Title: Analytical philosophy of history in Poland: inspirations and interpretations

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ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY IN POLAND. INSPIRATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS.

Abstract

Analytic philosophy is sometimes understood in opposition to continental tradition. In this article, I would like to show that a Lviv-Warsaw School shared many fundamental traits with analytic orientation. In afterwar Poland, this tradition clashed with the dialectical materialism that lacks strong scientific tradition but had the full support of the communist party. This situation produced a unique scenario in which the methodology of science could strive as a mainstream area. A crucial role was attributed to the theory of history.

Keywords: Analytic Philosophy of History, Lviv-Warsaw School, Marxist theory of history, Poznan School of Methodology

“Someone has rightly said that what has passed has not ceased to exist, and it has only become absent”

Tadeusz Kotarbiński

1 Unless stated otherwise all translations are from the author (P.K.J).
2 Tadeusz Kotarbiński, “Zagadnienie istnienia przyszłości” [The question of the existence of the future], Przegląd Filozoficzny 1 (1913): 74. This sentence was quoted and logically discussed in an antirelativistic paper by Stanisław Leśniewski, “Czy prawda jest wieczna, czy też wieczna i odwieczna?” [Is truth eternal, or both eternal and sempiternal?], Nowe Tory 18 (1913): 493–528. It may very well be the first discussion on the topic of ontology of history within the tradition of analytical philosophy, although it reflects the serious problem logic has with temporal sentences since Bertrand Russell’s famous “On Denoting” (1905).
Historians\(^3\) often arrange the past by naming its periods with an elegant names. Thus, the 18th century has been labeled the “Age of Reason” and the 19th the “Age of History”. Doesn’t such a rhetorical juxtaposition suggest that history is irrational? According to many scholars, history is a description of human actions, and as such, it is only as rational as its agents. Such a protagonist has a story that can only be understood by learning the entire context of the society he or she lived in. This historical context came to be known as culture and became the primary interest of 19th-century humanists. At the same time, Western culture was making great leaps in the rational sciences. Such intellectual dualism posed a severe challenge to philosophy still trying to synthesize knowledge at the dawn of the twentieth century.

In the early 1960s, the American philosopher and historian of intellectual life Morton White, seeking an elegant term for twentieth-century philosophy, used the term “The Age of Analysis”\(^4\). From a European point of view, both in the West (because of other intellectual currents such as existentialism, phenomenology, and philosophical hermeneutics) and in the East (because of Marxist philosophy), this was a proposition as controversial as it was evident in Great Britain and the United States. This time the difference was not temporal but spatial and went down in intellectual history as the Great Divide (or Analytic/Continental Divide).

In this article, I will return to this simplified model to problematize it by presenting two borderline cases. The first case is unique because it concerns the analytic philosophy of history (APH), a subject that has traditionally been beyond the interest of “analysts”. The second case involves Poland, drawing attention to the fact that it was at Polish universities where one of the first programs of analytic philosophy was developed (Lviw-Warsaw School). This situation was significantly altered after the 2\(^{nd}\) World War when analytic school came under criticism from historical materialism, which represented the official ideology of communist Poland. It led to a forced clash between two school: the analytical and the historical, which remained largely separated in the West. The synthesis of these two elements in Poland was, in my view, the reason for the extraordinary development of the philosophy of science and history in the second half of the last century.

All this makes the history of APH in Poland in two respects exceptional: it is uniquely exciting and uniquely challenging to explain within the framework of traditional categories of historical theory. Therefore it will be explained in easiest and most adequate way: historically.

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\(^3\) I would like to express my gratitude towards two historians, who gave me precious advice during the preparation of this article: Krzysztof Brzechczyn and Krzysztof Zamorski.

1. THE HISTORY OF (POLISH) ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY: LVIV-WARSOW SCHOOL (LWS)

There are two widely acknowledge origins of the analytic tradition: works of Gottlob Frege in Germany and works of Bertrand Russell in England. It should be mentioned that the analytical methods, both of Jena and Cambridge, constituted a response to the idea, typical at the time, of bringing philosophy closer to science and away from psychology and speculative metaphysics.

Similar ideas were soon developed in central Europe, where philosophers and scientists formed a well-known Vienna Circle. Less known but chronologically preceding the development of logical positivism in Austria was the Polish school of analytic philosophy established in Lviv after Kazimierz Twardowski arrived there from Vienna in 1895. Lviv was the capital of the autonomous region of Galicia, at that time part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, which had two Polish universities: in Krakow and Lviv. Soon after regaining independence after World War I, Twardowski’s students took up key chairs at Warsaw University, creating what is now known as the Lviv-Warsaw School. This school ranks among the five traditional schools of analytic philosophy: 1) Cambridge (philosophical analysis), 2) Lviv-Warsaw School, 3) Vienna Circle (logical positivism/empiricism), 4) Oxford (school of everyday language), and 5) American analytic philosophy.

Lviv, located in present-day Ukraine, was one of the most important centers of Polish culture at the turn of the 20th century. It was here that the Polish Historical Society (in 1886) and the Polish Philosophical Society (in 1904) were founded. Professionalization in the modern sense happened earlier in history because of the influence of German historism with the idea of historical Bildung as crucial for the development of engaged citizens. Philosophy, law, or the technical sciences were not essential to stimulating the national spirit, but these fields became increasingly popular among Polish intellectuals in the second half of the twentieth century. This was a direct reflection of trends happening in Western Europe, where Polish intelligentsia was educated, not having another opportunity since the loss of independence in 1795 until the re-polonization of the universities of Cracow and Lviv in the 1860s.

One might argue that the partitions of Poland led, on the one hand, to historians concentrating on the national history, but on the other hand, they brought the Polish intelligentsia closer to Western thought on a scale never seen before. In the first issue of the Przegląd Filozoficzny [Philosophical Review] published in Warsaw in 1897, the editor of the volume wrote in the introduction:

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6 Until 1924 known as “Historical Society”.

