed in the light of modern cultural studies. The article closes by pointing out pedagogical implications, especially those connected with emotional education.

Keywords:

feeling rules, semiotic concept of culture, emotional education, emotional culture, social control.

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INTRODUCTION

In a world in which cultural and ideological continuity has been replaced by the search for identity, emotions count more and more. It is a kind of cultural turn, which manifests itself, *inter alia*, in the interest in everyday life, the experienced world, and privacy. It is a sign of a profound reshaping of a broad range of academic disciplines (Przybylska, 2017, pp. 125–141). Over the last three decades, many researchers have turned to emotions as a critical source for understanding and explaining different aspects of social, interpersonal, and individual lives. In particular, scholars are just beginning to theorize how the discursive and culturally embedded nature of emotions intersects with different aspects of social and private lives. Most contemporary attempts tend to agree that the nature of emotions is dichotomous: they are universally experienced natural phenomena that vary significantly across cultures. Radical constructivists reduce emotions to a solely cultural construct. As Catharine A. Lutz puts it, emotions “can be viewed as cultural and interpersonal products of naming, justifying, and persuading by people in relationship to each other. Emotional meaning is then a social rather than individual achievement, an emergent product of social life” (Lutz, 1988, p. 5). This approach is popularized by many anthropologists, e.g., Horace Romano Harré (1986), Paul Heelas (1986), Catherine A. Lutz and Lila Abu-Lughod (1990). Others like John J. Leavitt (1996), Moreland Perkins (1966), and Michelle Rosaldo (1984) argue to maintain discourses about emotions within the relationship between nature and education (culture). Nature in emotions manifests itself in biological conditions and innate predispositions and education – in the local socio-cultural tradition. As Rosaldo stated, emotions are “social practices organized by stories that we both enact and tell. They are structured by our forms of understanding” (1984, p. 143). Thus, everyday experiences, observing, listening, and imitating behavior, as well as organized educational practice, introduce emotional meanings and rules and support emotional development. How emotions are experienced, expressed, perceived, and regulated is related to the rules contained in tradition, customs, and recognized values. I call them emotional culture, and I will analyze its conceptual map in this article.

INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH TO DEFINING THE EMOTIONAL CULTURE

Each community is characterized by an emotional tone, which is a cultural manifestation of its functioning. Participation in culture implies experiencing

community emotions in line with social rules. Émile Durkheim's epistemological argument locates the origin of the fundamental categories of human thought or reason in the shared emotional experience of those ritually produced moral forces created by the enactment of real practices. Reflecting on the reasons for the long-lasting existence of most societies, Durkheim (1990) pointed out that an individual who is strongly connected with society feels a moral duty to participate in its sorrow and joy. Lack of interest permanently severs social ties and is found as a rejection.

Pierre Bourdieu and Gregory Bateson also recognized the importance of emotions for understanding culture and, at the same time, noticed their cultural and generic character. Bateson² noted in the feelings and their social experience the factor of integrating and maintaining the sustainability of the community. Based on the research of various communities, he put forward the thesis that "[...] emotional background is casually active within a culture, and no functional study can ever be reasonably complete unless it links up the structure and pragmatic working of the culture with its emotional tone or ethos" (Bateson, 1958, p. 119). Bateson, for the purposes of cultural analysis, subdivided the social system into two: 'ethos', connected with the affective relation to social life, and 'eidos', connected with the logic immanent in cultural ideas. Ethos can be defined as "the expression of a culturally standardized system of organization of the instincts and emotions of the individuals" (Bateson, 1958, p. 118). Indicative of an ethos are tones of behavior that reflect definite attitudes toward reality and that is rather cultural than natural.

Ethos, as a system of instincts and emotions, controls their expression following the developed script, and in this approach, it is a synonymous notion of the habitus (culturally conditioned human possibilities) in the perspective of Bourdieu. Bourdieu himself, without referring to the concept of Bateson, defines ethos as pre-reflexive belief that balances eidos – the mood of thought (Bourdieu, 2006). Ethos and eidos should be treated as elements of the same whole, significantly different aspects of culture but reciprocally conditioning. As such, along with rituals, organization and structure, they describe culture (Geertz, 2005).

