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Of Wild(e)ness and Carceral Subjectivity

The final stage of Oscar Wilde's life was marked by an accumulation of unexpected events which culminated in a most startling *dénouement*. His attachment to Lord Alfred Douglas gave rise to a conflict between Wilde as a supposed corruptor of the youth and the Marquis of Queensbury, Douglas's father. In an attempt to provoke litigation, Queensbury accused Wilde of sodomy and the depravation of his son. The writer could not but stand his ground. He sued Queensbury for libel and lost the case. Subsequently, Wilde was charged with acts of gross indecency which had been brought up in the course of the Queensbury trial. And again the court found him to have been on the wrong side of the law. He was sentenced to two years of imprisonment with hard labour.

Oscar Wilde commenced his term with a very vague realisation of the transgression he had committed. His conduct prior to his confinement can be described as that of a pliant stalking-horse. Manipulated by his lover, he was trapped into bringing about his own destruction. In the course of a complex lawsuit his legal status underwent a radical change; initially the plaintiff, Wilde soon turned into the defendant. The alteration of the roles which were imposed upon him rather than accepted willingly shows that at that stage things got entirely out of his control. Wilde acknowledges later that his "will power became absolutely subject to [Douglas's]".¹ The present essay attempts to analyse the implications of that subjection and the extent to which one can be confined to one's own subjectivity. It tries to open the gates leading to the discursive field which has its locus in the jail yard or, more specifically, in a carceral cell which is a subjective zone *par excellence*.

¹ Oscar Wilde, *De Profundis and Other Writings* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1987), p. 103

Through most of his sentence Wilde suffered all the rigours of the penitentiary discipline. He was allowed to read but his books were censored; he was allowed to write letters but they were meticulously scrutinised by the prison authorities. At the end of his term, however, and mainly thanks to the leniency of the new governor of the Reading Gaol, he contrived to write a longer prose narrative in the guise of an epistolary text. Ostensibly, the letter was addressed to Lord Alfred Douglas but Wilde by no means intended it to be a mere piece of correspondence. He asked his friend Robert Ross to copy it before sending to Douglas and preserve the text which became “the only document that gives any explanation of my [Wilde’s] extraordinary behaviour . . .”² That Wilde attached considerable significance to the shape of his self-revealing testimony can be inferred from numerous revisions and corrections that he introduced. Although Vyvyan Holland in the introduction to *De Profundis* emphasises that the strict prison rules allowed the prisoner only one sheet of paper at a time and thus Wilde could never revise the finished document,³ Richard Ellmann points out that Major Nelson, who was the Governor of the Reading Gaol, relaxed the rules and allowed Wilde to keep the whole text in his cell and revise it or rewrite it when necessary.⁴ Ultimately, as it stands, *De Profundis* defies Wilde’s own assertion that “there is in it nothing of rhetoric”.⁵ It is precisely an instance of what Paul de Man calls “performative rhetoric”⁶ by means of which the autobiographer – and *De Profundis* is to a large extent an autobiography – aims at affecting extratextual reality.

In order to discuss Wilde’s text it is necessary to negotiate the various modes of subjectivity that both the writer and the character designated by that name may assume. Moreover, to avoid getting embroiled in the extratextual aspects of *De Profundis*, one should bear in mind that the Wilde of numerous biographical accounts is yet another literary character whose life and opinions, as we know them, are anything but factual.

In Wilde’s case, the autobiographical impulse, that urge which Jean Jacques Rousseau describes as a compulsion to leave behind “a witness in my favour that will sooner or later triumph over the machinations of men”,⁷ seems to have originated in the Reading Gaol. The carceral circumstances, the precipitous course of his career culminating in his downfall and ultimate ignominy, must have prompted him to meditate upon that image which one leaves behind in the memory of men. His prison record indicates that soon after he had managed to come to terms with

² Quoted in the introduction to Oscar Wilde, *De Profundis*, p. 92.

³ Vyvyan Holland, “Introduction” to Oscar Wilde, *De Profundis*, p. 91.

⁴ Richard Ellmann, *Oscar Wilde* (Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1988), p. 479.

⁵ Oscar Wilde, *De Profundis*, p. 198.