7 This is a simplification, but it gives a truthful idea about the difficult situation of polish scholars in the 19th century, especially after the failure of the November Uprising of 1830–31 when the so called “Great Emigration” started.
So far, philosophy in Poland has been only a delayed echo of one or another western movement [...] A new intellectual movement has begun in Poland since 1860. The development of the natural sciences in the West in the second half of our century, a series of new discoveries and theories have unveiled unknown new horizons and put an end to the subjective and idealistic speculation in philosophy.⁸

In keeping with the spirit of Warsaw positivism, the development of philosophy depended on its use of the achievements of physics, biology, psychology, and sociology. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the first text of this collection, Adam Mahrburg states that the main task of philosophy is to create a theory of science⁹.

This new spirit in Polish philosophy was personified most by Kazimierz Twardowski, who gained fame with his book on mental acts and representations published in Vienna in 1894¹⁰. A year later, he was appointed chair of philosophy in Lviv, and the history of Polish analytic philosophy began with his famous seminars. Permanent contact with the achievements of world science was an essential requirement¹¹. There is an anecdote according to which Twardowski gave a student a philosophical text in English and two-week deadline to prepare a paper for his seminar. Poor student said with embarrassment that he did not know English. The professor graciously increased the deadline to four weeks¹².

Twardowski was strict scholar, not only towards himself and his students but also towards science in general. He demanded, above all, honesty and clarity as they constituted for him the basic requirements of rational science. He was very far from dogmatism and interested in many philosophical theories as long as they were articulated in a precise manner¹³. His innovative teaching method has been recently called “philosophical grammar”¹⁴. His quest for conceptual clarity

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¹¹ This is also evidenced by the very extensive review section of foreign journals in the publishing organ of the Philosophical Society called Ruch Filozoficzny [Philosophical Movement] which he edited. See the goals statement in the first issue: “Od Redakcji”, Ruch Filozoficzny I/1 (1911): 16.
¹³ Twardowski was a student of Franz Brentano in Vienna, and is sometimes ascribed to so called “School of Brentano”. See more about the relation between Brentano and analytic philosophy in Peter Simons, Philosophy and Logic in Central Europe from Bolzano to Tarski. Selected Essays (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1992), where Author argues that analytic philosophy was developed in Mitteleuropa by Brentano and achieved it most developed European stage in Lviv-Warsaw School before being incorporated into Anglo-American Philosophy with the outburst of World War II.
and contact with foreign research led his colleagues to take an interest in other students of Franz Brentano and in the philosophy from Cambridge. They were, however, less interested in Edmund Husserl and G.E. Moore, but rather in less popular at that time logical works of Frege and Russell.

The major turn in the previous positivistic philosophy in Warsaw, and even the philosophy of Twardowski, happened when his students turned into modern logic. Within this step the "Golden Age" of polish philosophy begun\(^{15}\). Jan Łukasiewicz, the oldest student of Twardowski and the inventor of multi-valued logics, who in 1915 became a professor in reopened (after Warsaw was seized from Russia by German troops) University of Warsaw\(^{16}\) wrote in his memoirs:

\begin{quotation}
The first volume of Husserl’s Logical Investigations impressed the Lvov philosophical circle very much; in particular, it impressed me. I had not liked psychologism for some time, and I entirely rejected this view after reading Husserl. However, I became disappointed with the second volume of the Logical Investigations. Once more I encountered the obscure philosophical talk which always repelled me from German philosophers. I wondered that such a deep difference could occur between two volumes of the same work. Later, I realized that it was not Husserl who spoke to me in the first volume of the Logical Investigations, but someone else, who was used by Husserl in his book and was much greater than he, namely Gottlob Frege\(^{17}\).
\end{quotation}

Jan Woleński, a philosopher who spent his academic life tracking the development of Lviv-Warsaw School, claims that due to the works of Jan Łukasiewicz, Stanisław Leśniewski, and Tadeusz Czeżowski, reception of Frege in Poland was “faster and deeper than in other countries, except England, due to works of Russell and Jourdain”\(^{18}\). In another article, Woleński suggested that “Krakow, not Lvov, became the first serious centre of mathematical logic”\(^{19}\).

\begin{itemize}
  \item[16] It is generally accepted that Łukasiewicz’s arrival in Warsaw marked the expansion of the project of renewing philosophy through philosophical logic from Lvov to Warsaw and then to other universities. It should be remembered that regardless of the inspiration from Lvov, Warsaw positivists were already interested in similar ideas and Warsaw mathematicians developed their research on the foundations of mathematics (first specialized journal in the field, Fundamenta Mathematicae was first published in 1920).
\end{itemize}
Leon Chwistek began there the first systematic studies of Russells *Principia Mathematica*, and it is rumored that the support of the philosopher from Cambridge was the decisive factor in his appointment to the Chair of Mathematical Logic in Lviv in 1928 against Alfred Tarski. At the time, it was probably a bitter pill to swallow for Tarski, who became world famous for his semantic definition of truth, but it may have very well saved his life in the long run. Without a permanent professorship at a university in Poland, Tarski had to travel frequently to lecture on his theory of truth. This theory was of great interest to the Austrian community centered around the Unity of Science. After the *Anschluss* of Austria into Nazi Germany and the subsequent emigration of the Jewish philosophers from this terrain, the 1939 Unity of Science Congress was held in Harvard. Shortly after Tarski arrived in the US, World War II began, and Tarski started his life in exile.

Tarski is therefore not a suited candidate for one of the famous six people who, according to Russell, really read his *Principia Mathematica*, as he notes in his autobiography: “I used to know of only six people who had read the later parts of the book. Three of these were Poles, subsequently (I believe) liquidated by Hitler. The three other were Texans, subsequently successfully assimilated.” It is unclear what he meant in the last sentence, and the joke usually goes in another shorter version as: “Only six people have read through ‘Principia Mathematica’ and three of those were Poles.” Wolenski tried to identify these “three Poles” and concluded that it is impossible, as he shows that a deep understanding of Russell’s book can be found in the writings of many Polish philosophers. Russell’s ironic statement plays on the two sad but true preju-

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22 In 1935 Tarski applied for the chair at the University in Poznań, however, the post has been canceled. He tried again in Lviv in 1939 and was also denied. See Anita Burdman-Feferman, Solomon Feferman, *Alfred Tarski: Life and Logic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 102–103.


dices in the history of science: (1) many great 20th century logicians were Poles, and (2) Nazis killed many Polish intellectuals27.

