



You have downloaded a document from
RE-BUŚ
repository of the University of Silesia in Katowice

Title: The Electoral Palatinate: Key to Europe : Art of Diplomacy of Władysław IV

Author: Ryszard Skowron

Citation style: Skowron Ryszard. (2021). The Electoral Palatinate: Key to Europe : Art of Diplomacy of Władysław IV. „Eastern European History Review” (Vol. 4, 2021, s. 79-99)



Uznanie autorstwa - Użycie niekomercyjne - Na tych samych warunkach - Licencja ta pozwala na rozpowszechnianie, przedstawianie i wykonywanie utworu jedynie w celach niekomercyjnych oraz tak długo jak utwory zależne będą również obejmowane tą samą licencją.



UNIwersytet ŚLĄSKI
W KATOWICACH



Biblioteka
Uniwersytetu Śląskiego



Ministerstwo Nauki
i Szkolnictwa Wyższego

THE ELECTORAL PALATINATE: KEY TO EUROPE. ART OF DIPLOMACY OF WŁADYSŁAW IV

ABSTRACT

Władysław IV at the time of taking the throne in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had already specified the main goals concerning foreign policy. The expiration of the truce with Sweden in 1635 offered the king new opportunities to negotiate with other European courts, to organize the armed forces and to convince the nobility to accept the idea of an offensive war against Sweden, fought on its own territory. The strategic goal of Władysław IV, which combined the interests of the dynasty and the Commonwealth, was his to return to the throne of Sweden. The realization of that goal required development of diplomatic and military strategies and tactics; preparation of a political plan which would allow the king to become involved in international politics; organization of a diplomatic network covering the most important European courts, both Catholic and Protestant; gaining allies in the war with the Swedes; and maximal implementation of the royal prerogatives concerning foreign policy. Władysław IV pursued his goal using two interrelated strategies: of peace and of war. The peace strategy – the basis for which were two linked projects: peace mediation and marriage with Elisabeth, the daughter of Frederick V and Elisabeth Stuart. The war strategy assumed that in 1635 the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth would resume its war with Sweden. The king understood that the war conducted by the Commonwealth alone would not become an instrument for achieving the main goal. Therefore, he sought a joint and coordinated war of the Vasas and Habsburgs against Sweden.

KEYWORDS: Władysław IV Vasa; the Rhine Palatinate; Elizabeth Wittelsbach; Early Modern Diplomacy; The Thirty Years' War.

In the seventeenth century Władysław must have been the only king so perfectly well versed with the political situation from Moscow to Madrid, which he tried to influence taking into consideration his powerful position in Europe. Even before ascending to the throne he enjoyed a great prestige among European rulers. Beginning with 1610 when he became the tsar elect of the Grand Duchy of Muscovy, events that added to his glory and reinforced his myth in the courts of Europe and in the minds of the Polish and Lithuanian nobility occurred every few years. In 1610 he was hailed the Grand Prince of All Russia, in 1615 he received the Order of the Golden Fleece from Philip III of Spain, in 1619 he was offered the Crown of St Wenceslaus by the Bohemian Estates, in 1621 he gained the renown of the vanquisher of Turks, and in 1627 he was offered the command of the Vasa-Habsburg fleet. Irrespective of their purpose, his travels made Władysław familiar with the culture and politics of Europe. He was as close to Moscow as no other European ruler would later be until Napoleon, and he visited Wrocław, Prague, Vienna, Innsbruck, Munich, Brussels, Milan, Florence, Rome, and Naples. "Watching the world" also meant direct encounters with the master minds of his contemporary political reality including Pope Urban VIII, Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand II, his son Ferdinand and wife Eleonora Gonzaga, Archduke Leopold V, Maximilian I Duke of Bavaria and Elector of the Palatinate, the Clara Isabella Eugenia, Sovereign of the Spanish Netherlands, Ferdinand of Bavaria, Prince-Elector Archbishop of Cologne, George William Elector of Brandenburg, Ferdinand II Grand Duke of Tuscany, Duke de Alba Viceroy of Naples, and eminent military commanders Ambrogio Spinola, Duke de Feria and Albrecht Wallenstein. Those people and places, as well as the



accompanying events, disputes, negotiations, ceremonial, and propaganda built up the experience, hopes, and disillusion of the future ruler. They honed a prince who, at the moment of accessing to the royal throne, was ready to run a complex game on an international arena, accounting for the strategies and objectives of individual powers, and combining the interests of his dynasty with those of the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania.

The purpose of this text is to portray how Władysław IV Vasa ran his strategy and tactics of conducting diplomatic negotiations aimed at returning the Polish Vasa line to the throne of Sweden. It intends to show how, by recognising the Electoral Palatinate the geopolitical pivot during a transcontinental war, the King bound his goals to those of the key players on the international arena. Therefore the portrayal of the “board” of that game and the dynamics of Władysław IV’s diplomatic endeavours in 1632-37 on the vast space stretching from Moscow to Madrid, and from Rome to London is a significant element of this study.

IN THE INTEREST OF THE DYNASTY AND COMMONWEALTH: RETURN TO THE SWEDISH THRONE

The experience from the time of the war in Prussia proved to the Vasas only too well that all and any initiatives linked to their participation in endeavours in the West are torpedoed by Vienna considering the Commonwealth primarily the space for the drafting mercenaries and an ally that needs to be tangled into separate wars on Turkey to hold back its expansion along the Danube Valley¹. That is why after the truce with Sweden in 1629, when Sweden started its intervention in Germany, the Vasas had to embark on actions that forced the Austrian and Spanish Habsburgs to provide actual financial and military support for the Polish-Lithuanian state, as only a powerful alliance of the two dynasties gave the Catholic States a guarantee of the decisive solution of the Swedish problem.

Evidently, when elected King of the Commonwealth in November 1632, Władysław IV had precise main objectives for his foreign policy both in service of the state and of the dynasty. The view that the overarching goal for the Władysław IV (and Sigismund III) was to return to the throne in Stockholm dominates the opinion of Polish historians. It, however, fails to account for the fact that, at least in 1621–35, the Swedish problem became the keystone of the interests of the Commonwealth and the Vasa dynasty². Even if a great majority of Polish nobility primarily perceived the war on Sweden the attainment of the domestic goals and not the interests of the Polish-Lithuanian state, they nonetheless had to fight to stop the offensive actions of Gustav Adolf and to reclaim the lost lands. It needs remembering that, on the power of an act of the *sejm* of 1616, the Commonwealth undertook to support the king and his progeny in reclaiming Sweden should circumstances allow³. It is not without reason that, in his *Dyskurs o podniesieniu wojny inflanckiej* (1624), Krzysztof Radziwiłł, the Lithuanian Field Hetman, opposed moving the war to Sweden pointing to the incidental nature of that act, and demonstrating that it no longer remains in force eight years since its approval. At the same time, however, his text also proposed the joint effort of the king and the Commonwealth to obtain the throne in Stockholm for Sigismund III or his sons. In the conclusion of his work, the commander wrote: «even if we agreed to that recuperation of the Swedish kingdom, you would have to do it *ordinate* so as not to make *tumulturie*. For let us go *a vilissimis operariis* to the greatest among the monarchs»⁴. The war in

1 Adam Szelański, *O ujście Wisły. Wielka wojna pruska* (Warszawa: Gebethner & Wolff, 1905); Rafael Ródenas Vilar, *La política europea de España durante la guerra de los Treinta Años (1624–1630)* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1967), 83-131; Maciej Serwański, *Francja wobec Polski w dobie wojny trzydziestoletniej (1618–1648)* (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe UAM, 1986), 35-69; Radosław Lolo, *Rzeczpospolita wobec wojny trzydziestoletniej. Opinie i stanowiska szlachty polskiej (1618–1635)* (Pułtusk: Wyższa Szkoła Humanistyczna, 2004); Ryszard Skowron, *Olivares, los Vasa y el Báltico. Polonia en la política internacional de España en los años 1621–1632* (Warszawa: DiG, 2008), 113-286.

2 See for example: Władysław Czapliński, *Władysław IV i jego czasy* (Warszawa: PW Wiedza Powszechna, 1976); Henryk Wisner, *Zygmunt III Waza* (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1991); Stefania Ochman-Staniszevska, *Dynastia Wazów w Polsce* (Warszawa: PWN, 2006), 83-94.

3 *Volumina Legum: przedruk zbioru praw staraniem XX. pijarów w Warszawie od roku 1732 do roku 1782*, vol. III (Petersburg: Ohryzki, 1589), 133.

4 Krzysztof Radziwiłł, *Sprawy wojenne i polityczne 1621–1632* (Paryż: Wydawnictwo Biblioteki Polskiej, 1859), 493. All the translations from Polish to English are made on behalf of the author.

Prussia, and the subsequent intervention of Sweden in the Empire clearly showed that the main reason behind the wars with the Commonwealth were the efforts of Gustav Adolf to dominate the Baltic Sea, and not the claims of the Polish Vasas to the throne in Stockholm. Expiry of the Altmark Truce in 1635 opened new options for the political play with the European courts to Władysław IV, letting him organise his armed forces and win over the Polish nobility to the idea of an offensive war on Sweden that, in the final stage, would be conducted in its territory. He was too experienced a politician not to realise that the main goal could be achieved by combining international support with the participation of Polish and Lithuanian's armies.

The strategic objective of Władysław IV, which brought together the interests of the dynasty and the Commonwealth, was to return to the throne of Sweden to put an end to the Swedish wars lasting for over 30 years. The power of the dynasty was to vouchsafe safety and reinforce the power of the Commonwealth. The elimination of Sweden from the conflicts in the northeast of Europe meant a significant weakening of Muscovy, and opened a perspective to victorious wars on that front, at the same time strongly reducing the danger of fighting one on two fronts: northern and southern (with Turkey). Attainment of that goal required designing a diplomatic and military strategy and tactics, preparing a political action plan that would make it possible for the king to join international politics, organisation of a diplomatic network extending to both Protestant and Catholic key courts in Europe, and maximum use of the royal prerogatives in foreign policy. Władysław IV pursued his goal by carrying out two interconnected strategies through peace and war.

The foundation for the peaceful strategy were two interrelated projects: peace mediation and the marriage with Elisabeth of the Palatinate, daughter of Frederick V and Elisabeth Stuart⁵. The king believed that, binding in the relationships between the European dynasties, the principle of legitimism provided a solid foundation for European monarchs to confirm the hereditary rights of the Polish Vasas to the Swedish throne, and to have Charles IX and his successors considered usurpers, or, at worst, no more than just elected kings of Sweden. (Charles IX had *Carolus Dei gratia electus Rex Suecie* as part of his official title.) Władysław believed that the peace talks putting an end to the war on the territory of the Empire, with Christina remaining the only surviving scion of Gustav Adolf, the subject of returning his legal heirs living in Poland to the throne in Sweden could be brought back. This, however, would require finding someone to press that subject intensely at the peace congress. The king recognised that it would be best to participate directly in the negotiations by assuming the role of a mediator in the continuing war. That, however, required the acceptance of the belligerent parties. Władysław IV fulfilled all the conditions required for the role of the negotiator perfectly. With a great prestige in European courts and neutrality despite the pro-Habsburg stance in the continuing war, he was furthermore distant from the Catholic fanaticism of the House of Austria. The intention to marry Elisabeth of the Palatinate served winning the approval of the Protestant states (Brandenburg, England, the Netherlands, and Denmark) and of France for the king's peace mediation, and was also to provide a means of pressure on the Habsburgs.