⁶ Paul de Man, *Allegories of Reading: Figural Language in Rousseau, Nietzsche, Rilke and Proust* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1979), p. 282.

⁷ Jean Jacques Rousseau, *The Confessions* (London: Penguin Books, 1953), p. 525.

his life behind bars, Wilde asked for several books which included St. Augustine's *Confessions*, Pascal's *Pensées* and Newman's *Apologia Pro Vita Sua*.⁸ That the reading of those pious texts exerted some influence upon the shape of *De Profundis* can be inferred not only from the title of Wilde's autobiography. Alongside his fascination with Catholicism, it contributed to the overall tone of the letter which is that of a humble confession; "A man's very highest moment is, I have no doubt at all, when he kneels in the dust, and beats his breast, and tells all the sins of his life."⁹ Wilde consciously models himself on a penitent confessing subject feigning obeisance to the verdict of the Law which he accepts as the verdict of God. He embarks on a task unique in his career, namely, that of disclosing the truth about his life. But he cannot fail to introduce some melodramatic overtones into his account; in the conflict between Art and veracity it is always the former that gets the upper hand. Inasmuch as he takes pains to convey a very detailed and touching picture of his humility and degradation, he endows his carceral predicament with vivid aesthetic qualities and his confession becomes a pose assumed for want of better ones rather than a spiritual watershed.

The tendency to view himself as an aesthetic subject dates back to Wilde's Trinity years. In order to instil artistic undertones into his career he used to sign his contributions to the academic magazine with the complete set of his initials "O.F.O.F.W.W". (Oscar Fingal O'Flahertie Wills Wilde).¹⁰ What he found attractive about that *nom de plume* was, no doubt, a certain regular pattern of reiteration. Later on, he travelled under an assumed name of Lord Robinson,¹¹ the pseudonym selected by no means at random. Finally, when he was transferred to the Reading Gaol, he enthusiastically embraced his new cognomen "C.3.3" which also promised some symbolic significance.

The course of events that led to his confinement was ineluctable and left Wilde powerless to defend himself. In court, listening to the indictments aimed at his conduct he suddenly realised that the image and import of one's life story were essentially involved in the exercise of power and authority. "How splendid it would be if I was saying all this about myself",¹² that is how in *De Profundis* he summed up his reaction to the accounts of his transgression given by the hostile prosecutors. In this desire to be the sole author of his *curriculum vitae* there surfaces the impulse common to all autobiographers. What Wilde desires is to regain control not so much over his own life, which is in the hands of the jury, as over the narrative portraying his tempestuous career. He strives to master his own representation,

⁸ Cf. Richard Ellmann, *Oscar Wilde*, p. 456.

⁹ Oscar Wilde, *De Profundis*, p. 197.

¹⁰ Cf. Richard Ellmann, *Oscar Wilde*, p. 16.

¹¹ The idea of "donning" a false name for the duration of a journey or a period of transition is also explored in Jean Jacques Rousseau's *Confessions*. Cf., e.g., p. 145.

¹² Oscar Wilde, *De Profundis*, p. 197.

and reclaim the copyright – *le droit d'auteur* – for his biography. His text proves that it is not enough to steer the course of one's life; one has to hold sway over the elusive flickers of descriptions and epithets, metaphors and similies, in short, over the discourse which constitutes the only permanent human subject.¹³

Paradoxically enough, Wilde comes to appreciate the power of the discourse of the self in the house of detention. It is his experience of the penitentiary mechanisms that allows him to grasp their actual importance. Accordingly, he applies writing as a means of resisting those mechanisms. His resistance is aimed primarily at isolation which is, as Michel Foucault observes, a basic principle of confinement.¹⁴ Isolation forms a convenient hold for the application of power leading to the transformation of the convict; "through the reflection that it gives rise to and the remorse that cannot fail to follow, solitude must be a positive instrument of reform".¹⁵ What the process manifests is also the asymmetrical distribution of power rendering the prisoner's identity dependent on the carceral discipline. Thus, by moulding his own model in ink, Wilde fends off the possibility of becoming a penitentiary object shaped according to the demands of the Law.