More important are three other acknowledgments. Firstly, Lviv-Warsaw School (LWS) is only a common name for Polish analytical philosophy in the interwar period that should be understood broader: territorially and temporally28. After World War II, Lviv was no longer in Poland, and in Warsaw, a radically different vision for philosophy was implemented by force. Therefore, LWS the Lviv-Warsaw School ceased to exist in a dominant and organized way, but the spirit of analytical philosophy in Poland remains very strong. Secondly, it would be false to assume that analytical philosophy is a product of Anglo-American or even Anglo-German culture. It obscures the unique accomplishments of Polish analytic philosophy, which was the first to create such a solid and organized structure that we call it “school” within this tradition. Such a nationalistic interpretation is also problematic because of the apparent affiliation of many analytic philosophers with Jewish culture29. Third and key: the methodology of sciences, including social sciences, was one of the critical interests of the representatives of the European analytic philosophy from its beginnings, and LWS was no exception. Without these foundations, neither the analytic philosophy of history (APH) nor the Poznan School of Methodology (PSM) would have arisen.

2. ANALYTICAL PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY (APH): AN AMERICAN TRADITION?

An ocean away from the Nazi and Soviet atrocities, Alfred Tarski was safe, but his situation in exile was not easy. Somehow, he managed to secure an academic position in the US, first in Harvard and then Berkeley, where he continued to work with other analytic philosophers. A good illustration of his


28 To already the strong centers of Cracow, Lviv, and Warsaw came in 1920s Poznan and Vilnus, and thus the ideas of Lviv-Warsach School reached the whole country giving justification to the name Polish analytical philosophy. In Poznań (since 1928) and Cracow (since 1937) the chair for Theory and Methodology of Science was held by Zygmunt Zawirski. Soon after incorporaton of Vilnus to Poland another of Twardowskis pupils, Tadeusz Czeżewski became professor there. During the war he was able to saved 8 people from the Jewish ghetto for was named a member of the Righteous Among the Nations in 1963. At this time, he was professor in Toruń. See: Irena Szumilewicz-Lachman, Zygmunt Zawirski. His Life and Work. With Selected Writings on Time, Logic & the Methodology of Science (Boston: Kluwer Academic, 1994) and Tadeusz Czeżowski, Knowledge, Science, And Values. A Program for Scientific Philosophy, ed. by Leon Gumański (Amsterdam/Atlanta: Rodopi, 2000).

situation can be found in his letter to Morton White during the time of the Warsaw Uprising:

I must apologize for not answering your earlier cards. But you can easily imagine how badly I feel during these last months in connection with the situation in Warsaw. I have of course no news from my family since the uprising and the siege began, and I am afraid that even if they survive this ordeal I shall not hear from them for a long time. Russians are not anxious to permit their subjects to communicate with the rest of the world. I have not yet received any word from those parts of Poland which were “liberated” many months ago, though I have some very good friends there who know my address. In this situation I can hardly do anything but worry and listen by radio; even to write a letter is for me an effort... 30

According to White, this letter was one of the first efforts to overcome the analytic/synthetic distinction:

in this letter [...] Tarski discusses the circumstances under which he was ready to reject the logical and physical premises of a science. Here his views are similar to views later advanced by W. V. Quine in his “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”. In the first footnote of that paper, Quine acknowledges a “large and indeterminate debt” to Tarski and others [...] I should add that I had letters such as this one from Tarski in mind, as well as conversations with him, when I wrote, in the opening footnote to my article “The Analytic and the Synthetic: An Untenable Dualism, “that my general attitude on the issue had been influenced not only by Goodman and Quine but also by Tarski. 31

With this small example, I hope to stress this relatively unknown Polish contribution to one of the most critical changes in analytic philosophy. The distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences has its roots in the philosophy of Immanuel Kant and was adopted by Frege, for whom truth and false were logical values and not something that tells us anything about the “outside world”. It led to the conviction that actual (analytic) knowledge can be achieved only by explaining the observed phenomena via showing its covering law. Subsequently, the deduction has to become the ultimate method for all of science. Unity of Science movement wanted to use this distinction to eliminate another one: the division between Naturwissenschaft and Geisteswissenschaft. Since history became the ultimate symbol of the latter in the 19th century, it has provided a borderline case for verifying the unity of science thesis.

In 1942 another philosopher of science from Europe in US exile, Carl Hempel, published his first article in claiming that historians are also deducting their knowledge from generalisations 32. Because of the complex subject-

31 White, Philosophical Letter, 28.
matter, they have to deal with, they cannot provide scientific explanations but are making “explanation sketches” that are “scientifically acceptable”. On the one hand, Hempel justified history as a science; on the other, he made it look like a lesser and not fully autonomous one. The controversy over Hempel’s vision of history created a new current in the philosophy of science called the analytical philosophy of history (APH). In England similar ideas were developed by Karl Popper, but, in my opinion, it was William Dray's strong criticism of Hempel’s vision of historiography that really started the field called APH\textsuperscript{33}.

To my best knowledge, the term APH was first used by Morton White in 1950\textsuperscript{34}, when he tried to outline what modern philosophy of history in America is and should be. This new philosophy was obviously analytical but was already very distant from the early ideas of Russell atomism or even the strict vision of Hempel’s unity of science. In my opinion it had to do mainly with the intense criticism of analytic/synthetic distinction by W. A. Quine in “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”, where he wrote: “our statements about the external world face the tribunal of sense experience not individually, but only as a corporate body [...]. Each statement, taken in isolation from its fellows, can admit of confirmation or infirmation at all”\textsuperscript{35}.