Cultures differ in emotional principles, which Peter N. Stearns calls the principles of feelings (2005, pp. 21–27). Barbara Rosenwein strongly emphasizes the stability and changeability of culture and its emotional aspects. In her research, she criticizes the structural-political approach to history and draws attention to the

2 Bateson describes certain ceremonial behavior of the Iatmul tribe in New Guinea, and apart from structure and pragmatic aspects, he pays attention to the ethos.

emotional complexity of cultures. The emotional community creates its systems of feelings, i.e., what communities (and individuals within them) have defined as valuable or harmful, assessing the emotions of others, the recognized nature of affective bonds, and forms of emotional expression that were expected, tolerated, or banned in the community (Rosenwein, 2002, p. 842). Systems of feelings unite the community and are a manifestation of social control processes, which in the perspective of historical research, gradually increased the supervision of emotional practices. They replaced spontaneous behaviors with those expected by the group (Plamper, 2010). The system of feelings can be considered as a mechanism of social control that has led to the differentiation of emotions in specific contexts and the construction of meanings contained in symbols, language, rules, and social rituals. It is reproduced mainly through participation in society, and socialization and education processes play a significant role. In the most general terms, acquiring the principles of emotional expression is accompanied by learning the emotional language, which, according to Paul Heelas, is local and related to the context (1986, pp. 234–236).

Social control ensures the continuity of communities that are simultaneously variable in an economic, social, or political context. Expression patterns evolve in the community, and ‘modifications’ of complex emotions and feelings appear. As Barbara Rosenwein (2002) argues, there is no single emotional community even within one nation. Each person participates in his or her life in many communities which differ exactly in the principles of feelings. Community, centered around emotional practices, rules and regulations, is a concept that leads to a more complex category of emotional culture.

All of the theories and concepts mentioned above assume the existence of a relationship between a human and her/his cultural environment. Similarly, Jaan Valsiner (2001) describes the cultural constructions of emotions and feelings using the metaphor of the affective field. The affective field is a quasi-structure that is created independently of the will of a human, takes on meaning in the semiosphere, and is dynamized by it. Citing Valsiner, it is:

[...] a theoretical system that brings the notion of affect in the form of semiotically mediated hierarchical fields. The crucial feature of the system is recognition of limited access to parts of the system both at the ‘low’ (immediate feeling) and ‘high’ (semiotically mediated hypergeneralized affective fields) levels (Branco & Valsiner, 2010, p. 250).

Development implies constantly giving meaning and seeking answers to sometimes competing questions: “What am I feeling here and now?”, and “What should

I be feeling?” (Branco & Valsiner, 2010, p. 247). Therefore, as in the concept of emotional labor, the field is determined by different emotions experienced in response to the same event, consistent or not with the rules of feeling (Hochschild, 1979, p. 555). The efficiency of using semiotic tools of culture allows for flexible adaptation in a given context: expansion, as well as limitation of subjective experience and possibilities of action. That is why the affective field is dynamic, conditioned by a personal and cultural-social context. It reveals itself in various spheres of life, daily routines, celebrations, common and individual experiences (Hochschild, 1979, p. 172).

EMOTIONS AND CULTURE IN THE CONTEXT OF CONTEMPORARY CULTURE RESEARCH

The most primitive and, in fact, the most obvious way of defining culture is its ontological distinction from nature. Culture-nature dichotomy has also shaped thinking about emotions, and its abolition has enabled discussion about the essence of emotions. The shift of emotions from the sphere of nature to the public area includes considerations in an anti-naturalistic perspective, focusing on their socio-cultural aspect. As part of this methodological approach, two ways of describing emotional culture can be chosen: anti-individualistic, typical of the socio-regulatory concept of culture, and individualistic. Although the terms are linguistically contradictory, they are, citing cultural anthropology, not mutually exclusive in the description of emotional culture (Kmita, 2007, p. 81). Emotional culture is immersed in two interpenetrating contexts: individual and social. Although experiencing and expressing emotions is associated with individual capabilities and predispositions of a person, they are supra-individual (shared by a group, community) in their meaning and manifestations.