Michel Foucault, in reading the intricate alterations of disciplinary mechanisms in the eighteenth century emphasises the association of power with knowledge.¹⁶ In point of fact, a parallel theme of *Nosce teipsum* dates back to the ancient Greece. That in order to exercise self-control and authority over oneself one requires self-knowledge becomes evident from Socrates onwards. Foucault describes that phenomenon in *The History of Sexuality* as the relation to truth constituting the ontological foundations of subjectivity.¹⁷ The imperative "know thyself" becomes a prerequisite for the formation of selfhood whose shape and foundations rest on that self-centred cognition. In other words, self-examination is not restricted to its epistemological function but one is, first and foremost, *defined* by one's relation to oneself;

It's then a matter of *forming* and recognizing oneself as the subject of one's own actions, not through a system of signs denoting power over others, but through a relation that depends as little as possible on status and its external forms, for this relation is fulfilled in the sovereignty that one exercises over oneself.¹⁸

¹³ Cf. Emile Benveniste, "Subjectivity in Language", in *Problems in General Linguistics* (Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami Press, 1984), pp. 223–30.

¹⁴ Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (London: Penguin Books, 1979), p. 236.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 237.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 224.

¹⁷ Cf. Michel Foucault, *The Use of Pleasure*, Vol. 2 of *The History of Sexuality* (London: Penguin Books, 1992), p. 89.

¹⁸ Michel Foucault, *The Care of the Self*, Vol. 3 of *The History of Sexuality* (London: Penguin Books, 1990), p. 85 [emphasis mine].

In this structure of the application of power one seems to be its subject and its object at the same time. But the necessary detour through self-knowledge that one must make on the way to oneself implies the exercise of discourse, that is, it essentially involves “the detour through the Other”, to use Derrida’s phrase.¹⁹

The Other may manifest his/her/its existence on the printed page of an autobiography as well as on the polished surface of a *speculum*. When Narcissus falls for his reflection in the water his desire is as selfless as it is irresistible. According to Mikkel Borch-Jakobsen, what Narcissus actually desires is to become a subject and identify himself with the illusory mirror-image which constitutes his representation.²⁰ Similarly, Wilde expects that Art, as the supreme *speculum*, will allow him to see his true features and disclose himself to others. Art is to him “the great primal note by which I . . . revealed, first myself to myself, and then myself to the world; the great passion of my life”.²¹ What is at stake here is not only the epistemological impulse to know oneself but also the emotional involvement in the enterprise which results from the ontological condition of privation. Wilde, like Narcissus, desires to be a subject because he lacks subjecthood; “if I desire to be (an) I, if I desire myself, it must, following elementary logic, be because I am not it”.²² Narcissus is an allegorical paradigm of the autobiographer who plunges into discourse in quest of an “I”; Art perversely promises the boon of subjecthood but offers him his Other.

What makes Art’s lure so appealing is precisely the phantasmal refuge *from* the Other that it seems to provide. In Wilde’s autobiographical letter, literature forms a counterbalance to the obtrusive company of Lord Douglas who is “the absolute ruin of [Wilde’s] art”.²³ Wilde’s creativity is paralysed in the presence of his lover whose friendship is “intellectually degrading”²⁴ to the artist. Douglas represents the worldly element in their relationship and belongs to the order of Society. His role is that of a distraction and a diversion. Art, by way of contrast, functions for Wilde as a solitary retreat; a locus of voluntary confinement. Strikingly enough, when Wilde gets physically – and no doubt involuntarily – behind bars, he is inclined to find his carceral isolation less propitious for artistic manifestations. Confronted with himself, sentenced to his own company, he is finally offered an opportunity to define his own subjectivity, starting from scratch

¹⁹ Jacques Derrida, *The Ear of the Other: Otobiography, Transference, Translation* (New York: Schocken Books, 1985), p. 88.

²⁰ Mikkel Borch-Jakobsen, “The Freudian Subject, from Politics to Ethics”, in *Who Comes After the Subject?* eds. E. Cadava, P. Connor and J. L. Nancy (New York and London: Routledge, 1991), p. 69.

²¹ Oscar Wilde, *De Profundis*, p. 129.