The military strategy assumed that the Commonwealth would restart war with Sweden in 1635. The King understood that, conducted independently by the Polish-Lithuanian state, that war would not provide an instrument to attain the main goal. That is why he pursued a joint and coordinated Vasa-Habsburg war in Sweden. The theatre of that war was to extend to Prussia and Livonia in the Polish-Lithuanian state, and to Silesia, Brandenburg, and Western Pomerania in Germany. The condition Władysław IV considered indispensable for that joint arms union (*coniunctio armorum*) was that the Polish and imperial armies ran shared operations in the aforementioned German territories⁶. He believed that running the hostilities in parallel, he would win the Polish nobility's buy-in for an offensive preventive strike, while the military developments would justify actions along the western border. Such a coordination of the military operations against the Swedish not only gave the King

5 Adam Szelański, *Rozkład Rzeczy i Polska za panowania Władysława IV* (Kraków: Akademia Umiejętności, 1907), 71-177; Czaplinski, *Władysław IV*, 177-223; Ryszard Skowron, *Pax i Mars. Polsko-hispańskie relacje polityczne w latach 1632-1648* (Kraków: Towarzystwo Wydawnicze "Historia Iagellonica", 2013), 84-149.

6 Szelański, *Rozkład Rzeczy*, 104-19; Skowron, *Pax i Mars*, 86-102.

high likelihood of victory but also offered him assorted openings in the political and military game, including a direct incursion into the territory of Sweden. Irrespective of the course of events, the fact of participating in the war and having Polish armies on the territory of the Empire, guaranteed the king's participation in the peace talks. Military tactics required obtaining financial and military support from both Vienna and Madrid Habsburgs. Knowing the apprehensions of Emperor Ferdinand II concerning the dynastic ambitions of the Vasas (Silesia, Western Pomerania), Władysław also had to possess tactical instruments to enforce close cooperation of the Emperor with Poland. These on the one hand included the threat of extending the truce with Sweden, and on the other the continuous emphasis on the option of allying with the anti-Habsburg camp through the marriage to Elisabeth of the Palatinate.

TO FINLAND VIA THE DUCHY OF MOSCOW

The prospect of war with Sweden forced Władysław IV to ensure safety and peace in the western and southern borders of his state in the first two years after entering the throne. The war with Muscovy and the Turkish threat during the *interregnum* and in the first months of his reign required military and diplomatic steps to achieve this goal. The Vasa's personal participation in the victorious Smolensk campaign, and the repulsion of the Turkish onslaught strongly reinforced the king's position in the country and his prestige in the European courts. Again, like in 1621, the pamphlets published in Paris, Rome, and Madrid reinforced the image of the Polish king as a great strategist⁷.

Setting forth to release the siege of Smolensk in August 1633, Władysław not only intended to stop the siege but also to make a deep incursion into the Duchy of Muscovy, to capture the territories that were to be transferred to his brother, John Casimir. Subsequently, the Polish army supported by the recruited Muscovy soldiers was intended to attack Finland along the land via Karelia⁸. However, the king modified his plans under the pressure from the Senators and in the interest of the Commonwealth, and put an end to the war with the Treaty of Polanowo, finally relinquishing his rights to the crown of the tsars. He knew only too well that as long as he did use the title of the tsar, there would be no peace along the border with Muscovy. How some among the Polish nobility construed the decision of Władysław is proved by the gratitude expressed by the *sejmik* of Belz, who thanked the king «not only for relinquishing the tsardom of Muscovy for the Commonwealth, but also for being ready to sacrifice the royal title which was his heirloom for the sake of its unity»⁹. The decision was certainly difficult on the dynastic plane, as it diminished the splendour of the House of Vasa, whose members used the *electus magnus dux Moschoviae* formula in the letters that exchanged with European monarchs. Władysław also renounced the title in the interest of his family and the Swedish heritage, as he recognised Muscovy a potential ally in obtaining political and dynastic goals. That is why, during the negotiations, the Polish commissioners proposed to Muscovite diplomats to establish a personal union, strongly following upon the one presented by Lew Sapieha in 1600. Moreover, early in 1635 the king instructed his legates to Moscow, Aleksander Piaseczyński and Kazimierz Leon Sapieha, to embark on negotiations of an anti-Swedish alliance with the tsar¹⁰. Thus, Władysław endeavoured to open the third Swedish front on the Russian border, which would force the Swedes to fight along the entire southern and south-eastern shores of the Baltic Sea – from the Bay of Lübeck to as far as the Gulf of Finland. However, Michał staunchly rejected the possibility of fighting on the side of the Commonwealth against Sweden. The peaceful negotiations in Polanowo are an important proof

7 Konrad Zawadzki, *Gazety ulotne polskie i Polski dotyczące XVI–XVIII wieku. Bibliografia*, t. 1: 1514–1661 (Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1977), 105–16; Anna Filipczak-Kocur, “Wojna smoleńska 1633–1634 w ówczesnych gazetach ulotnych”, in *Komunikacja i komunikowanie w dawnej Polsce*, eds. Krzysztof Stępnik and Maciej Rajewski (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2008), 55–79.

8 Władysław Godziszewski, *Polska a Moskwa za Władysława IV* (Kraków: PAU, 1930), 8–42.

9 Biblioteka Zakładu Narodowego im. Ossolińskich in Wrocław, ms. 121/74, f. 145.

10 Godziszewski, *Polska a Moskwa*, 33–40; Anna Filipczak-Kocur, *Poselstwo Aleksandra Piaseczyńskiego i Kazimierza Leona Sapiehy do Moskwy w 1635 roku* (Opole: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Opolskiego, 2017), 14–6.

demonstrating the king's readiness to align the interests of the dynasty and the Commonwealth to forestall the expansionist policy of Sweden.

THE HENICIUS MEMORANDUM: THE VASA DREAM OR DYNASTIC PLANS?

A document known as the Henicius Memorandum (Pol. *memoriał Heniciusa*), a source frequently discussed in historical literature, laid out Władysław Vasa's detailed political goals in the wake of his father's death¹¹. The researchers agree that the memorandum, in which the Vasas surrender to the protection of the Emperor and present their dynastic claims, is a proof of pro-Habsburg policy of Władysław IV, as the document points that the king's key objective is to reclaim the crown of Sweden, even at the cost of the throne of the Commonwealth. According to the constitutional standards of the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania, sons of the elected kings did not enjoy the status of successors to the throne, and their rights were highly curbed. Their position was in no way changed by the fact that they were formal heirs to the Swedish crown. They could hold no state offices, be members of the Senate, or own inheritable estates, which closed their path to lay careers in the Commonwealth. While reaching for the crown of Poland, it was a natural family obligation for Władysław IV to take care of the future of his brothers. The more so as Sigismund III limited the dynastic policy to his own marriages only. Therefore the nomination of his two sons, John Albert and Charles Ferdinand, to bishoprics needs to be treated as a way of safeguarding their material standards of life rather than caring for the interests of the family as a whole.

For the Emperor, the Henicius Memorandum guaranteed close cooperation of the entire family, and confirmed Władysław's readiness to reopen the Swedish war. A novelty, and certainly a surprise for Ferdinand II, were the Vasas' territorial ambitions. Could the Emperor accept and entertain a concept that would put the Polish Vasas among the most powerful dynasties of Europe, along the Habsburgs, with John Casimir ruling the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania, Władysław IV – Sweden, Alexander Charles – Western Pomerania and Brandenburg (Electorate), with John Albert being the Bishop of Olomouc? It was a very serious warning for Vienna that, to be an ally, Władysław would claim territorial compensations for members of his family, which in the current political reality first meant lobbying to rule the duchies of Silesia. Moreover, the Vasas holding the thrones of German states could be more than just a threat of caused by mingling with the matters of the Empire but also by entering the competition for the imperial crown; a prospect that, by the way, the King was later deluded with by the French. Vienna's great uncertainty as to the King's intentions concerning Silesia was one of the chief obstacles in concluding the anti-Swedish alliance. The best proof to the significance of this area in the Habsburg-Vasa relations are the proposals of the French diplomacy, submitted to the Polish king through the French envoy d'Avaux, and concerning concluding an alliance, in which France would recognise the justification of Władysław's claims to Silesia¹². That vision of the power and westward expansion of the Vasas not only had to be rejected by Ferdinand II but it also made a significant impact on his decisions concerning cooperation with the Commonwealth and its ruler.

THE ELECTORAL PALATINATE: CHARLES I STUART AND THE HABSBURGS

Polish historians have frequently investigated Władysław IV's plans to marry Elisabeth of the Palatinate, while its international circumstances and the concept of European peace mediation are practically missing from European works¹³. From the point of view of diplomatic strategy, an intention

11 Józef Krajewski, "Władysław IV a korona szwedzka", *Biblioteka Warszawska*, t. 297/3 (1913): 214-16; Szelągowski, *Rozkład Rzeczy, 37-8*; Czaplinski, *Władysław IV*, 98-9; Wisner, *Władysław IV Waza*, 80-1; Skowron, *Pax i Mars*, 85-6.