Emotions can be studied as individual and unique phenomena (psychodynamic approach) and socially constructed experiences (socio-cultural approach). In idiosyncratic stories, one can find some common, repetitive, or canonical elements. Undoubtedly, the ability to feel is natural, but what, how, and when we experience and express is created by social learning (Oatley & Jenkins, 2005, p. 130). With repetition of experience and its interpretation, cognitive and affective responses become linked together in what Oatley and Jenkins refer to as ‘emotion schemas’ that serve as organizing structures for future experience (2005, p. 205). Schemas are the kind of mental models of emotions, their meaning, and expression; as schemas develop, connections between emotions and cognition blur, and emotional

responses become increasingly automatic. Schemas relate to self-image, the image of others, and interaction. They work as a map, which, as Mark Baldwin puts it, allows people to navigate in interpersonal situations (1992, p. 468).

The conviction that culture is the factor constituting the experienced world is firm among phenomenologists. For example, Ferdinand Fellmann rediscovers and focuses on life *feelings* created in and by participation in culture. According to him, “[t]he ensemble of culture making a given community unique constitutes the perception of the experienced world in that community as real” (Fellmann, 1993, p. 53). An expressive function that gives meaning and motivates to participate in culture is ascribed to emotions. How we act is based on the image of the world. Actions are rational (i.e., appropriate, tailored to situation and expectations) if they respond to recommendations regarding the fulfillment of specific roles and behavior in various situations following established beliefs. These belief systems are called cultural models created by normative and directive beliefs. They form a symbolic culture. Culture is knowledge in the most general sense, so everything one needs to know about emotional behavior and what one needs to believe to function in society (group) can be called emotional culture. It is a collection of knowledge about how it should be (normative approach) and how to meet these expectations (directive, instructional approach), without which we would not be able to function in a particular culture, i.e., we would not know what forms of expression – and in what social situations – are culturally ‘appropriate’ (cf. Goodenough, 2003). Normative and directive beliefs are to varying degrees accepted and shared, form a set of rules regulating social practice in the field of emotions, thanks to which we not only regulate our behavior but, above all, we shape attitudes towards ourselves and the world. Taking into consideration the above-mentioned concepts, the cultural pattern of emotions consists of the following aspects:

1. normative: rather conscious, informing how we should behave,
2. behavioral: often unconscious and manifested in our actions (speaking, acting, making decisions) (Goodenough, 2003; Kmita, 2007).

Proponents of the semiotic concept of culture see a source of meanings that give social and psychological reality an objective conceptual form: by adapting to it and adapting it to oneself, a human participates in a community of meanings. Culture, in this sense, is a space for locating personal freedom within the limits of existing rules, not for restricting freedom. **Social control mechanisms, including education, in addition to participation and imitation, play a special role**

in preserving cultural models, “as man is the most emotional as well as the most rational animal, a very careful cultural control of frightening, enraging, suggestive, etc., stimuli – through taboos, homogenization of behavior, rapid ‘rationalization’ of strange stimuli in terms of familiar concepts, and so on – is necessary to prevent continual affective instability, a constant oscillation between the extremes of passion” (Geertz, 2005, p. 97).

Agreeing with C. Geertz’s interpretation of culture, emotional culture patterns should be sought much deeper than just in habituation and socialization “training”. Action as part of culture is preceded by reading all symbolic forms in which patterns, knowledge about life and life attitudes are preserved and communicated. Culture, sorting out amorphous emotional experiences by nature, also has a communicative and interpretative function (Geertz, 2005, p. 97). The application of emotional rules is related to the interpretation of behavior by observers and their reactions. The implementation of symbolic meaning in a particular emotional behavior always occurs in interaction. The nature of these phenomena and their potentially positive identity-building effect and sense of bond depends on the context in which they occur. Based on the above, it can be concluded that emotional culture is not just a collection of rules, but rather socially fixed (in various degrees) dynamic meanings and their communication.

Russell Hochschild, drawing on Durkheim and Goffman, argues that sociology of emotion “presupposes a human capacity for, if not the actual habit of, reflecting on and shaping inner feelings, a habit itself distributed variously across time, age, class, and locale” (1979, p. 559). Societies, groups, cultures, and subcultures create feeling rules that a person should obey to be understood and included. The rules are culturally driven, some of them may be nearly universal, others are unique to particular social groups and can be used to distinguish among them (Hochschild, 2003, p. 81). The way people understand the rules, what values they recognize, and how they are motivated for a particular behavior creates their emotional culture in which they communicate their belonging to the group.