²² Mikkel Borch-Jakobsen, “The Freudian Subject, from Politics to Ethics”, p. 66.

²³ Oscar Wilde, *De Profundis*, p. 101.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

“a *Vita Nuova*”,²⁵ as he poetically describes his new life. But face to face with his ‘pure’ self, Wilde regresses to his memories instead of renouncing them in an effort to purge himself of the Other. He feels obliged to assert his personal history by claiming that “to regret one’s experiences is to arrest one’s own development”.²⁶ Hence, his new life is “no new life at all, but simply the continuance, by means of development and evolution, of [his] former life”.²⁷ Even in prison he cannot fail to absorb what Derrida calls “the trace of the Other in us, the Other’s irreducible presence”.²⁸ His carceral attempt to become oneself where one can be nobody else proves to be a failure.

One cannot escape sharing the cell with the Other. According to Martin Heidegger’s existential analytic in *Sein und Zeit*, coexistence with others, Being-with, as he formulates it, “is an existential characteristic of *Dasein* even when factually no Other is present-at-hand or perceived”.²⁹ *Dasein*’s subjectivity cannot be reduced to the singular; it is rather a variant name of a relation which is established between the self and the Other, namely, the relation of subjection;

Dasein, as everyday Being-with-one-another, stands in subjection [*Botmässigkeit*] to Others. It itself is not; its Being has been taken away by the Others. *Dasein*’s everyday possibilities of Being are for the Others to dispose of as they please.³⁰

To answer the question about the “who” of these Others Heidegger introduces the term *das Man* (the impersonal “they”) which is a primordial phenomenon belonging to *Dasein*’s positive constitution. *Das Man* exercises its authority over *Dasein* by means of prescribing opinions and judgements, tastes and impressions, but shrinks from being identified with a particular Other. It is exterior to the self and yet it is constantly being reabsorbed into the unprotected interiority of *Dasein*’s identity. *Dasein* is thus deprived of the very possibility of being one-self. Or rather, *Dasein* is always itself but it never exists homogeneously. It is a composite of the elements which, unchecked, penetrate the cellular walls of the self. *Das Man* must be crumbled and dispersed to effect this osmosis; hence its vagueness and insidiousness.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 152.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 163.

²⁸ Jacques Derrida, *Memoires for Paul de Man* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), p. 29.

²⁹ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1962), p. 156; In Heidegger’s analytic, *Dasein* is obviously not tantamount to the notion of the subject but it comes to occupy the same place and retains its essential traits. Cf. Jacques Derrida, “Eating Well, or the Calculation of the Subject: An Interview with Jacques Derrida”, in E. Cadava, P. Connor and J. L. Nancy, eds., *Who Comes After the Subject?*, p. 98.

³⁰ Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 164.

Heidegger's spectacular declaration: "Everyone is the other, and no one is himself",³¹ apart from anything else, points to the interchangeability of the respective positions of *Dasein* and the Other, which makes *das Man*'s "dictatorship" even more effective. The very word "dictatorship" brings to mind a political context of *Dasein*'s predicament. *Das Man*, as a phenomenon characteristic of Being-with-one-another, is responsible for constituting what Heidegger calls "publicness".³² Its function is parallel to that of the Law; it "proximally controls every way in which the world and *Dasein* get interpreted, ... it is insensitive to every difference of level and genuineness".³³ Thus *das Man* relies on "averageness"; it operates in the name of a unified and generally accepted standard and suppresses any manifestations of individuality which, by defining an individual in opposition to that standard, introduces the element of transgression. *Das Man* is invested with the capacity of a police agent whose task is to discipline the delinquent and reclaim him for the community. It functions as the principle of the unwritten law keeping watch over any symptom of transgression. Needless to say, once a transgression is committed, the transgressor is bound to be incarcerated.