12 Serwański, *Francja wobec Polski*, 105, 133-49.

13 Zofia Trawicka, "Projekt kalwińskiego małżeństwa Władysława IV", *Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce*, 11 (1966): 93-100; Jan Dziegielewski, *O tolerancję dla zdominowanych. Polityka wyznaniowa Rzeczypospolitej w latach panowania Władysława IV* (Warszawa: PWN, 1986), 93-8; Edward A. Mierzwa, *Anglia a Polska w pierwszej połowie XVII wieku* (Warszawa: PWN, 1986), 147-53; Andrzej Korytko, "Echa znad Wisły. Dyplomaci weneccy o mariażu Władysława IV z Elżbietą Wittelsbach", in *Ad fontes. Studia ofiarowane Księdzu Profesorowi Alojzemu Szorcowi w siedemdziesiątce*

to marry a niece of the King of England was a perfect concept from the point of view of a pan-European conflict as it brought Władysław into one of the strategic centres of the war. It was so as the Palatinate was highly significant both from the military and from the ideological point of view. It was where the interests of Bavaria, Spain, the Netherlands, England, France, and even Sweden crossed. The election of Frederick V Elector of the Palatinate the King of Bohemia transformed local uprisings into a pan-European conflict, and the “Winter King” became the unquestioned leader of the Empire’s Protestants. After the defeat at the Battle of White Mountain and capture of the Electoral Palatinate by the armies of Ambrosio Spinola, deprived of title and power, Frederick V and his family found refuge in the Netherlands. Most of his lands were occupied by Spanish troops until the Battle of Breitenfeld in 1631, when they were taken over by the Swedish, who controlled them until the Battle of Nördlingen. Beginning with the marriage of Frederick V to Elisabeth Stuart, daughter of James I, in 1613, the Electoral Palatinate was connected to England with especially close ties. Even the occupation of James I’s estates by the Spanish did not interfere with the English-Spanish rapprochement. The aggravation of the relationships between the two countries only lasted for a brief moment after accession of Charles I to the throne. However, faced with the French threat, England and Spain started a new round of talks in 1627. On 15 November 1630 they resulted in the signing a treaty on peace, mutual relations, and trade¹⁴. In the 1630s, Charles I conducted a highly complex foreign policy, negotiating with states involved in the opposing political and military blocks. This to a certain extent was similar to the foreign policy run by Władysław IV, as both the English and Polish kings retained neutrality, allowed the belligerent parties to recruit, and “seized” every opportunity the international situation offered to attain their political and dynastic goals. One of the key goals for the Charles I was to regain the Palatinate for Frederick V, and after his death in 1632, for Charles Louis.

A consequence of the alliance with Spain was the resumption of the diplomatic negotiations between the King of England and the Emperor after a nearly ten-year break. Already in 1630, at the Diet of the Empire in Regensburg, Robert Anstruther, a representative of Charles I unsuccessfully raised the issue of the restitution of the Palatinate. In June of the following year he arrived with a Palatinate diplomat Johann van Rusdorf in Vienna to lobby for the restitution of the Electoral Palatinate for Frederick V and his heirs. In 1630-36 negotiations on the English-Habsburg alliance and trade treaties were conducted by Spanish diplomats (Carlos Colona, Juan de Neocolalde) in London and the English ones (Hopton, John Taylor, and Walter Aston) in Madrid, with the English always raising the issue of the Palatinate¹⁵.

The progress in English-Spanish negotiations also forced Vienna to continue talks with Charles I. A new ambassador extraordinary, John Taylor, arrived at the imperial court in November 1635. Working with the Spanish diplomats, he lobbied for the recovery of the Palatinate for the successors to Elisabeth Stuart in exchange for an alliance with the Emperor in Spain. The messages Taylor sent to the English court informed about Vienna’s favourable attitude to England, and prospects of granting Charles Louis at least a part of his father’s inheritance, and thus gave hope for a positive resolve of the issue of the Palatinate to Charles I and partisans of pro-Habsburg policy. However, when a new English ambassador extraordinary, Earl Arundel Thomas Howard arrived in Vienna early in 1636, Ferdinand II rejected the possibility of restituting the Palatinate and the title of the elector to the heirs

urodzin, eds. Zoja Jaroszewicz-Pieresławcew and Irena Makarczyk (Olsztyn: Pracownia Wydawnicza “Elset”, 2006), 177-82; Skowron, *Pax i Mars*, 110-49. Cfr. Elizabeth Godfrey, *The Sisters of Prince Rupert, Elizabeth Princess Palatine and Abbess of Herford* (London-New York: John Lane, 1909), 70-3; Rainer Pape, “Elisabeth von der Pfalz”, in *Westfälische Lebensbilder*, ed. Robert Stupperich (Münster: Veröffentlichungen der Historischen Kommission für Westfalen, 1979), 23-41. Catharine Newmark, “Prinzessin Elisabeth von Böhemen”, in *Von Diana zu Minerva: Philosophierende Aristokratinnen des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts*, ed. Ruth Hagengruber (Berlin: Akademie Verlag 2012), 50-7.

14 Albert J. Loomie, “Olivares, the English Catholics and the Peace of 1630”, *Revue Belge de Philologie et d’Histoire*, 47/4 (1969): 1154-66; Lawrence John Reeve, “Quiroga’s Paper of 1631: A Missing Link in Anglo-Spanish Diplomacy during The Thirty Years War”, *The English Historical Review*, 101 (1981): 913-25; Id., *Charles I and the Road to Personal Rule* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 249-57.

15 Reeve, *Charles I and the Road*, 226-91; Porfirio Sanz Camañes, *Diplomacia hispano-inglesa en el siglo XVII. Razón de Estado y relaciones de poder durante la Guerra de los Treinta Años, 1618-1648* (Cuenca: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, 2002), 93-114.

of Frederick V. As far as the transfer of a chunk of the Palatinate to Charles Louis was concerned, he recommended talking to Spain, as these were the Spanish troops that occupied the territory¹⁶.

WŁADYSŁAW IV AND THE PALATINATE: THE ORIGIN OF THE IDEA TO MARRY ELISABETH WITTELSBACH

In conjunctions with the war in the Empire started by Gustavus Adolphus, the negotiations between the English king and the Habsburgs presented above were particularly significant for the development of Władysław's political concepts and their fulfilment. For it was only during peacetime, and even a minor political rapprochement of Charles I with Spain and Austria, that the Polish king could continue to plan working with England and conduct negotiations concerning his marriage to Elisabeth of the Palatinate. For in the face of the English-Habsburg conflict, which at the time would also mean support of Charles I for Sweden and the Netherlands, Władysław would not pursue a rapprochement with England, as that would threaten his relations with Vienna and Madrid.

A view prevailing among Polish historians suggests that the plan of the king's marriage to Elisabeth emerged during the election *sejm* following the death of Sigismund III, or at the latest during the coronation *sejm* of Władysław IV. However, there are multiple indications suggesting that the concept of that marriage was born late in 1631, while Sigismund III was still alive. Its origin needs to be sought in the events connected to the activity of the English diplomacy in the Habsburg courts in 1630-31. The English lobbying for the restitution of the Palatinate made the Vasas aware of the significance of that area in European politics, and it was Charles I with his policy of looking for allies in Madrid and Vienna that opened up options for new stratagems in the game played on the international arena. Sigismund III and Władysław IV found that new situation an opportunity to position themselves in the centre of European politics, as the issue of the patrimony of Frederick V became a catalyst for the construction of a new system of coalitions in the European conflict. This could result in further escalation of the war, but it could equally well support the activities serving the start of international peace talks. These were the circumstances of the birth of the plans to have Władysław marry Elisabeth, niece of Charles I, and slightly later also of the European peace mediation that, if fulfilled, could make it possible for the Vasas to return to the throne in Stockholm or, depending on the circumstances, become instruments of pressure on obtaining the greatest possible Habsburg aid in the war on Sweden, and on obtaining estates and dignities for the brothers in the areas ruled by the House of Austria.

I presented the details and particulars of the concept of King's marriage to Elisabeth of the Palatinate in a work entitled *Pax i Mars*, in which I pointed to the significance of young Prince Władysław's stay in Prague and Cheb in 1631, and diplomatic missions held in the same year: of Jan Rakowski to London and of Mikołaj Gniewosz to Paris¹⁷. A study of the activity of Polish diplomacy in the last year of reign of Sigismund III in conjunction with the international situation also allows to claim that a draft concept of Prince Władysław marrying Elisabeth of the Palatinate originated as far back as in 1631. The illness and death of Sigismund III and the period of *interregnum*, however, prevented it efficiently. Nonetheless, Władysław IV decided to disclose the plan of that wedding, as discreetly as unofficially, to some European rulers already at the coronation *sejm* in February 1633.

MATRIMONIAL DIPLOMACY: BERLIN – THE HAGUE – LONDON

A few days after being elected king, Władysław started a grand diplomatic campaign, lasting for over five years, sending missions to the West: Janusz Radziwiłł to London, Brussels and the Hague, Gerard Denhoff to Copenhagen, Jan Zawadzki to Berlin, Dresden, the Hague and London, Piotr Gembicki to Vienna, Stanisław Szczucki to Paris, Wilhelm Forbes to Madrid, Magnus Ernest Denhoff to Berlin

16 John H. Elliott, "The Year of the Three Ambassadors", in *History and Imagination. Essays in Honour H.R. Trevor-Roper*, eds. Hugh Lloyd-Jones, Valerie Pearl and Blair Worden (London: Duckworth, 1981), 165-81; Thea L. Lindquist, *The Politics of Diplomacy: The Palatinate and Anglo-Imperial Relations in The Thirty Years' War* (PhD diss., University of Wisconsin, 2001); David Worthington, *Scots in the Habsburg Service, 1618-1648* (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2004), 177-200.

17 Skowron, *Pax i Mars*, 118-27.

and Dresden, and Jerzy Ossoliński to Rome¹⁸. Their endeavours were supported by the king's residents: Francisco Bibboni in Vienna and Pio Domenico Orsi in Rome. This is how, even with no permanent embassies at his disposal, the king covered the whole of Europe with a temporary diplomatic network. The scope of activity and the objectives of the diplomats varied, as they were adjusted to the relationships of the Commonwealth with the country they were sent to. Other than notification about Władysław IV acceding to the Polish throne, there were two other overarching goals: gaining support for the king's rights to the Swedish crown, and acceptance for the peaceful intermediation during the continuing war. Some of the aforementioned diplomats were also expected to take action regarding the marriage to Elisabeth of the Palatinate.

The king maintained that network until 1638, entrusting the returning diplomats with successive missions and posting new ones, including Jan Zawadzki to London, the Hague and Paris, Aleksander Przypkowski to the Hague and London, Stanisław Mąkowski to Madrid, Domenico Roncalli to Rome, Mikołaj Korff to Copenhagen, Maciej Pstrokoński to the Hague, Father Valerian Magni and Jerzy Ossoliński to the Emperor and the Diet of the Empire, and Andrzej Rey to London.

Opening the game with the Palatinate marriage gambit, and lobbying for the support of European monarchs for his role of a mediator, the Pole considered strengthening cooperation with Protestant states a priority. In the attainment of this part of his plans, Władysław IV assigned an important role to the court in Berlin. George William, a Prussian vassal of the Polish king was to act as the intermediary in starting and strengthening cooperation with Protestant rulers in a number of areas: mediation between Władysław IV and Sweden, assistance in gaining the support of Protestant states for the peace mediation, and an important negotiator in marrying a Calvinist¹⁹. Elisabeth Charlotte, wife of George William, was a daughter of Frederick IV Elector of Palatinate and Louise Juliana of Orange, sister of Frederick V, and aunt of Elisabeth of the Palatinate. It was not a coincidence that setting forth to the west, Jan Zawadzki took a roundabout way, and first went to Königsberg, to visit the Elector dowager Louise Juliana and Elisabeth Charlotte, to assure them about the king's readiness to lobby in the imperial court for the return of the Palatinate to the Elector's heirs²⁰. However, it is most likely that he did not take up the question of the marriage while staying in Berlin. However, an order to disclose unofficially the king's nuptial plans was given to Magnus Ernest Denhoff, who arrived in the court of George William in April 1633.