EMOTIONAL CULTURE: FEELING RULES AND THEIR MEANING

Both Hochschild’s cultural interpretation of emotions and the concept of Gordon’s emotional culture derive from the dramaturgical concept of Goffman. According to it, both interactional processes: face-work and exchange of gestures must fulfill the emotive requirements of the situation: “It is plain that emotions play a part in this cycles of response, as when the anguish is expressed because of what one

has done do another's face, or anger because of what has been done to one's own. I want to stress that these emotions function as moves, and fit so precisely into the logic of the ritual game, that it would seem difficult to understand them without it" (Goffman, 2000, p. 24).

Taking into account Goffman's theory, Hochschild articulated feeling rules and emotion-management perspective in social interaction first by distinguishing it from the dramaturgical perspective on the one hand and the psychoanalytic perspective on the other. She extended and deepened Goffman's approach to emotive behavior and proved that conserving the convention is not a passive action: people do not only conform outwardly (social rules), but do so inwardly as well (personality, reflection). The feeling is a kind of pre-script to action; it prepares us to act (Hochschild, 2003). With regards to the above, emotional culture can be defined as socially shared principles that represent ideas of what one should feel in specific situations and distinguishes its two basic elements: ideologies and emotional markers (Hochschild, 2003, p. 61). The difference between the two can be described in an example: when a child starts school, he/she learns through a system of punishments and rewards, as well as imitating how to behave, which emotions can be expressed and which should be suppressed. Using the terminology proposed by Hochschild, these experiences can be called an emotional marker (determinant), based on which the child learns the emotional ideology applied at school. Ideologies are a kind of meta-forming rules, while markers extract and symbolize emotional ideologies in various contexts of human activity (Hochschild, 1979, p. 557).

In psychology, the concept of emotional rules explains intercultural differences in the expression of emotions. Emotions can be exaggerated, minimized, or completely masked, and the skills to use them are acquired from early childhood (Ekman, 1993). Feeling rules indicate what should be felt in different situations and what meaning should be given to emotions. They could be so precise that they control the intensity of emotions (weak–strong), duration (short-term–long-term), and their sign (positive–negative). However, expression rules direct attention to what “fits and does not fit” in a given situation. In Goffman's rhetoric, the actor rather accepts the role and its conventions and submits to social expectations, even if it appears necessary to pretend and suppress emotions (Hochschild, 1979, p. 557), all to gain approval and maintain status. Hochschild believes that the Goffman's (2005, p. 10) actor lacks an internal “I” and assigns an active role as a person who copes with the rules, performs internal work (so-called deep work) to thoughtfully manage not only expressions but also emotional experiences (Hochschild, 1979, p. 556).

Gordon's concept is also based on the normative-directive understanding of culture and, in his analysis, distinguishes between emotions and sentiments³. Emotions are considered to be not very diverse, mainly somatic experience, while sentiments are "socially constructed patterns of sensations, expressive gestures, and cultural meanings organized around a relationship to a social object" (Gordon, 1981, pp. 566–567). Sentiments are by definition a derivative of culture, and Gordon incorporates the rules that shape them into the structure of emotions. Similar to the concept of Arlie Russell Hochschild, he describes emotional beliefs and normative expectations but adds a third component in which the rules manifest themselves, namely, the emotional vocabulary. The vocabulary consists of labels understandable to members of a given community and referring to a common experience, with the help of which we not only describe but also give meaning to emotional experiences (Gordon, 1981; Markus & Kitayama, 1991).

The emotional vocabulary is dynamic, sensitizing to specific emotions, way of feeling, behavior and assessment of the situation. Sample sayings: "anger detracts from one's beauty", "men should be tough", "guys don't cry", "good girls don't behave like that", or "I am full of pride", describe the emotional state and situation of a person (emotional vocabulary) and norms (emotional beliefs), and indicate what emotions and behaviors are accepted. The words with which we explain occurrences and situations have the power to change experiences, which is why, apart from the communicative and expressive function, they have a self-regulatory function. In colloquial Polish, more terms describe negative emotions, which can be explained by a greater frequency and acceptance of experiencing and expressing negative feelings (Lubaś, 2003, p. 210). On the other hand, the analysis of Anna Wierzbicka shows that warmth in interpersonal relations is a "cultural script" in Polish discourse, compared with English (Wierzbicka, 1999). In managing emotions, language competence is combined with cultural (acceptance of norms and meanings): the linguistic richness of the language or simply knowing the terms and sayings allows one to communicate emotions appropriately to the situation and the socio-emotional context. It also has psychological significance: naming your feelings can lead to more reflective action and the development of personal competences (Saarni, 1999; Mayer et al., 2004).