Criticism of the principle of verification of independent statements and modified Hempel's “general law theory” was fully developed in Arthur C. Danto’s book from 1965. It was called the Analytic Philosophy of History\textsuperscript{36}. This represented a developed vision of historical science typical for Anglo-Saxon philosophy in the 1960s. Professional historians usually locked themselves in archives and ignored this new “field”. Nevertheless, a new discipline called “Theory of History”\textsuperscript{37} was created at this time and is growing ever since.

Anglo-American “Theory of History” distanced itself from German metaphysics of history. Patrick L. Gardiner described the latter as a philosophical monster and proposed development of modern methodology of history in the spirit of Hempel and Popper instead\textsuperscript{38}. In 1965 similar position was taken in introductory chapters of Danto’s Analytical Philosophy of History and White’s

\textsuperscript{34} Morton White, “Toward an analytic philosophy of history,” in Philosophic thought in France and the United States, Essays representing major trends in contemporary French and American philosophy, ed. by Marvin Farber (Buffalo: University of Buffalo Publications in Philosophy, 1950), 705–725.
\textsuperscript{36} Arthur C. Danto, Analytical Philosophy of History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965).
\textsuperscript{37} The formative role of this journal, which has been published continuously since 1960, cannot be overestimated.
Foundations of Historical Knowledge\textsuperscript{39}. Years earlier, Karl R. Popper described historical materialism as the most influential and most dangerous version of this historiosophy monster\textsuperscript{40}.

It is clear that “historicism” described by Popper was an “ideal type” that has little to do with reality. Nevertheless, after a short period of optimism about the potential of Marxism applications to social sciences in postwar Poland (in 1945–1950), similar “ideal type” was implemented through administrative force. This version of historical materialism was provided by Joseph Stalin in his (in)famous Short Course (Russian: Краткий курс)\textsuperscript{41}.

During one of the recent symposiums about the future of analytic philosophy, Marcin Miłkowski claimed:

> How did dogmatic Marxism arise in Poland? By way of a critique of analytic philosophy – the Lviv-Warsaw School. This fact is well known to all participants in the discussion. However, not everyone knows that in the attacking pamphlets written at the time by Kołakowski, Schaff, or Baczko, there were also arguments (very numerous for those times) alongside the epithets. The main line of argumentation was that idealistic bourgeois philosophy (read: analytical philosophy) is ahistorical and ignores the social context\textsuperscript{42}.

Analytical philosophy had problematic relation to history, but precisely around the heydays of Stalinism in the East, many thinkers in the West abandoned dogmatic désintéressement toward history for the plea for a new philosophy of history. Nevertheless, the logically oriented tradition of Lviv-Warsaw School was easily targeted and dismissed as ahistorical and abstract. With history as a central part of the system, Marxism-Stalinism was introduced to solve these problems.

The symbol of this general change was the 1\textsuperscript{st} Congress of Polish Science held in Warsaw between 29 June and 2 July 1951. Although the organization of the philosophical section was handed over to one of Twardowski’s closest student, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz\textsuperscript{43}, it was made clear, that it is only temporal before the Marxism philosophy will take root. The leading role in this process was

\begin{itemize}
  \item At this time Ajdukiewicz, dean of the Poznan University, was probably the best known philosopher who was still in Poland. His strong position between war was also shown as Ajdukiewicz also represented Polish delegation at the 1\textsuperscript{st} International Congress of Scientific Philosophy in Paris in 1935. At that time he described the general program of the Lviv-Warsaw School as “logical anti-irrationalism”. He also used the name of the school for the first time, however it has become popular only when Marxist philosophers were attacking it under this name. Also, in this propaganda originate the myth that polish logicians were actually only a were merely a branch of foreign English and Austrian/German philosophy. This accusation was clearly wrong, as the formation of Lviv-Warsaw school not only
\end{itemize}
given to Adam Schaff, who received his Ph.D. in Moscow during the war and after oversaw re-educating Polish academics in the spirit of Marxism-Stalinism. According to one anecdote, after Schaff vigorously criticized Ajdukiewicz for Kantian idealism and anti-materialism, the accused stood up and said, “there is something that makes me different from Kant: I have a wife and two children”, after which he left. Surprisingly, this overt manifestation of resistance had no negative consequences for the career of Ajdukiewicz, who in 1954 moved to the University of Warsaw, where he taught logic and methodology of sciences until his retirement in 1961.

During the Congress, similar pressure was put onto the community of historians, who traditionally had a strong position in Poland. In the opening paper Żanna Kormanowa made clear that new Poland needed new historiography (of the masses and for the masses) and that the decisive issue lies in methodology. Additionally, the contemporary class struggle was linked with the historical one, and therefore with historians. Kormanowa not only focused her research on the history of workers movement (after her Ph.D. in Warsaw in 1927), but more importantly, after deportation, in 1943-1944 she worked in the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union. Not only essential positions in Polish science were given to people with strong ties to Moscow, but soon Russian historians came to make sure that the new methodology of history is interpreted correctly. This happened during the First Methodological Conference of Polish Historians (December 1951 to January 1952 in Otwock, near Warsaw). Despite using the adjective “Polish” in the conference title, three of

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46 It was also internationally recognized as the 8th International Congress of Historical Sciences was held in Warsaw in 1933. In comparison none Polish city was ever a host of World Congress of Philosophy, but also historians did not have this same opportunity to work in exile contributing to the main contemporary issues as it was the case with Polish philosophers. There were many historians in exile that have played a crucial role in the state of discipline in Poland, but they always stayed Polish historians interested in Polish affairs and not in universal laws of logic. This could serve to confirm the thesis of a strong separation between philosophy and history, but I know of at least two examples from interwar Poland where a close relationship between professional philosophers and historians can be demonstrated: 1) The *Historic* of Marceli Handelsman (also a vice-chairman of the Organizing committee of VIIth International Congress) was read and commented on before publication by Władysław Tatarkiewicz, for which the author thanks him warmly in the introduction; 2) Roman Lutman’s very valuable articles on the methodology of history were probably consulted with his wife, Maria Kokoszyńska-Lutmanowa, who was Twardowski’s pupil and later head of the Department of Logic and Methodology of Sciences at the polonized University of Wrocław.
the nine plenary papers were delivered by guests from the USSR. Suffice to say that Boris Dmitrievich Grekov, director of the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, presented “The Origins of Feudalism in Russia in the Light of J. Stalin’s Works on Linguistics” in the presence of leading representatives of the Polish government. The message was clear: historical science in Poland should share the fate of historical science in the USSR, namely, be subjected to direct Party control.