The crucial task assigned to Zawadzki, sent to the Hague and London, was to win the favour of the Protestant states for the king's peaceful mediations, the unofficial disclosure of his nuptial plans, and also learning the opinions of those courts on the return of the Polish Vasas to the throne of Sweden. In his journey, the diplomat visited all the members of Elisabeth of the Palatinate's nearest family. As mentioned before he met Louise Juliana and Elisabeth Charlotte. From the Hague he moved to the camp of Frederick Henry, Duke of Orange, laying siege to Rheinberg, where he met Elisabeth's brothers, and certainly Rupert. What was, however, of key importance were the conversations of the Polish envoy with Elisabeth Stuart. Information on their course can be found in the letters she exchanged with Thomas Roe²¹. It proves that the diplomat did not directly refer to the subject of the marriage at the audience. In a letter to the Queen of Bohemia, written just before leaving the Hague, Zawadzki himself reminded her that Władysław IV wanted to be a mediator and bring peace to the Empire. One of the conditions for pacifying the situation must be returning the Palatinate to the heirs

18 Henryk Wisner, "Dyplomacja polska w latach 1572–1648", in *Historia dyplomacji polskiej*, vol. II: 1572–1795, ed. Zbigniew Wójcik (Warszawa: PWN, 1982), 87–161.

19 Władysław Czaplinski, *Polska a Prusy i Brandenburgia za Władysława IV* (Wrocław: Wrocławskie Towarzystwo Naukowe, 1947), 24–80.

20 Marta Szymańska, "Misja Jana Zawadzkiego na dwory Europy Północnej w 1633 roku a geneza polityki zagranicznej Władysława IV", in *Władza i polityka w czasach nowożytnych. Dyplomacja i sprawy wewnętrzne*, eds. Małgorzata Karkocha and Zbigniew Anusik (Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 2020), 87–106.

21 See *The Correspondence of Elizabeth Stuart, Queen of Bohemia*, vol. 2, ed. Nadine Akkerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

of Frederick V, to which end the Polish king shall undertake “certain means” (*quelques moyens*)²². Answering Elisabeth’s letters, Roe clearly stated that the purpose of the visit of the Polish Ambassador to the Hague was to learn the opinions concerning the marriage of her daughter to Władysław IV. After Zawadzki’s arrival in Edinburgh and his first audience, the ambassador of Venice, Vincenzo Gussoni, wrote that everyone in the English court would be glad if the Polish king married the Princess of the Palatinate²³. However, while sojourning in the court and during the audiences with the English King, the envoy did not mention the question of marrying Elisabeth, even though that part of his king’s plans had already been known in England. It was only the mission of Aleksander Przytkowski, who visited Elisabeth Stuart in the Hague in 1635, and arrived in London in the following month, provided the official opening of the King’s marriage negotiations with the Stuarts.

Charles II fully supported his niece’s marriage to Władysław IV. He believed a dynastic alliance to be more advantageous for both the parties, as it would strengthen the trade between England and Poland, reinforce their position over the Baltic, and let the Polish party recruit mercenaries in Scotland and Ireland as well as purchase arms. Following the principle of legalism, he recognised Władysław’s rights to the throne in Stockholm, however he did not entertain the possibility of England participating in the invasion of Sweden. Realising he had to lend credibility to his actions, and the propagandist significance of contacts with the King of England, the Pole sent his diplomats to the court in London virtually every year from 1633 to 1637. They were Janusz Radziwiłł in 1633, Aleksander Przytkowski in 1633, Jan Zawadzki in 1633, again Aleksander Przytkowski in 1635, again Jan Zawadzki in 1636, and Andrzej Rey in 1637²⁴. At the same time he tried to convince the English diplomats staying in Poland, agent Francis Gordon and ambassador George Douglas (one of the mediators in the Polish–Swedish peace negotiations), that his declarations to wed the Princess of the Palatinate are honest and sincere, and do not result from political calculations.

ROME: THE GAME AROUND THE DISPENSATION

The activities of Władysław IV in Rome were important to add credence in the European courts to his intentions to marry Elisabeth. As early as in the spring of 1634 the king used his resident in Rome, Abbot Pio Domenico Orsi, to make the first attempts to acquire the pope’s dispensation to marry the Princess of the Palatinate. Here, the king could not count on the support of nuncio Onorato Visconti, who was an ardent opponent of marrying a Calvinist, and, following the orders from Rome, opposed these plans anyway he could. Fully aware of the significance of the channels of communication used by the papal diplomacy for the transfer of information in Europe, Władysław IV entered a particular game with Visconti, in which he was supposed to be the sender of messages confirming the King’s readiness to marry Elisabeth. Francesco Barberini, heading the Secretariat of State of the Holy See opposed the marital plans. In turn, Pope Urban VIII, whose pontificate involved refocusing the policy of Rome, from unconditionally support for the Habsburgs to a more neutral one with clear francophone sympathies, decided to choose the wait-and-see attitude and kept postponing the final decision concerning the marriage of Władysław IV to a Calvinist²⁵.

The talks on the dispensation sped up significantly in the spring of 1635. Acting on the information

22 Jan Zawadzki to Elizabeth Stuart, s.l. 30 May 1633, in Akkerman, *The Correspondence of Elizabeth Stuart*, 181–82.

23 Vincenzo Gussoni to the Senate, London 8 July 1633, in *Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*, vol. 23, ed. Allen B. Hinds (London: Published by H.M.S.O., 1921), 123.

24 The diplomatic relations between Poland and England in 1633–37 have been very well researched. Especially worth mentioning are the works of Jan K. Fedorowicz, *England’s Baltic Trade in the Early Seventeenth Century. A Study in Anglo-Polish Commercial Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Mierzwa, *Anglia a Polska*; Zdzisław Tażbierski, *Związki Polski z Anglią od schyłku XIV do połowy XVIII wieku. Studium z dziejów polityki dynastycznej* (Olsztyn: Wyższa Szkoła Pedagogiczna, 1999); Anna Kalinowska, “The Polish Match? British Diplomacy, Poland-Lithuania and the Stuart-Vasa Dynastic Alliance Project”, *Sarmatia Europaea*, 2 (2011/2012): 7–27.

25 Paweł Duda, “Stolica Apostolska a projekt małżeństwa Władysława IV z Elżbietą von Wittelsbach”, in *Sztuka roztropności. Dyplomacja Stolicy Apostolskiej wobec Rzeczypospolitej, Europy i świata w epoce nowożytnej i XX wieku*, eds. Krzysztof Ożóg and Ryszard Skowron (Kraków: PAU, 2020), 121–40.

received from Count d'Avaux and carrying out his plan to discourage Władysław IV from an alliance with Habsburgs, Cardinal Richelieu decided to support the king's effort to obtain a marriage dispensation from Urban VIII or to have the king marry one of the candidates France found suitable, namely Marie Louise Gonzaga, her younger sister Anna and Anne Genevieve Bourbon²⁶. Moreover, Louis XIII proposed the marriage of Anne Catherine Vasa to Gaston, Duke of Orléans, however, carrying that plan out required the papal annulment of his marriage to Marguerite. The negotiations on the dispensation for the Polish king were conducted by the French ambassador to Rome, François Noailles, supported by the Bishop of Montpellier, Pierre de Fenouillet, and later also by the ambassador extraordinary and Cardinal of Lyon, Alphonse-Luis du Plessis de Richelieu, Armand's brother. The aid of the French diplomacy made Władysław IV send Domenico Roncalli, a Canon of Warmia, on a mission to Rome, to intensify the lobbying for the permission for the planned marriage²⁷. In the several months to come, Rome became the stage of fierce rivalry between French and Habsburg diplomacies (the Spanish ambassador Marquis de Castel Rodrigo vs. the Emperor's ambassador Duke di Bozzolo) concerning the dispensation for the Polish king. Roncalli and Orsi conducted the negotiations with the diplomats of both the parties in a highly skilful manner, most likely in line with the king's guidelines, giving them hopes for the support of their positions. In the wake of the talks between Marquis de Castel Rodrigo and the Canon of Varmia, the court in Madrid instructed Abbot Vázquez and Count de Solre to travel immediately to Vienna and Warsaw, to oppose the French influence in Poland, and negotiate the most favourable conditions for the alliance of Władysław IV with the Habsburgs and his marriage with the Emperor's daughter. The negotiations in Rome were also material for Louis XIII's acceptance of the Polish king as a peace mediator at the pope's side.

Cancellation of Władysław's plans to marry Elisabeth put a natural end to the lobbying for the dispensation, and Urban VIII was not forced to take the a clear position, delegating the duty to the congregation of cardinals, which persistently rejected the petition of the Polish king. Applying to the Pope for a permission to marry a Calvinist, the Polish Vasa did realise the impossibility of obtaining it, even if he inspired the cardinals with a vision of re-Catholicisation of Sweden. That, however, was necessary to present his marriage plants credibly. Even if the fight for dispensation was a mystification, it was perfectly well played, and proved that the king was well-versed in his contemporary complex diplomatic games.

PHILIP IV AND OLIVARES: A WIFE FOR THE VASA

For Spanish diplomacy, Władysław IV was one of the most important figures on the European geostrategic board. Philip IV and Count-Duke of Olivares defined a far more important role for the Vasas and the Commonwealth in their strategic plan than the successive emperors and their councillors, who might construe Poland as an ally in fighting the Turks but also as a rival in central and eastern Europe. After ascension of Władysław IV to the throne, what mattered most to Spain was not as much keeping the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth among the neutral allies but turning it into a military ally that would not only reopen the war on Sweden after the expiry of the armistice but would also provide military support for Habsburgs in Germany, and later perhaps even against France²⁸. In a letter to Philip IV of December 1632, Duke de Feria thus referred to the Polish king attacking Swedes on their own territory:

it would be important for Your Majesty to aid and assist that monarch in the best of possible ways, as with only one daughter of Gustav left, there may be no other opportunity as good as this [...] after providing aid to that prince of blood, and moreover Catholic, the advantages for Your Majesty will be

26 Serwański offers an extensive insight into the subject in his *Francja wobec Polski*, 133-49.

27 Skowron, *Pax i Mars*, 133-39.

28 For Poland's relations with Spain in this period see Szelągowski: *Rozkład Rzeszy*, passim; Skowron, *Pax i Mars*, passim; Miguel Conde Pazos, *La Monarquía Católica y los confines orientales de la cristiandad, relaciones entre la Casa de Austria y los Vasa de Polonia* (PhD diss., Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 2016), 306-86.

great, as transferring war [to Sweden – author's note] would remove not only the Swedish commanders but also troops and soldiers from Germany, where they reside today. If, God willing, King Władysław renders great harm to the Dutch, who hold significant trade in the Baltic Sea with that kingdom [...] it will always be a great benefit for us that the Polish king has great power and repute²⁹.