The way of defining emotional rules in the concepts of Hochschild and Gordon indicates their monitoring function rather than controlling one (cf. Geertz, 2005, p. 115). The rules leave room for freedom, but within the framework of the current convention:

3 S.L. Gordon draws on T. Parsons, Ch.H. Cooley, J.H. Turner's category of sentiments.

A feeling rule is like these other kinds of rules in the following ways: It delineates a zone within which one has permission to be free of worry, guilt, or shame with regard to the situated feeling. A feeling rule sets down a metaphoric floor and ceiling, there being room for motion and play within boundaries (Hochschild, 1979, pp. 565–566).

It is similar to other rules, and like them, it can be followed, broken, changed, and above all internalized to various degrees. Emotional rules differ from other social interaction rules in general in a way that they interfere much more deeply in the subjective space. They determine what one should feel, how to express it and how to regulate it, so they do not directly refer to action, instead of a precursor to action. Therefore they are difficult to codify (Gordon, 1981; Hochschild, 2003).

Emotional rules are difficult to sort out because they are not verbalized. They differ in their scope; one can indicate universal and group- and place-specific rules. Non-specific and highly valued in our culture are behaviors related to control of expression: dignity, pride, honor, or not hurting other people's feelings. All behaviors "without heart", "without shame", "without empathy" are not accepted and condemned. Although the rules can only be temporary, agreed during the meeting, they become the basic feature of interaction. Using the language of the rituals theory, the rules of respect, trust, and acceptance cause the strive to protect the face of oneself and other participants (Goffman, 2005, pp. 10–11), and at the same time, are a condition for the occurrence of an educational relationship.

Concerning the concepts outlined above, the questions about emotional culture: What constitutes its whole?, What is the essence of this whole?, and ultimately: What is its meaning?, can be answered as follows:

1. emotional culture is a collection of patterns, norms, and rules that control emotional experience and the process of its communication (descriptive approach),
2. these elements form a structure, they are interrelated and are the basis of a cultural order (systemic and structural approach),
3. this order generates and maintains meaning distinctive for a group or society (semiotic approach) and scripts of emotion-laden situations. Hence, emotional culture is both meaning and the process of making meaning.

The description in these aspects creates a broad theoretical framework for the interpretation of emotional culture and competence attained and updated only in its context. As an analytical category, emotional culture incorporates emotions and expressiveness into cultural scripts; it can be considered as a relatively inde-

pendent aspect defining the cultural significance of everything that we experience, express, or suppress. Emotional culture is an inseparable part of the semiosphere and is construed of symbols, meanings, and values. It manifests itself in rituals, customs, art forms, and other cultural messages, e.g., religious, educational, scientific discourse, and folk theories (Turner & Stets, 2009, pp. 46–47; Wierzbicka, 1999). They reflect representations of emotional exchanges, thus telling us how to interpret emotional behavior.

SUMMARY: IMPLICATIONS FOR EDUCATION

Incorporating semiotic perspective, emotional culture (emotional community, ethos, feeling rules) is perceived as entangled in the webs of significance. Its analysis is, therefore, interpretative actions in search of meaning. The construct combines cognitive moderation with a constructivist point of view that understands emotions as an individual's positive or negative assessment of a situation, constantly performed within the semiotic framework. The framework is a socio-cultural system of rules and norms that condition to a great extent how emotions are experienced. Based on social constructivism (anthropological, psychological, historical, and sociological concepts), it can be assumed that emotional culture is a context for the acquisition of system of meaning which is reproduced and partly changed in the processes of socialization and acculturation (Illouz, 2007). **The shared experience provides the culture with a certain regularity, and learning (socializing) is an essential mechanism for its creation, duration, and development.** Language, representation, scripts, and narratives as means by which emotional meaning is articulated are not explicit systems. Therefore, they act as background knowledge, recorded and changed in various contexts. We usually learn about the existence of emotional rules when there is a tension between what is felt and what should be felt in a given situation (Hochschild, 2003).