Despite many valuable points, such as the criticism of Eurocentrism and the thesis of “historical” and “non-historical” nations, or the emphasis on the necessity of economic research, the crucial goal was to recognize the Stalinism interpretation of historical materialism as the only methodology valid in historiography. This plan was only partially implemented, as the Polish historians were able to advocate for non-dogmatic Marxism. This fragile compromise would probably not last long, but Stalin died, and Władysław Gomułka came to power in Poland. A certain de-Stalinization of politics within “Polish road to socialism” began. For historians, this did not mean freeing themselves from the framework of historical materialism but at least avoiding its very dogmatic interpretation.

3. Poznań School of Methodology (PSM): Between LWS, APH and Marxism

The political situation in post-war Poland forced the adoption of the basic principles of historical materialism as the matrix of history and all of science. LWS was criticized after the war mainly in two areas: for its lack of pragmatism and historical perspective. It seemed that once these deficiencies were remedied, a dialogue, or rather an absorption of the LWS tradition into Marxism, might ensue. This is important as other philosophical currents such as Thomism or phenomenology were considered to be in apparent contradiction with the prevailing ideology and were fought mainly politically rather than ideologically. Most prominent representatives of the LWS (Ajdukiewicz, Kotarbiński) were attacked with some philosophical arguments (backed up with political pressure) in order to force self-criticism and “exploit” them for Marxism.

As mentioned before, these efforts remained unsuccessful, as most LWS philosophers decided to defend their “scientific world-perspective” against any dogma. This position among with the international recognition of LWS made it appealing for the new generations of scholars who were educated in Poland during or shortly after the war. Certain liberalization of the apparatus control over science after 1956 led to more scientific interest in the methodology of history and Marxism. In 1958 historian Witold Kula published Rozważania o historii [Reflections on History], and 1960 saw the publication of Studia

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If the first book was somehow similar to Marc Bloch’s *The Historian’s Craft* [French: *Apologie pour l’histoire ou Métier d’historien* (1949)], providing in-depth comments about the historical practice; the second book follows a different pattern. It is a rigorous logical study of main theoretical problems of historical knowledge illustrated with few practical examples. It was a collaborative effort of historian Jerzy Topolski and philosopher Andrzej Malewski.

It is worth mentioning that the general theory of science, including social science and humanities, was significantly developed within LSW. It seems that the tradition of “methodology of science” instead of “philosophy” or “theory” is also a lasting legacy of the LWS environment, and first of all, of Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz. His habilitation thesis in Lviv was called *Z metodologii nauk dedukcyjnych* [From the Methodology of Deductive Sciences] (1921). If Lviv was the center of the theory of science in Poland before 1939, after 1945, Poznań has taken this spot.

The tradition of the theory of empirical sciences created by Florian Znaniecki, one of the creators of the methodology of understanding sociology based on the so-called “humanistic coefficient”, was still vibrant there. However, after World War II, Ajdukiewicz played a key role at the University of Poznań. Even though his achievements in linguistics were so outstanding that when MIT was looking for a reviewer for Noam Chomsky’s doctoral thesis, Ajdukiewicz (as the pioneer of categorical semantics) was approached, he supposedly said later that he regrets all this time spent on analyzing the language, as the most important philosophical task lies inside the methodology of sciences.

In order to prove this conviction he gathered most of philosophers working in Poznań around his project of the methodology of empirical science [Metho- dologia nauk empirycznych], which his students continued there after Ajdukiewicz left to teach logic in Warsaw in 1954. His successors in Poznan accepted his key division between pragmatic (descriptive) and apragmatic (deductive)

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methodology. The former was a characteristic of empirical sciences and the latter of logical ones. It seems that the focus on empirical sciences and pragmatic logic may have been influenced by Marxism criticism, but we have enough evidence to claim that it was Ajdukiewicz’s lifetime endeavor.51

After Ajdukiewicz left Poznań, his work was continued by Adam Wiegner until his retirement in 1960 and by Jerzy Giedymin until he left Poland in 1966. Giedymin has adopted Ajdukiewicz’s logical theory of argumentation for the pioneering work on the reliability of informants52. To this day, these works are among the most formalized articles devoted to problems of historical theory. This English philologist, economist, and philosopher of science played a crucial role for the methodology of history in Poland. Using the small window of liberalization, he went on two fellowships at the Department of Logic and Methodology of Science in London (1957/58 and 1959/60), where he worked with Karl Popper. After coming back, he familiarized scholars in Poland with the development of the theory of science and analytical philosophy of history in English-speaking countries. This is one of the reasons why Popper's falsificationism was much more influential in post-war Poland than Carnapian inductionism characteristic for the neo-positivists.53

Giedymin pursued the project of analyzing the methodology of history in relation to the rationalized and idealized research practice of historians and in the context of the general methodology of sciences. He sought to reconstruct methods of inference from sources based on his original concept of informant reliability. The key to evaluating a source and consequently inferring from it was the assumption of the rationality of human actions. Regarding the relationship between the natural and social sciences, he was a proponent of methodological naturalism, common among analytic philosophers. In 1966 he left Poland to take the visiting professor post in Durham University. Since then, he has worked at several universities in Great Britain, researching mainly on the methodology of science (especially historical and logical analysis of Henri Poincaré’s concepts). It can be said that his “transformation” into a typical Anglo-Saxon analytic philosopher occurred smoothly as Giedymin never was influenced by Marxism. At the same time, the change of interests shows that at time, the philosophy of history was not considered in the UK as a crucial subject, as it