The best proof to the great hopes that the Spanish vested in Władysław IV is the arrival of ambassador extraordinary Count de Siruel to the coronation of the Polish king in Cracow. The hopes were mutual, as the Vasa considered Philip IV one of his key allies, capable of providing him with a financial and military (fleet) support, and also supporting his relationships with the Emperor. Forbes's and Mąkowski's missions in 1633–34 reinforced the conviction of the court in Madrid that the Commonwealth would resume the war with Sweden after the expiry of the armistice.

From the accession of Władysław IV to the throne, Spanish diplomacy kept a very close eye on the king's new marriage plans. The information about the intended marriage to a Calvinist reached the court in Madrid in June/July 1633 and immediately became subject of debate at the Consejo de Estado³⁰. Philip IV considered the marriage of the Polish king the best means of reinforcing the Vasa-Habsburg friendship, as it would make it possible to further joint interests in various parts of Europe, which is why he openly supported one of Ferdinand II's daughters, ordering Count de Oñate, his ambassador to Vienna, to discuss the matter with the Emperor. Unlike the Emperor, who was absolutely uninterested in the first diplomatic leaks concerning Władysław's marriage, the King of Spain reacted quickly and decisively.

The question of the marriage of the Polish king returned in November 1634, when reports about his intention to marry Elisabeth of the Palatinate again reached Madrid and Brussels from various corners of Europe. In his letters to Olivares, Antonio Sarmiento de Acuña residing in Italy on a diplomatic mission, informed that, sojourning in Florence, Charles Ferdinand Vasa shared the news of the idea of Władysław IV marrying Frederick V's daughter with Ferdinand II, Duke of Tuscany. In turn, Don Diego de Saavedra y Fajardo, ambassador to Bavaria, notified that he was informed in a letter from the Elector of Cologne, Archbishop Ferdinand Wittelsbach, about the progress of the negotiations on the marriage of the Polish king to the niece of the King of England³¹. Philip IV again ordered Count de Oñate and diplomats in other European courts to follow the course of negotiations, and thwart them. Even though Philip IV considered Poland a strategic ally, and considered it necessary for Poland to restart the war with Sweden and block the Polish king's option to marry a Protestant, until the spring of 1635, much like the Emperor, he had not undertaken any direct actions at the court in Warsaw. It was only with the war with France being unavoidable that, in April 1635, he sent to Poland a legacy announced for two years. It was entrusted to Count de Solre and Father Alonso Vázquez de Miranda, Abbot of Santa Anastasia. The instructions prepared for the two diplomats contained separate sections devoted to the marriage of King Władysław IV³². Their duty was to oppose strongly the intentions of marrying Elisabeth and have the Pole marry the candidate supported by Philip IV. The King of Spain considered marrying one of the Emperor's daughters or Anna de Medici, sister of the Duke of Tuscany, the best solution. In matters related to that marriage, both the diplomats were instructed to cooperate with the ambassadors at the imperial court: Count de Oñate and Marquis de Castañeda, Capuchin Father Valerian Magni, and one of Władysław IV's trusted ministers.

INDIFFERENTISM AND THE EMPEROR'S FAILED HOPES: FROM CONIUNCTIO ARMORUM TO THE TRUCE OF ALTMARK

During the *interregnum* following the death of Sigismund III, the activity of imperial diplomacy in Poland was low compared to the previous three interregna. A proof of a certain chill in the relations

29 AGS, Est., 3832, *Duke of Feria to Philip IV*, Milan 26 December 1632, f. 103.

30 AGS, Est., 2459, *Philip IV to Duke of Feria and Marquis of Castañeda*, Madrid 13 VII 1633, f. 170.

31 *Diego de Saavedra y Fajardo to Cardinal-Infante Ferdinand*, Braunau 10 November 1634, in Aldea Vaquero, *España y Europa en el siglo XVII. Correspondencia de Saavedra Fajardo*, t. II (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1991), 409-10.

32 Skowron, *Pax i Mars*, 73-84.

between the Vasas and the court in Vienna is the fact that the Emperor sent no representative to the coronation of the king, which is the more astonishing if the rank of the envoys of Bavaria and Spain is taken into account. Although the imperial agent Clemens Radolt was present at the coronation *sejm*, he did not participate in any official ceremonies as an official representative of Ferdinand II. His mission resulted in the renewal of the alliance treaty from 1613. Nonetheless, this changed little in the mutual relationships that deteriorated even further in March, as some Polish troops enlisted in imperial service began to return to Poland for the war with Muscovy.

Soon after the coronation *sejm*, the Grand Secretary of the Crown, Piotr Gembicki, visited Ferdinand II to ask his consent to the peace mediation in the war on the territory of the Empire. Similarly, the Danish king Christian IV arrived with an initiative of starting peace talks in December 1632. Ditlev Reventlow, Count of Wartenleben, and his mission were favourably received at the imperial court. Ferdinand II expressed his consent to the mediation by the Danish king. That was the reason why Gembicki received two extensive memoranda, *Considerationes pro regno Poloniae in futuro tractatu pacis and Circa pacis conditiones*, which were to provide a proof that the king had a well designed concept and an agenda for the negotiations³³. The mission of the Polish diplomat failed. The Emperor made it clear to the Vasa that he saw no option for him to manage the peace talks. The lobbying in support of the mediation had no support from the Electors of Saxony and Brandenburg either. Such a position of Ferdinand II came to the king as no surprise. It confirmed the concept developed earlier that Władysław could only count on the actual aid of Vienna in regaining the Swedish throne had he put a powerful pressure on the Emperor by pointing to alternative political options. In fact, it was the Emperor's refusal that made the Polish king start diplomatic endeavours connected to the marriage with the Princess of the Palatinate in Protestant courts.

For nearly two years after Gembicki's mission there were no exchanges of legates between Vienna and Warsaw. However, at that time the Emperor and the king exchanged letters that included subjects connected to Muscovy, Turkey, and the steps taken by the Danish king Christian IV. The two, however, refrained from subjects concerning war with Sweden, peace mediation, and the marriage of the Polish king. A change only occurred in the autumn of 1634, when Father Valerian Magni, entrusted by Władysław IV with a mission to Vienna, arrived in Poland³⁴. Perfectly well versed in the plans and intrigues of the Catholic courts, the Capuchin Father was to obtain Ferdinand's support for the key military and political plans of the Polish king concerning the military and financial aid in the Polish-Swedish war, coordination of actions against Sweden, and consent for peace mediation³⁵.

The arrival of Father Valerian in Vienna, the start of negotiations between the Polish and Swedish commissioners in Pasłęk, and the announcement of convening the *sejm* in Warsaw on 31 January 1635 forced Ferdinand II to start direct negotiations at the court in Warsaw. The mission was entrusted to Mathias Arnoldin von Clarstein, already familiar with Poland. He was given two overarching goals: countering the Polish-Swedish peace negotiations and resumption of the war between the two states, and obtaining a permit for recruitment to the imperial army. Ferdinand II tried to convince Władysław IV and the *sejm* that, after the victorious wars on Muscovy and Turkey, the Commonwealth was perfectly prepared to conduct a war that would provide support for the Catholic armies fighting in the territory of Germany. Therefore, the envoy sent to Warsaw needed appropriate proposals and powers to fulfil the goals of his mission. What were then the arguments and proposals that Ferdinand II intended to use to convince Władysław IV and the Commonwealth to the war against Sweden? A study of the documents on the mission of Arnoldin found in Viennese archives allows a definite statement

33 Szelągowski discusses both the documents in *Rozkład Rzeszy*, 51-3.

34 Jerzy Cygan, *Valerianus Magni (1586-1661), "Vita prima", operum recensio et bibliographia* (Romae: Institutum Historicum Capuccinum, 1989), 68-70.

35 About the tasks to be performed by Father Valerian at the Viennese court see *Malatesta Baglioni to Francesco Barberini*, Wiener Neustad 30 December 1634, 13 January 1635 and 20 January 1635 in *Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland nebst ergänzenden Aktenstücken*, 4/vol. 7: *Nuntiatoren des Malatesta Baglioni, des Ciriaco Rocci und des Mario Filonardi. Sendung des P. Alessandro d'Ales (1634-1635)*, ed. Rotraud Becker (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2004), 99-100, 116-18, 129-30.

that he had none³⁶. No financial or military support whatsoever was mentioned. He gave no support to the endeavours of Władysław to conduct peace mediation, and he was especially loathed to see him joining the negotiations with Saxony, and that despite the approval of Christian IV King of Denmark, John George Elector of Saxony, and the Roman Curia. Ferdinand II rejected the Polish king's concept of a preventive strike against the Swedish army stationed in Silesia, and gave no approval for the coordination of military actions in Silesia, Brandenburg, Western Pomerania, and Mecklenburg.

The news of the developments of the *sejm* in Warsaw (31 January–17 March 1635) debating and passing resolutions “On supporting war against the Swedish”, on taxation and on the *levée en masse*, as well as news of the movements and concentration of the Polish army's³⁷ that kept reaching the imperial court made Ferdinand II recognise the resumption of the Polish–Swedish war unavoidable, and in consequence disregard the mediation efforts of the French ambassador to Poland, Count d'Avaux.

The Polish–Swedish armistice signed in Sztumska Wieś (Stuhmsdorf) with support of mediators from France, England, the Netherlands, and Brandenburg in September 1635, was a major surprise for the Habsburg courts. Soon both Ferdinand II and Philip IV realised the error of their policy towards Władysław IV, whose continuation carried a threat of the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania joining the anti-Habsburg camp. The more so, as, taking his intentions to marry Elisabeth of the Palatinate and the peace mediation as the starting point, the king started a new game with Habsburg, turning France into an instrument of pressure.

THE FRENCH LEVERAGE

For the French court, the missions of Gniewosz and Szczucki were an important sign of Władysław's readiness to start cooperation on more than just peace mediation, due to the expiry of the Polish–Swedish armistice. The arrival of the news of the royal wedding in Paris created new perspectives and hopes to influence the position of the Commonwealth towards the war continuing in Europe. The main goal of France was not to allow the resumption of the Polish–Swedish war in Prussia. The activity of the Polish diplomacy in Protestant states made Cardinal Richelieu believe that Władysław IV could reorient his politics from supporting the Habsburgs to neutrality favourable for France, with an option of making drafts in Poland. A way to achieve that was seen in the king's marriage to a candidate supported by Louis XIII.

France embarked on talks concerning the Polish–Swedish conflict much faster than the Habsburgs did. Count d'Avaux went on a mission to Denmark, Sweden, and Poland as early as in July 1634. His main task was to convince Swedes and Poles about the detrimental impact of the war on both the countries, and prove that the most beneficial solution was the extension of the armistice. D'Avaux reached Sztumska Wieś in the second half of May 1635, and played an exceptionally important role in the peace talks, cooperating with the diplomats from the Netherlands and Brandenburg³⁸.