Emotional culture (or emotional semiosphere) has social and psychological significance and nature. It relates not only to cultural order but also to human predispositions and capabilities (cf. Jenks, 2005; Saarni, 1999). Habitualized norms construct social expression of ontologically amorphous emotions, guide and police appropriateness of emotions about the display, suppression, or duration of the feeling. **Understanding and internalization of these norms is the core of emotional competence. Literally, it is the competence to participate in emotional culture.** Being competent in this regard means that children in the process of socialization have learned their subcultures' expectations and standards for

appropriate communication. They have developed skills that provide self-efficacy in emotion-eliciting situations (Saarni, 1999).

Participation in emotional culture is therefore equivalent to learning rules, meaning, and developing emotional competence. It is educational *per se*. Children involved in social relations, observing and imitating significant others, learn how to send and receive emotion-laden messages and much more: they find out how to interpret situations and emotionally communicative behavior of others. Emotional culture reveals implicitly in the rules that organize the environment and educational relationships and is also explicitly communicated by parents, educators, and others. In the process of upbringing in various environments, framing emotions (expressing emotions “properly” and associating them with specific situations) is of great importance. Even seemingly irrelevant communications contain a clear message about behavior, as well as what one should feel and express. Questions, advice, suggestions or orders may contain emotional subtext: “Holidays are coming, you should be happy!”, “Should you not be a little more worried about your exam results?”, “Don’t laugh, we are in the office, school, church...”, “Don’t cry, nothing happened!”, “You have the right to feel...”, “You know that here you’re not allowed to...”, “You should...”, “You shouldn’t...”. Emotional rules that we learn every day are revealed in these out-of-context sentences. Most of the rules are internalized and applied automatically. We do not always have to make the effort of working on emotions, we just know what can be expressed. We also know when to express emotions spontaneously. Self-reflexive thoughts like: “I was too nervous...!”, “I don’t know why, but it doesn’t make me happy!”, “Why didn’t I control my anger...?”, remind us of the existence of cultural codes that we learn particularly intensively during childhood. Reflection is not only a manifestation of social control over emotions but also of emotional competence that is current in the culture in which it develops (Saarni, 1999).

Foremost, the concept of emotional culture draws attention to the role played by the context and the significance of goals in developing students’ (children’s) competence. Emotional competence is determined not only by socialization in a particular culture but also by increasing the complexity of cognitive and moral development of a person (Saarni, 1979, p. 424; Matthews, Zeidner, & Roberts, 2008). Thus emotional competence cannot be constricted to a set of emotional abilities: cognition, self-definitions, and representational skills are inextricable from how emotions are interpreted (Saarni, 1999) or received (Halberstadt et al., 2001) based on introspection and observation of the environment. Therefore, it is the context that differentiates what a person thinks about himself/herself: either

perceives himself/herself as a very emotionally sensitive woman, a cool and emotionally non-involved man, or vice versa (Gerhards, 1989, pp. 738–739).

The problem raised in the article is of fundamental importance for educational practice. The concept of emotional culture significantly broadens the understanding of emotional education and draws attention to the need for thoughtful creation of the context of education because emotional competences that allow understanding, participation, and self-creation within culture develop around various forms of social activities (Saarni, 1999; Gordon, 1981). The experience of the family environment, relationships and contacts with relatives and reference group, the experience of kindergarten and school are the sources of the most critical experiences socializing emotions and cultural rules for expressing and regulating them. When a child observes the behavior of parents or other important adults in emotion-laden situations, he/she perceives how they cope with difficult situations, as well as how the environment reacts to their emotions (are they accepted or suppressed), he/she learns the emotions and their culture. To add more, emotional education is not only about teaching skills to manage emotions. It primarily means introducing emotional culture: learning the meanings, rules and developing capabilities for understanding emotions in the given context (Gordon, 1981).

In the article, I tried to highlight that emotional culture is not a theoretical category, but it is of great importance for educational research and practice. I anticipate that interdisciplinary research on emotional culture will spell out a rich platform to examine and improve educational efforts to strengthen students' emotional competence. School is one of the primary places where students learn about emotions and their conventions and develop capabilities to cope with emotions at intrapersonal and interpersonal levels. Promoting emotional culture means incorporating it into curricula and everyday school life. It involves teaching emotional skills and allowing students to practice these skills in different situations (Przybylska, 2018). Thus it is crucial to support teachers' professional competencies in observation, conceptualization, and modeling context for students' emotional development. The task is critical as we observe the loosening of social bonds, commercialization of emotion, and cooling intimacy (Hochschild, 2003; Lutz & Abu-Lughod, 1990; Przybylska, 2017).

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