53 Although it has to be noted that another Polish philosopher of science, Stefan Amsterdamski, contributed even more to introducing Karl Popper to Polish audience (he was also the translator of Popper works into Polish). See: The Significance of Popper's Thought, ed. By Stefan Amsterdamski (Leiden: Brill, 1996), series: Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities, vol. 49.
was in Poland, where its position was stronger due to the great interest on the part of Marxist philosophy. After Giedymin left, Jerzy Kmita took the task to organize the efforts in the studies of the methodology of science in Poznań. The results were significant. Jerzy Topolski commented on them in these words:

It is mainly his name that should be associated with the emergence of something most valuable and, at the same time, very rare in science, namely the foundation of a scientific school. Of course, we must admit that the premises for the formation of such a school were already laid in Poznan earlier (just to mention the names of A. Wiegner, J. Giedymin, K. Ajdukiewicz, A. Malewski), but all this would not suffice for the scientific integration of the Poznan methodological and philosophical community based on some common scientific ideas consistently developed and enriched. This integration took place mainly thanks to the scientific and organizational influence of Jerzy Kmita. It was he who, with his profound and comprehensive knowledge of the methodology of various branches of science, of logic, of the theory of language and philosophy in the broad sense of the term, as well as of the idea of social development, was able to contribute to the formulation of a highly ambitious program of research that was unique on a world scale and fundamental for the development of Polish philosophy and Marxist methodology.54

What is stunning, soon after the Poznan School of Methodology (PSM) formation, most of its members felt that they are doing something “unique on a world scale”. The last time that happened in Polish philosophy was precisely during the reign of LWS in the 20s and 30s. Another similarity is the relatively weak influence on professional historians, who nevertheless used Topolski’s methodology to gain more research freedom.55

1968 saw another major change in the situation of Marxism in the world. This was related to the military intervention of the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia and the reaction to the Israeli-Arab Six-Day War. In Poland, this led to a political crisis and a campaign against Jews and intellectuals. The pacification of student protests and the climate of anti-Semitism were used to bring about significant changes in Polish universities. Once again in Polish history, many intellectuals found themselves in exile, where they continued their work, which

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54 Jerzy Topolski, “Opinia o dorobku naukowym doc. dra Jerzego Kmity w związku z wnioskiem o powołanie go na stanowisko profesora nadzwyczajnego” [Opinion on the scientific achievements of docent Jerzy Kmita in connection with the application for appointment to the position of associate professor], Archiwum UAM, Ref. 825/393.

55 Historian Andrzej Wyczański wrote about Topolski’s Methodology in Poland: “For us it was a shield against the attacks of dogmatists or doctrinaires, since it introduced Western methods of research and could not be regarded as contradictory to rational Marxism. This in turn ensured a considerable degree of research freedom and a common language with Western historians.” Cited after Rafał Stobiecki, who also rightfully concluded in his book, that: “The conception of the Poznan school of methodology, although it gained recognition on the international arena, in the Polish realities it remained a certain niche within the totality of Polish historiography. It seems that the texts published by J. Topolski were written in a language too hermetic...” Rafał Stobiecki, Historiografia PRL. Zamiast podręcznika [Historiography of the People’s Republic of Poland. Instead of a textbook] (Łódź: Wydawnictwo UL, 2020), 160–161.
led to the creation of the so-called “second circulation” of scientific texts in the 1970s. For those who remained, Edward Gierek’s “small stabilization” era allowed for a fundamental departure from Marxism and the development of national historiography in the tradition of individual historicism.

The road to such historiography led through an escape from methodological issues that were problematic philosophically and politically. It would be untrue to say that Marxism no longer played a role in Polish science, but it should be noted that from the 1970s onwards, it became a necessary “garnish” for very pluralistic and pragmatic projects. Historian Tadeusz Łepkowski wrote in retrospect:

Marxism appeared more and more intertwined in the phraseology of new non-Marxist and semi-Marxist theories and methodologies, with some predominance of Anglo-Saxon in Poznan, French in Warsaw. Such Marxism-not-Marxism was approved as harmless. What is important, however, is that some valuable elements of Marxist thinking entered the scholarly circuit carefully and unnoticed, revealing themselves more deeply and more interestingly in formally good works and irritatingly in weaker and therefore inherently more numerous ones.

The works of PSM belonged to the first group, as they were trying to reconsider the marriage of two important theoretical frameworks available at this time: the LWS analytic and the Marxism synthesis. In my interpretation of the movement, the main aim was to revise historical materialism in the spirit of the scientific worldview. It can also be argued that it was rather a rejection of Marxism and a return to analytic philosophy dressed only occasionally in the rhetoric of socialism. I, however, chose to read thoughtfully the declarations of the school’s founders, who assure us that it is actually about restoring a proper image of Marxism that would not be ridiculed to its Stalinist version.


57 Cited after Stobiecki, Historiografia PRL, 158–159.


59 Even in 1992 Topolski wrote “The restoration in 1989 of the political independence of Poland and the building of democracy has meant the beginning of new conditions for the development of Polish historiography, with the possible presence in it of Marxism as one of the sources of theoretical conceptualization.” Jerzy Topolski, “Polish Historians and Marxism after World War II,” Studies in Soviet Thought 43, no. 2 (1992): 182.
It is my belief that the Anglo-American philosophy of history provided a very convenient intellectual bridge between the LWS tradition and historical materialism, which is why Jerzy Topolski referred to it when he wrote his monumental *Methodology of History* in 1968. On the other hand, if the author’s ambition was to engage in discussion with the ongoing methodological discussion in historiography in the West, he had no other choice: at the time, this discussion was analytical.60

It is worth noting that Topolski’s very title refers to the analytical tradition, suggesting that his theory is not a philosophy of history but a modern methodology of history. It should also be acknowledged that only the Marxist critics in Poland popularized this technical term of the LWS philosophers, especially Ajudukiewicz, from whom Topolski also took the distinction between pragmatic and apragmatic methodology. This was an essential change in the Polish (and German) tradition of the name “Historyka” (German: Historik) that was adopted for the world’s second academic journal devoted to the philosophy of history, founded in Krakow in 1967 by Celina Bobinska and published until today.61 To be precise, the full name was and still is *Historics. Metological Studies* [Historyka. Studia Metodologiczne], as it was the publishing body of Commission of Methodology at Institute of History, Polish Academy of Sciences [Komisji Metodologicznej Instytutu Historii PAN].62