Possibly already in the latter half of June the king realised that signing a new truce with Sweden cannot be avoided. However, he had his country involved in intensive preparations to the war, as his political and military tactic required. Władysław knew that it would be impossible to obtain aid from Ferdinand II and Philip IV, as, even if they decided to provide some funds in summer, they could not be used for the autumn campaign, as it took many months to recruit, purchase weapons, and expand the fleet. However, not unlike during the negotiations in Altmark, it was the international situation that had a decisive significance. The political circumstances on the European stage, within which the king had to carry out his plan, changed significantly in May. Having concluded an alliance with Sweden, France waged war on Spain, and Ferdinand II signed peace in Prague with Saxony

36 The files on Arnoldin's mission can be found in HHStA, *Polen I*, 57. See Szelągowski, *Rozkład Rzeszy*, 77-119; Lolo, *Rzeczpospolita*, 356-66.

37 Andrzej Rachuba, “Litewskie przygotowania do wojny ze Szwecją w roku 1635”, in *Z dziejów stosunków Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów ze Szwecją*, ed. Mirosław Nagielski (Warszawa: DiG, 2007), 33-43; Maciej A. Pieńkowski, “Polskie przygotowania do wojny ze Szwecją w 1635 r. ”, in *Na z góry upatrzonych pozycjach*, eds. Bartłomiej Międzybrodzki, Magdalena Gajda, Krzysztof Fudelaj and Michał Przeperski (Warszawa-Zabrze: Inforteditions, 2011), 137-46.

38 Serwański, *Francja wobec Polski*, 94-132.

and now conducted talks with the Elector of Brandenburg. The Polish king never intended to break away from the Habsburgs, and now, when his plans could no longer be fulfilled, he had to adjust them to the current international situation. He started a game that, in the new circumstances, was to bring the largest benefits to the Vasa dynasty and to the Commonwealth. In that battle, France became the main tool. The secret talks with ambassador d'Avaux that Władysław conducted since the early July aimed at making an impact on the Swedes and the Habsburgs. The issue with the first were armistice negotiations, as this was primarily the French diplomacy who could have a decisive influence on the position of Sweden and result in the largest concessions in the negotiations. In turn, as far as Habsburgs were concerned, this was a demonstration of the options stemming from the alliance with France: assistance in lobbying for dispensation to marry Elisabeth of the Palatinate to be obtained in Rome, concession to the capture of Silesia, financial support, marriage with Marie Louise or Anne Genevieve, and consent to peace mediation by the side of Pope Urban VIII. To make the rapprochement with Louis XIII more credible, the king agreed to the French drafting, announced his readiness to become a peace mediator on behalf of France and Sweden, and announced sending a legate to Paris. In turn, the French expressed support for Władysław IV regaining the throne in Stockholm by way of a marriage to Christina, granting the Vasas rights to the Swedish crown after her death, or at the least having Finland assigned to John Casimir.

Count d'Avaux and Cardinal Richelieu were easily drawn into the game played out by the Polish king. Both parties presented absolutely unrealistic projects. The French promised Władysław the imperial crown, and he presented visions of conducting grand peace negotiations with the participation of Ferdinand King of Hungary, Cardinal Richelieu, Count-Duke of Olivares, Christian IV King of Denmark, and Secretary of State Barberini, as well as of the Polish army entering the Empire in the force of 25'000 people to separate the belligerent parties³⁹. In the real political dimension, Louis XIII first did not want to allow the Polish–Swedish war, secondly would have the Vasas discouraged from reaching an agreement with the Emperor, and therefore, seeing the king ready for further negotiations, presented a draft of an offensive and defensive alliance.

Conducting negotiations with France, Władysław IV sent signals demonstrating the solidity of the alliance with the Catholic camp to the Habsburgs. Simultaneously with sending Maciej Pstrokoński to the Hague on a mission to convince Elisabeth to convert to Catholicism late in June 1635, he had Prince John Casimir leave for Vienna and join the army of Matthias Gallas, where he fought against the French in the rank of a regimental commander. Throughout spring and summer, the king did not thwart the Emperor's emissaries recruiting in the Commonwealth. Conducting negotiations with Louis XIII, Władysław reached his goal. There is no doubt that France played the role of a lever and made Habsburgs realise that the Vasas could unite with the Bourbons, which forced them to renew and strengthen the friendship with the Polish king.

THE TWO FAMILY TREATIES BETWEEN THE VASAS AND THE HABSBURGS

Władysław IV's plans were thwarted by the armistice in Sztumska Wieś. Conducted on a grand scale for three years, the diplomatic game he played at the courts of London, the Hague, Vienna, Madrid, Berlin, Paris, and Rome failed to obtain foreign financial and military aid for the war with Sweden or to make him a peace mediator. Despite assembling an army of 28'000 people and drawing up plans for military operations, Władysław IV did not break off the peace negotiations⁴⁰. He knew that the majority of senators and nobles opposed the resumption of hostilities. He could not be certain about obtaining the *sejm's* consent for further taxes to continue the war or move it to Sweden either. Therefore his plan was based on the premise of a joint and coordinated military effort of the Vasas and Habsburgs against Sweden. Having failed to achieve it, he gave up rather than took the risk of starting an armed conflict. After signing the truce the king had to start the last stage of the game to ally with the Habsburgs and take care of the future of his brothers and sisters.

39 Szelągowski, *Rozkład Rzeszy*, 167-77; Serwański, *Francja wobec Polski*, 113-58.

40 See footnote 37.

Armistices with Sweden and France, and maintaining the intention to marry Elisabeth of the Palatinate finally forced Vienna to revise its previous policy towards the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania late in the autumn of 1635 and start the negotiations with the Vasas, to counteract the French influence and re-establish the strong bonds between the Polish monarch and the Habsburgs. The arrival of Alexander Greiffenclau, the Emperor's extraordinary resident, at the autumn session of the *sejm* marked the start of a reset in that friendship. In the speech delivered at the audience on 4 December 1635, the imperial resident emphasised the Emperor's understanding for the conclusion of the Polish-Swedish armistice and the king's and Commonwealth's peace aspirations. However his pivotal task was to obtain the permission for the Emperor to take over some troops recruited during the Polish preparations to the war on Sweden. Władysław IV expressed his consent to such recruitment, and 15'000 soldiers entered the Habsburg service⁴¹.

The Emperor entrusted the main role in rapprochement with the Polish king to Father Valerian Magni. On 23 November 1635 the instruction on the negotiations at the court in Warsaw was ready⁴². It was a reaction to the proposals Władysław made a year earlier. Father Valerian was to convince the Vasa king that the Emperor had always been ready to aid Poland, which was, however, rendered impossible by the international situation and the unexpected conclusion of the Polish-Swedish armistice. Ferdinand II also declared his readiness to provide the Commonwealth with financial and military support should only the *sejm* reject the armistice and war. Moreover, he expressed his readiness to conclude an alliance against Turkey. Magni is also believed to have informed the king that, with Pope Urban VIII assuming the role of the mediator in peace negotiations, the Emperor also approved Władysław IV as the other mediator. The last item in the instruction concerned the marriage to Elisabeth of the Palatinate. Father Valerian was expected to oppose these plans with all means available. However, the Emperor did not instruct him to conduct talks on the king marrying any other candidate, for example one of his daughters, which was a proof of Ferdinand's lasting and powerful aversion to the Polish monarch.

Magni arrived in Poland in mid-December, his close relationship with the king resulting in the agreement of the fundamental assumptions and the course of future cooperation between the Habsburgs and the Vasas (especially with regard to their common enemies, i.e. primarily Sweden and Turkey) being agreed in a matter of weeks. The Capuchin was keen on starting a very close cooperation between Władysław and Ferdinand that would furthermore be crowned by the signing of an alliance treaty. He was the more eager to achieve these as subsequently the king started intensive lobbying in Rome for having him made cardinal. It cannot be ruled out that the Capuchin suggested that Władysław continued his Palatinate marriage game as it was very useful for exerting pressure on the Emperor. An indication of that could be the mission of Zawadzki who was sent back to the Hague, London, and Paris in March 1636⁴³. He was to inform Charles I that, in the wake of the position of the Polish Senate, the king could only wed the Princess of the Palatinate if she converted to Catholicism. In the French court, the envoy was to seek support for Władysław's peace mediation, and suggest to Louis XIII that the Polish king could marry a candidate proposed by France.

The marriage of the Polish king to one of the Emperor's daughters was to provide the crowning point of the restoration of friendship and cooperation between the Vasas and the Habsburgs. The King of Spain strongly favoured such a solution from the very moment of coronation of Władysław IV. However, despite the pressure from Philip IV, the Emperor did not embark on the subject in contacts

41 HHStA, Polen I, 59, *Ad serenissimum Regem Statusque Poloniae publica propositio Caesarei residentis Alexandri Greiffenclau de Volratz, Novembris 1635*; Ibid., *Jan Wężyk to Ferdinand II*, Warsaw 7 December 1636, ff. 1-5, and Ibid., *Władysław IV to Ferdinand II*, Warsaw 22 December 1635, f. 19. See Ryszard Skowron, "W służbie Filipa IV. Finansowanie i zaciągi żołnierzy z Rzeczypospolitej przez Hiszpanię w latach 1635-1636", in *Hortus bellicus. Studia z dziejów wojskowości nowożytnej. Prace ofiarowane Profesorowi Mirosławowi Nagielskiemu*, eds. Konrad Bobiatyński, Przemysław Gawron, Krzysztof Kossarzewski, Piotr Kroll and Dariusz Milewski (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Neriton, 2016), 261-75; Mirosław Nagielski, "Emperor's recruitment in the Republic of Poland done by Maciej Arnoldin von Clarstein in 1635", *Przegląd Zachodniopomorski*, 34/4 (2019): 83-100.

42 Szelągowski, *Rozkład Rzeszy*, 182-85; Skowron, *Pax i Mars*, 143-49.

43 Fedorowicz, *England's Baltic Trade*, 239-41; Serwański, *Francja wobec Polski*, 189-90.

with the Polish and Spanish courts. The change occurred when Count de Solre and Abbot Vázquez, Spanish diplomats travelling to Poland in March/April 1636, reached Vienna. Their main task was to convince Ferdinand II to put a quick end to the disputes with the House of Vasa by having Władysław IV marry one of the Emperor's daughters, which the Spanish court considered the fundamental and necessary condition for the Commonwealth to resume the war against Sweden. However, rather than yielding to the pressure from Madrid, Ferdinand II emphasised that any negotiations concerning the marriage with Archduchess Cecilia Renata could only begin after the conclusion of Jan Zawadzki's mission to England and the Stuarts' rejection of the proposal to have Princess Elisabeth convert to Catholicism⁴⁴. The steadfastness of the Emperor's position on this issue is also borne out by his talks to Jerzy Ossoliński during the latter's mission to the *Reichstag* in Regensburg.