Already in the first number, the idea of integral science was discussed as one of the main challenges/opportunities for social sciences (in Marxism history was often seen as social science and not humanistic). In praxis, this idea was implemented by Annales school, but it was the PSM where it was fully developed on the theoretical level. This is due to the strange combination of the three “founding fathers” of the PSM: Jerzy Kmita was a philosopher, literary and cultural scholar; Leszek Nowak, a philosopher of law and Marxism; and Jerzy Topolski, a theorist and practitioner of economic history. In the crucial year of 1968, the latter published his *Methodology of history* and the two philosophers published *Studies in the theoretical foundations of the humanities* [Studia nad teoretycznymi podstawami humanistyki].63 In my opinion, from this point, we can talk about a new philosophical program in Poznan. The formation of PSM

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61 This is in the same year as *Historical Methods Newsletter*, 7 years after *Theory of History* and 15 years before *Storia della Storiografia*. This is an important argument for the position of the field in Poland: Jakub Muchowski, Rafał Swakoń, “Historia społeczno-gospodarcza, integracja nauk i szkoła Annales. Historia według «Historyki» w latach 1967–1995,” *Historyka. Studia Metodologiczne* 50 (2020): 9–33.
62 In 2020, the commission was reactivated at the initiative of Jan Pomorski under the altered name of Commission on Theory and History of Historiography and Methodology of History. Ewa Domańska became the first chairperson.
was completed with the publication of *Założenia metodologiczne «Kapitału» Marksa* [Methodological assumptions of Marx’s “Capital”] in 1970.

Jerzy Topolski’s critique of Adam Schaff’s concept of historical truth was also a symbol of change. In a sense, this was analytic philosophy’s retaliation against Stalinist Marxism. However, it should be noted that at this time, Schaff himself had abandoned his previous dogmatic position, and his relegation to the shadows may also have related to the anti-Semitic campaign since he was a Polonized Jew from Lviv (or to the power shift in very politicized academic structure). Already in *Methodology of History* Topolski introduced his famous concept of “non-source-based knowledge” according to which historians, like representatives of other sciences, integrate source knowledge (empirical findings) and non-source knowledge (non-empirical beliefs and life experiences) in their explanations. This was not a new idea, but Topolski’s systematical analysis of this phenomenon and its consequences was an exciting contribution to theory of history. It was closely related to the concept of the dynamic historical source, that has been further developed and presented by Topolski at the 14th International Congress of Historical Sciences in San Francisco in 1975.

The main criticism in Western reception of his *Methodology* was that it proposes a prescriptive methodology for historians and that the author does not take a clear position in many of the debating points of analytical philosophy of history. William H. Dray wrote:

> Topolski’s Marxism leads him at times to quote from Lenin and other authorities in ways that are rather tiresome. However, what is disappointing about the book is not that it argues dogmatically from a Marxist point of view—that could have been a valuable exercise—but that too often it argues only feebly, or fails to produce anything that could be called an argument at all. On issue after issue, after identifying allegedly “extreme” positions, the author simply reports his own “opinion” which generally falls somewhere in between.

Topolski’s falling “in-between” was an effect of adopted position, that was a search of synthesis between 1) scientific worldview of LSW (1), 2) scientific Marxism, and 3) the German tradition of *Geistenwissenschaft*. Krystyna Zamiara, analyzing the beginnings of the PSM, points out that the goal of the school from the very beginning was to combine two contradictory concepts: naturalism [of (1) and (2)] and anti-naturalism.

67 One of the most important Polish analytical philosophers, Józef M. Bocheński, described the philosophy of Rusell, Neopositivism, and dialectical materialism as “materialistic philosophy” that is essentially different philosophy of ideas, life and existence. See: Joseph M. Bochenski, *Contemporary European Philosophy*. transl. from German Donald Nucholl and Karl Aschenbrenner (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1956).
Topolsky’s way to this synthesis was to create a scientific interpretation of Marxism within PSM and bringing it closer to structuralism and Anglo-Saxon philosophy of science while emphasizing the active role of man in history. This led him to an integral concept of explanation in historiography. His approach to the philosophy of history also enabled him to seamlessly integrate historical narrative analyses into his analytical-Marxist methodology of history.

Jerzy Kmita also saw the potential of using newly interpreted Marxism as a contribution to the program of scientific holism. Based on the ideas of Adam Wiegnner, he and Leszek Nowak developed the theory of idealization in science. Polish researchers have thus carried out an exciting program of going beyond the limitations of Max Weber’s concept of ideal types, extending idealization to all of science. Kmita’s concept of humanistic interpretation was also not limited to humanities. Topolski adopted these ideas to historiography and Nowak to legal studies. Another researcher associated with the PSM, Jan Such, dealt mainly with the philosophy of science, where he developed an exciting concept of experimentum crucis. Interestingly, even former student of Adam Schaff, Tadeusz Buksiński, came to Poznan in 1973 and contributed significantly to the development and popularization of PSM ideas.

It is fascinating that Kmita and Buksiński wrote extensively on the epistemological problems of historiography, seeing it as the symbol for all of the

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75 It is also worth mentioning that in Warsaw a program of logicalization of historiography was postulated by a historian of the Middle Ages, Stanisław Piekarczyk, see Stanisław Piekarczyk, Historia, kultura, poznanie: książka propozycji (Warszawa: PWN, 1972).
humanities. This particular position of history was also a unique trait of PSM. The exceptional importance of these ideas was realized by Nowak, who, wanting to establish permanent contact with Western science, launched the publishing series Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities. The strength and importance of the PSM as a school are shown by the fact that subsequent generations of scholars continue this initiative.

Making a specific summary of philosophy in Poznan, Buksiński wrote in 2010 that only four employees of the Institute of Philosophy of the Poznan University dealt with the methodology of science. In the 1990s, there were forty of them, which constituted about two-thirds of all active philosophers in Poznań. In his opinion, after the transformation of the political system, the demand for philosophy of science and philosophy in general decreased, and a tendency to shift from interest in the philosophy of science to cultural studies was observed.

It would seem that the “Age of Analysis” has ended, with its final departure in Poland. During the advance of postmodern trends, once again, the synthetic spirit and openness of Polish analytic philosophy, both LWS and PSM, revealed its strength, allowing in many places for the evolution of views instead of a radical break. Although the great merit of the Poznań methodologists was to acquaint Polish researchers with the most important trends in the West, their program went far beyond this one-sided account. The goal was to build bridges for discussion with Western science, which was not an easy undertaking under the conditions of the Cold War. Avoiding the pigeonholing PSM merely as an enclave of analytic philosophy in the Eastern Bloc allows to understand why the postmodern turn in France and the narrative turn in Anglo-Saxon countries, which ended there the dominance of the APH paradigm, did not cause such a crisis in PSM. Instead, it proved to be a challenge that was taken up by the next generation of history theorists trained under Topolski (Wojciech Wrzosek, Jan Pomorski, Piotr Kowalewski Jahromi).
Ewa Domańska\textsuperscript{82}). Topolski himself not only encouraged but also entered the dialogue with new ideas. In this sense, he continued the best features of analytic philosophy, which are also features of any science practiced seriously, critically, and anti-dogmatically.

It would be naïve to limit the impact of PSM only to Poznan. With the students of Topolski, Kmita, and Nowak, their spirit spread into many Polish universities\textsuperscript{83}. Nevertheless, in many regards, Poznan remained the center of the Polish methodology of history, although it has little to do with Marxism or classical APH today. If one interprets the latter in the idealized spirit of Hempel, one will find this tradition to be gone. But if the broader definition of APH, championed by Artur C. Danto, would be implemented, one will find that many ideas of APH are still very prominent. In this view, history is a narration while still being a knowledge that constitutes an integral part of all scientific and cultural systems\textsuperscript{84}. Many scholars still expect historiography to explain the past and to do it truthfully, although the limits of this endeavor are better known.

Because Marxism always looked on science historically, the philosophy behind Thomas Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions, that ended the APH in the eyes of Danto, was not devastating to the PSM worldview. The benefits of the synthetic position adopted by PSM paid dividends in the long run. Poland is perhaps the only place on earth where Paul A. Roth did not have to explain his need for revival of the AFH in the 21st century\textsuperscript{85}. Here, the tradition has maintained its validity throughout, even if it was no longer “main-

\textsuperscript{82}Ewa Domańska continued Topolski’s effort in building bridges with Western theory of history. She popularized in Poland concepts of Frank Ankersmit, Hayden White and propose an important theoretical analysis of microhistory and postcolonial studies. See: Ewa Domańska, Encounters: Philosophy of History After Postmodernism (Charlottesville and London: The University Press of Virginia, 1998).

\textsuperscript{83}From the point of view of history theory, a special role on this map is occupied by Lublin, where Jan Pomorski managed to create an environment which could be called the Lublin School of Historical Methodology (Andrzej Radomski Piotr Witek, Ewa Solska, and Tomasz Pawelec [now at University of Silesia in Katowice]) and is recently organized into The Department of Digital Humanities at Maria Curie Skłodowska University. See: Piotr Witek, Ewa Solska, „Lubelska Szkoła Metodologii Historii,” HISTORIA@TEORIA 2/4 (2017): 135–155.

\textsuperscript{84}Arthur C. Danto, Narration and Knowledge: Including the Integral Text of Analytical Philosophy of History (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982).

stream”. Krzysztof Brzechczyn, one of Nowak’s students, has invited Roth to Poznań and later edited *Towards a Revival of Analytical Philosophy of History: Around Paul A. Roth’s Vision of Historical Sciences* that appeared in *Poznań Studies*. It is no coincidence that also the Hayden White Research Center for Narrative Modes was established in Poznan (in 2020).

In the end, Poles are pretty pragmatic, and so is the Polish methodology of history. Even if historiography in Poland was often practiced in a somewhat romanticized nationalistic manner, meta-reflection on this practice was usually critical and rational. Logical analysis and empirical verification do not contribute to coherent ideology in the first place but can, and should, be seen as an essential tool for any serious discussion of science and culture. Only in this sense may we speak of a ”Polish methodology of history” as a necessary element of the self-reflection of historiography. Brzechczyn and Pomorski have used this name descriptively. I want to go a bit further and suggest using “Polish Methodology of History” (PMH) as a proper name. This name seems legitimate, considering the specificity of the development of theoretical reflection on history in Poland, which has been present in the Polish humanities since the Enlightenment, constantly provoking dialogue with its own tradition and Western ideas. Even if PMH is not strictly analytical, it cannot be understood without the history of APH, and I think, cannot develop further without the epistemic tools offered by the analytical tradition.

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86 Brzechczyn is not only a direct continuator of PSM’s approach and methods, but also a propagator of its achievements. In his works, he interprets the Poznan analytical philosophy of history primarily as a polemic against Popper’s critique of theoretical historiography. See his most recent book: Krzysztof Brzechczyn, *The Historical Distinctiveness of Central Europe* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2020).

87 Conference Naturalizing the Humanities. A View from the Analytical Philosophy of History, Poznan, 13th October, 2015 (See the program at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/282505388_Conference_Announcement_Naturalizing_the_Humanities_A_View_from_the_Analytical_Philosophy_of_History).


89 Its director is Ulrich Timme Kragh, who runs the international project “Core Concepts of Historical Thinking” in Poznań.

90 This idea of pragmatic methodology was used by Ewa Domanska in her recent project (2017) *Nekros. Introduction to the ontology of the dead body*, where she consciously uses both medical theory and literary examples in her research; Ewa Domańska, *Nekros. Wprowadzenie do ontologii martwego ciała* (Warszawa: PWN, 2017).

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