In the latter half of June 1636, Count de Solre and Abbot Vázquez arrived in Poland. Working closely with Father Valerian, they played a key role in closing the links between Władysław IV and not only Spain but also Vienna. Their main task was to make the king's marriage to Archduchess Cecilia Renata happen and to have the war against Sweden resumed. At that time Philip IV considered the Commonwealth the main ally of the Habsburgs, whose support would not only result in having the Swedish driven out of Germany but also in sending armies to fight France by the Rhine. The above were the reasons why the Spanish monarch expected his Austrian relatives to make a quick and decisive change in their policy towards the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania⁴⁵.

The path to the direct negotiations of the marriage of the Polish king to the Emperor's daughter opened when a letter of Charles I of England, in which the king firmly rejected the possibility of Elisabeth of the Palatinate converting to Catholicism, reached the Polish court in the latter half of August. Already in September Władysław sent Father Magni on a mission to Regensburg⁴⁶. The cleric was given the task to conduct negotiations on the Vasa-Habsburg alliance that would be guaranteed by the King's marriage to Archduchess Cecilia Renata. Magni arrived in Regensburg with a list of political and dynastic preconditions (still unknown to us), on whose fulfilment any further negotiations depended. That list provided the foundation for drafting the treaty of alliance.

Ferdinand II was quick to accept the proposals of the Polish king, and the treaty on the alliance between the Houses of Habsburg and Vasa was signed already on 14 December 1636 not only by the Emperor but also by his successor Ferdinand III. Both parties to the contract, that is the Austrian House of Habsburgs, and the elder Sigismund line of the Vasa undertook to cooperate closely and mutually safeguard their dynastic interests⁴⁷. The Emperor pledged political and military aid for Władysław IV to regain Sweden. Should the wars on Turkey be victorious, the captured territory was agreed to become a hereditary or feudal possession of a member of the House of Vasa. The Emperor was to support the Sigismund through marriages, and endowments of titles and dignities. In return, in his capacity of the King of Sweden, Władysław IV transferred the right to the Swedish crown after the extinction of the House of Vasa to the Habsburgs, and, as the ruler of Sweden and Poland, promised not to enter any treaties conflicting with the interests of Austria. The dynastic treaty was accompanied by a document (unknown today) in which Ferdinand II agreed that the dowry of Cecilia Renata, the unpaid dowries of Queens Anne and Constance, and other Emperor's pecuniary dues payable to Władysław IV were secured on the duchies of Opole and Racibórz (Ratibor), and Cieszyn. Both the duchies were to be entrusted into hereditary possession to the sons born from the union of the Polish king with Cecilia Renata. The document was brought to Warsaw by Francesco Magni.

The dynastic treaty and the marriage agreement were the success of Władysław IV. The House of Vasa obtained more than just the confirmation of their rights to the Swedish crown as the Emperor

44 Skowron, *Pax i Mars*, 149-51.

45 Skowron, *Pax i Mars*, 151-62; Conde Pazos, *La Monarquía Católica*, 383-86.

46 Vincenzo Criscuolo, "Tre diplomatici cappuccini al "kurfürstentag" di Regensburg del 1636-1637: Valeriano Magni, Francesco Rozdrazewski e Diego de Quiroga", *Laurentianum*, 45/1-2 (2004): 59-107.

47 Szelągowski, *Rozkład Rzeszy*, 255-65. Cf. Skowron, *Pax i Mars*, 173-85; Miguel Conde Pazos, "Relaciones entre los Habsburgo y los Vasa de Polonia. La embajada a Varsovia del conde de Solre y Alonso Vázquez y la firma del Tratado Familiar (1635-1660)", in *Tiempo de cambios: guerra, diplomacia y política internacional de la Monarquía Hispánica (1648-1700)*, ed. Porfirio Sanz Camañes (Madrid: Editorial Acts, 2012), 298-301.

pledged to provide military assistance in wars with Sweden and Turkey. In the dynastic dimension, the King received what he had been playing for since the start of his reign: hereditary duchies for his descendants in Silesia, and support in the form of salaries and dignities for the members of his family. The main benefactor of the treaty was the House of Vasa, as it gave hardly anything to the Austrian Habsburgs, save for a potential and limited possibility to assume the throne in Stockholm. The motives behind Ferdinand II's decision cannot be fully understood, as those were the very plans of it was because of Władysław IV concerning Silesia that prevented him from entering into political negotiations in 1633–35. Moreover, the military situation in the Reich at the end of 1636 did not require concessions reaching that far, even despite the defeat of the imperial-Saxon army in October by the Swedish at Wittstock. The Emperor may have accepted what Władysław IV proposed under strong pressures from Spain, as the Habsburgs decided that the time had come to put a stop to the king's negotiations with Louis XIII, as they might soon become too dangerous for them.

After the death of Ferdinand II, his son and successor upheld the dynastic treaty already on 16 March 1637. However, he strongly opposed the provisions included in the marriage contract between Cecilia Renata and Władysław IV securing the dowry of the Archduchess and granting fief rights to the duchies of Silesia to their children⁴⁸. Ferdinand III proposed to have Cecilia Renata's dowry and other outstanding dowry and loan payments secured on the Wittengau (Třeboň) estates in Moravia. Despite the advancing preparations to the wedding, the negotiations of the marriage contract continued until August. The king insisted on obtaining a duchy in Silesia for his family and, after a prolonged effort, in 1645 he managed to convince Ferdinand III to entrust the Vasas with the duchies of Opole and Racibórz, to which all the Wittengau estate mortgages were transferred.

Conducting negotiations with the Habsburgs on marrying the Emperor's daughter, the king endeavoured to maintain good relationships with England. Already during Zawadzki's mission in 1636, the Polish king emphasised that the pressure to have Princess Elisabeth convert to Catholicism resulted from the decision of the Parliament and not from his own will. In August 1637, Władysław IV sent Andrzej Rey on a mission to London and the Hague, to present the English king the reasons why the Polish king could not marry his niece, assure him of Władysław's readiness not only to maintain the friendship but also of his continued support for the efforts of restoring the Palatinate to the sons of Frederick V, and the need for further development of trade between the two countries. The mission ended in failure as, annoyed by Władysław IV, the King of England did not invite the diplomat to an audience, which was tantamount to severing the relations between the two countries.

CONCLUSION

The possibility of attaining Władysław's main political goal, namely his return to the throne in Stockholm, depended on both internal factors and the quickly changing international situation, so that the Polish king had to adjust his political, diplomatic, and the military strategy to such circumstances. The way he ran foreign policy, whose fundamental tools were diplomacy and the military, was defined by the law binding in the Commonwealth of Poland-Lithuania. The crucial limitations of the scope of his liberties resulted from the constitutional principles of the state, in force since the fifteenth century, which gave the *sejm* the right to approve the taxes, summon *levée en masse*, and declare war. Thus the monarch was thus deprived of the two fundamental tools for running international politics, namely money and the army, and yet at the same time he had to ensure the security and integrity of the state. The view that the Henrician's Articles (*Articuli Henriciani*) adopted by the election *sejm* of 1573 strongly curtailed the king's liberty of running international politics and subjected it to the control of the nobility is prevalent among Polish historians. However, the author believes that the document, and especially its Article 3 (in conjunction with Article 6) so often quoted by researchers of modern diplomacy did in no way limit the king's prerogatives to run international politics compared to the reign of the last two kings of the Jagiellonian dynasty. Nor did the resolutions concerning resident senators and Senate councils (*senatus consilia*) passed by the *sejm* reduce the monarch's competences, as the institutions

they set up were only consulting bodies with no power of legal sanctions, given the task of controlling the king and informing the nobility about the current foreign policy of the monarch. The studies of Andrzej Korytko and Artur Goszczyński on the organisation and functioning of the Senate and the *senatus consilia* in the reign of Władysław IV demonstrate that as far as diplomacy is concerned, the king carried out his will with high efficiency⁴⁹. Falling back on the experience of his father and using different stratagems for working with the Council of the Senate, he primarily exploited the latter to legitimise his decisions and activity on the international stage. Władysław IV was the last ruler of the Commonwealth who, furthering the interest of the dynasty and the state, could and knew how to carry out autonomous foreign policy, exploiting the binding laws and efficiently opposing the efforts of the estates to expand their rights to external policy. The decline of the royal authority that began practically at the start of the reign of John Casimir greatly sped up the juxtaposition of interests of the state and the monarch, which was also reflected in the further practical, customary, and normative curtailment of the royal competences in the foreign policy. The process intensified under John III Sobieski, and culminated in the seventeenth century with August II's *pacta conventa* of 1697.

On the strategic and tactical levels, the concepts for international political and military actions and the diplomatic game devised and carried out by Władysław IV in 1632-37 were in no way inferior to those of the greatest strategists of the Thirty Years' War, to mention Olivares and Richelieu. The key distinctive factor was the effective power which, in the case of the Polish king, was limited by the will of the *sejm* and the Senate. The king had no option to make decisions on offensive wars and military operations abroad. If that is put together with the ruler's lack of certainty as to obtaining the Parliament's consent to further taxation to continue the war and to take military action to the territories of Germany and Sweden, the plan to seek persistently ways of allying with the Habsburgs and embroiling the Commonwealth in a pan-European war become understandable. The whole process of designing a plan to marry Elisabeth of the Palatinate and peace mediation carried out by the Polish diplomacy proves that, despite its contemporary weakness and lack of professionalism, it retained its efficiency and capacity to become part of pan-European negotiations, which certainly had to be accredited to the monarch himself. The armistice in Sztumska Wieś was a failure not only for Władysław IV but also for the Commonwealth. In his policy geared on the West and the North, the king was left alone and could not count on the political people. From a historical perspective, the king's claim that a given political situation needed "seizing on the fly" is consistent with his actions. Moreover the king must have designed such situations himself not only for the use of the nobility but also European rulers.

49 Andrzej Korytko, "Na których opiera się Rzeczpospolita". *Senatorowie koronni za Władysława IV Wazy* (Olsztyn: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warmińsko-Mazurskiego, 2015), 247-70; Artur Goszczyński, "The Institution of Council of the Senate in the Political System of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth under the Rule of Ladislaus IV Vasa (1632-48)", *Acta Poloniae Historica*, 122 (2021): 181-207.

ABBREVIATIONS

AGS: Archivo General de Simancas

Est.: *Estado*

HHStA: Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv in Vienna

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Conde Pazos, Miguel. *La Monarquía Católica y los confines orientales de la cristiandad, relaciones entre la Casa de Austria y los Vasa de Polonia*. PhD diss., Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, 2016.
- Conde Pazos, Miguel. “Relaciones entre los Habsburgo y los Vasa de Polonia. La embajada a Varsovia del conde de Solre y Alonso Vázquez y la firma del Tratado Familiar (1635–1660)”. In *Tiempo de cambios: guerra, diplomacia y política internacional de la Monarquía Hispánica (1648–1700)*, edited by Porfirio Sanz Camañes, 283–309. Madrid: Editorial Acts, 2012.
- Criscuolo, Vincenzo. “Tre diplomatici cappuccini al kurfürstentag di Regensburg del 1636–1637: Valeriano Magni, Francesco Rozdrzewski e Diego de Quiroga”, *Laurentianum*, 45/1-2 (2004): 59–107.
- Cygan, Jerzy. *Valerianus Magni (1586–1661), “Vita prima”, operum recensio et bibliographia*. Romae: Institutum Historicum Capuccinum, 1989.
- Czapliński, Władysław. *Władysław IV i jego czasy*. Warszawa: PW Wiedza Powszechna, 1976.
- Czapliński, Władysław. *Polska a Prusy i Brandenburgia za Władysława IV*. Wrocław: Wrocławskie Towarzystwo Naukowe, 1947.
- Duda, Paweł. “Stolica Apostolska a projekt małżeństwa Władysława IV z Elżbietą von Wittelsbach”. In *Sztuka roztropności. Dyplomacja Stolicy Apostolskiej wobec Rzeczypospolitej, Europy i świata w epoce nowożytnej i XX wieku*, edited by Krzysztof Ożóg and Ryszard Skowron, 121–40. Kraków: PAU, 2020.
- Dzięgielewski, Jan. *O tolerancję dla zdominowanych. Polityka wyznaniowa Rzeczypospolitej w latach panowania Władysława IV*. Warszawa: PWN, 1986.
- Elliott, John H. “The Year of the Three Ambassadors”. In *History and Imagination. Essays in Honour H.R. Trevor-Roper*, edited by Hugh Lloyd-Jones, Valerie Pearl and Blair Worden, 165–81. London: Duckworth, 1981.
- Fedorowicz, Jan K. *England’s Baltic Trade in the Early Seventeenth Century. A Study in Anglo-Polish Commercial Diplomacy*. Cambridge: University Press, 1980.
- Filipczak-Kocur, Anna. *Poselstwo Aleksandra Piaseczyńskiego i Kazimierza Leona Sapiehy do Moskwy w 1635 roku*. Opole: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Opolskiego, 2017.
- Filipczak-Kocur, Anna. “Wojna smoleńska 1633–1634 w ówczesnych gazetach ulotnych”. In *Komunikacja i komunikowanie w dawnej Polsce*, edited by Krzysztof Stępnik and Maciej Rajewski, 55–79. Lublin: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej, 2008.
- Godfrey, Elizabeth. *The Sisters of Prince Rupert, Elizabeth Princess Palatine and Abbess of Herford*. London-New York: John Lane, 1909.
- Godziszewski, Władysław. *Polska a Moskwa za Władysława IV*. Kraków: PAU, 1930.
- Goszczyński, Artur. “The Institution of Council of the Senate in the Political System of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth under the Rule of Ladislaus IV Vasa (1632–48)”. *Acta Poloniae Historica*, 122 (2021): 181–207.
- Kalinowska, Anna. “The Polish Match? British Diplomacy, Poland-Lithuania and the Stuart–Vasa Dynastic Alliance Project”. *Sarmatia Europaea*, 2 (2011/2012): 7–27.
- Korytko, Andrzej. *“Na których opiera się Rzeczpospolita”. Senatorowie koronni za Władysława IV Wazy*. Olsztyn: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Warmińsko-Mazurskiego, 2015.
- Korytko, Andrzej. “Echa znad Wisły. Dyplomaci weneccy o mariażu Władysława IV z Elżbietą Wittelsbach”. In *Ad fontes. Studia ofiarowane Księdzu Profesorowi Alojzemu Szorcowi w siedemdziesięciolecie urodzin*, edited by Zoja Jaroszewicz-Pieresławcew and Irena Makarczyk, 177–82. Olsztyn: Pracownia Wydawnicza “Elset”, 2006.
- Krajewski, Józef. “Władysław IV a korona szwedzka”. *Biblioteka Warszawska*, t. 297/3 (1913): 209–34.
- Lindquist, Thea L. *The Politics of Diplomacy: The Palatinate and Anglo-Imperial Relations in The Thirty*

- Years' War*. PhD diss., University of Wisconsin, 2001.
- Lolo, Radosław. *Rzeczpospolita wobec wojny trzydziestoletniej. Opinie i stanowiska szlachty polskiej (1618-1635)*. Pułtusk: Wyższa Szkoła Humanistyczna, 2004.
- Loomie, Albert J. "Olivares, the English Catholics and the Peace of 1630". *Revue Belge de Philologie et d'Historie*, 47/4 (1969): 1154-66.
- Mierzwa, Edward Alfred. *Anglia a Polska w pierwszej połowie XVII wieku*. Warszawa: PWN, 1986.
- Nagielski, Mirosław. "Emperor's recruitment in the Republic of Poland done by Maciej Arnoldin von Clarstein in 1635". *Przegląd Zachodniopomorski*, 34/4 (2019): 83-100.
- Newmark, Catharine. "Prinzessin Elisabeth von Böhemen". In *Von Diana zu Minerva: Philosophierende Aristokratinnen des 17. und 18. Jahrhunderts*, edited by Ruth Hagengruber, 47-64. Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2012.
- Ochman-Staniszevska, Stefania. *Dynastia Wazów w Polsce*. Warszawa: PWN, 2006.
- Pape, Rainer. "Elisabeth von der Pfalz". In *Westfälische Lebensbilder*, vol. 12, edited by Robert Stupperich, 23-41. Münster: Veröffentlichungen der Historischen Kommission für Westfalen, 1979.
- Pieńkowski, Maciej A. "Polskie przygotowania do wojny ze Szwecją w 1635 r". In *Na z góry upatrzonych pozycjach*, edited by Bartłomiej Międzybrodzki, Magdalena Gajda, Krzysztof Fudelaj and Michał Przeperski, 137-46. Warszawa-Zabrze: Inforteditions, 2011.
- Rachuba, Andrzej. "Litewskie przygotowania do wojny ze Szwecją w roku 1635". In *Z dziejów stosunków Rzeczypospolitej Obojga Narodów ze Szwecją*, edited by Mirosław Nagielski, 33-43. Warszawa: DiG, 2007.
- Reeve, Lawrence John. *Charles I and the Road to Personal Rule*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- Reeve, Lawrence John. "Quiroga's Paper of 1631: A Missing Link in Anglo-Spanish Diplomacy during The Thirty Years War". *The English Historical Review*, 101 (1981): 913-25.
- Ródenas Vilar, Rafael. *La política europea de España durante la guerra de los Treinta Años (1624-1630)*. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1967.
- Sanz Camañes, Porfirio. *Diplomacia hispano-inglesa en el siglo XVII. Razón de Estado y relaciones de poder durante la Guerra de los Treinta Años, 1618-1648*. Cuenca: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Castilla-La Mancha, 2002.
- Serwański, Maciej. *Francja wobec Polski w dobie wojny trzydziestoletniej (1618-1648)*. Poznań: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Adama Mickiewicza, 1986.
- Skowron, Ryszard. "W służbie Filipa IV. Finansowanie i zaciągi żołnierzy z Rzeczypospolitej przez Hiszpanię w latach 1635-1636". In *Hortus bellicus. Studia z dziejów wojskowości nowożytnej. Prace ofiarowane Profesorowi Mirosławowi Nagielskiemu*, edited by Konrad Bobiatyński, Przemysław Gawron, Krzysztof Kossarzecki, Piotr Kroll and Dariusz Milewski, 261-75. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Neriton, 2016.
- Skowron, Ryszard. *Pax i Mars. Polsko-hiszpańskie relacje polityczne w latach 1632-1648*. Kraków: Towarzystwo Wydawnicze "Historia Iagellonica", 2013.
- Skowron, Ryszard. *Olivares, los Vasa y el Báltico. Polonia en la política internacional de España en los años 1621-1632*. Warszawa: DiG, 2008.
- Szelągowski, Adam. *O ujście Wisły. Wielka wojna pruska*. Warszawa: Gebethner & Wolff, 1905.
- Szelągowski, Adam. *Rozkład Rzeszy i Polska za panowania Władysława IV*. Kraków: Akademia Umiejętności, 1907.
- Szymańska, Marta. "Misja Jana Zawadzkiego na dwory Europy Północnej w 1633 roku a geneza polityki zagranicznej Władysława IV". In *Władza i polityka w czasach nowożytnych. Dyplomacja i sprawy wewnętrzne*, edited by Małgorzata Karkocha and Zbigniew Anusik, 87-106. Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, 2020.
- Taźbierski, Zdzisław. *Związki Polski z Anglią od schyłku XIV do połowy XVIII wieku. Studium z dziejów polityki dynastycznej*. Olsztyn: Wyższa Szkoła Pedagogiczna, 1999.
- Trawicka, Zofia. "Projekt kalwińskiego małżeństwa Władysława IV". *Odrodzenie i reformacja w Polsce*, 11 (1966): 93-100.
- Wisner, Henryk. *Zygmunt III Waza*. Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1991.

- Wisner, Henryk. "Dyplomacja polska w latach 1572-1648". In *Historia dyplomacji polskiej*, vol. II: 1572–1795, edited by Zbigniew Wójcik, 5-161. Warszawa: PWN, 1982.
- Worthington, David. *Scots in the Habsburg Service, 1618-1648*. Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2004.
- Zawadzki, Konrad. *Gazety ulotne polskie i Polski dotyczące XVI–XVIII wieku. Bibliografia*, tom 1: 1514–1661. Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich, 1977.

PRIMARY SOURCES

AGS

Est., 2569, 3832.

Biblioteka Zakładu Narodowego im. Ossolińskich in Wrocław

Ms. 121/74.

HHStA

Polen I, 57, 59.

PRINTED SOURCES

- Akkerman, Nadine, ed. *The Correspondence of Elizabeth Stuart, Queen of Bohemia*. vol. 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
- Becker, Rotraud, ed. *Nuntiaturberichte aus Deutschland nebst ergänzenden Aktenstücken*, 4/vol. 7: *Nuntiatoren des Malatesta Baglioni, des Ciriaco Rocci und des Mario Filonardi. Sendung des P. Alessandro d'Ales (1634–1635)*. Tübingen: Niemeyer, 2004.
- Hinds, Allen B., ed. *Calendar of State Papers Relating to English Affairs in the Archives of Venice*. vol. 23. London: H.M.S.O., 1921.
- Radziwiłł, Krzysztof. *Sprawy wojenne i polityczne 1621–1632*. Paryż: Wydawnictwo Biblioteki Polskiej, 1859.
- Vaquero, Quintin Aldea, ed. *España y Europa en el siglo XVII. Correspondencia de Saavedra Fajardo*. t. II. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1991.
- Volumina Legum: przedruk zbioru praw staraniem XX. pijarów w Warszawie od roku 1732 do roku 1782*, vol. III. Petersburg: Ohryzki, 1859.