The ideology of the prison has been inseparably associated with its reformatory function. The transformation of the individual by means of labour and coercion is justified by its 'therapeutic' objective. The jargon of the founding fathers of the prison is borrowed from the medical lexicon, including such words and phrases as "a therapy", "to cure" or "to diagnose".³⁴ The application of the same type of discourse runs parallel with the deployment of similar disciplinary mechanisms in relation to prisoners and patients, especially those suffering from contagious diseases. Bentham's Panopticon, as a prototype of the modern house of correction, allows, in Foucault's view, for a multiplicity of functions, which makes it "a figure of political technology that may and must be detached from any specific use".³⁵ By employing power over pathology – be it medical or social – the Law aims at the recuperation of the individual. The isolation he must suffer is prescribed as a remedy. But in the carceral cell, it is ultimately the prisoner himself who is left in charge of the treatment.

The avowed aim of the penal system, however, may be challenged by the progress of a malady which develops *within* the self and comes to verge on madness. For Wilde, confinement and isolation epitomise the pathological state of separation from the Other. His imprisonment is prefigured in his Brighton experience when he falls ill and is confined to bed for a couple of days. Douglas, who stays with him in the same hotel, shuns his company, which makes Wilde

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 165.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ *Ibid.*

³⁴ Cf. Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, p. 227 and *passim*.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 205.

feel “unattended” and deprived of “mere necessities”.³⁶ Douglas’s absence is for him a symptom of the painful and drastic rift between himself and the Other, and so is his subsequent solitude behind bars. In prison, when he is confronted with his sterile self, forcefully severed from his Other, Wilde is consumed by “sexual madness”, as he acknowledges in his plea for release.³⁷ It is not by accident, then, that madness is supposed to pertain to man’s perception of himself, to his “delusive attachment to himself”,³⁸ rather than to his relation to the external world.

The erotic undertones of this malady are strikingly inconspicuous in Wilde’s letter. He never mentions, nor even alludes to, the sexual context of his relationship with Douglas. As if to defy the precepts of the confessional discourse which compel him to unburden himself of his most grievous transgressions in order to achieve absolution and begin a new life (and this is what Wilde claims for himself in *De Profundis*), he produces a balance sheet of his expenditure on Douglas. His lover becomes an object of a financial settlement rather than an addressee of amorous discourse. Wilde disguises his desire for the Other behind the economic jargon taking advantage of “a very pronounced ambiguity between the sexual meaning and the economic meaning of certain terms”³⁹ which exists in Greek as well as in many other languages. Thus the word *soma* may designate both the body and possessions; *ousia* means fortune but also sperm and the loss of the latter might signify the expenditure of the former.⁴⁰

Wilde’s relationship with Lord Alfred Douglas is blatantly irregular not just because at the end of the nineteenth century homosexuality connotes a subversive and disruptive social pattern. Their affair engages them in a structure of exploitation and financial abuse in which Douglas confines his involvement to the demands and reception of benefits whereas Wilde is obliged to supply the required commodities.⁴¹ The *status quo* cannot satisfy Wilde who delivers a list of monetary grievances trying to limit his excessive outflow. The frivolous extravagance entails the investment in the Other of his physical and emotional assets. In addition, it presupposes a degree of intimacy making this exchange possible. What Wilde’s liason with Douglas cannot veil is his tendency to obscure the boundaries of his self. It is additionally emphasised by the asymmetrical quality of their partnership. Wilde complains that his “substance” is taken over by his lover; “Having made your most of my genius, my will power, my fortune, you required, in the

³⁶ Oscar Wilde, *De Profundis*, p. 116.

³⁷ Richard Ellmann, *Oscar Wilde*, p. 471.

³⁸ Michel Foucault, *Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason* (London: Routledge, 1971), p. 27.

³⁹ Michel Foucault, *The Care of the Self*, p. 27.

⁴⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 27.

⁴¹ Cf. Oscar Wilde, *De Profundis*, pp. 102, 123–4.

blindness of an inexhaustible greed, my entire existence".⁴² Thus Wilde is rendered void by the Other. By becoming subjected to Douglas he is made *subjectless*, that is, deprived of his own subjecthood.

The continual fluctuation of subject-object positions demonstrates the ontological potential at Wilde's disposal. At the same time, his status is connected with the ethical stance that he tends to assume in relation to Lord Alfred Douglas. The latent possibilities of misinterpretation and abuse of his discourse are also due to the ambiguity of his letter. In point of fact, the "straighter" it is the more subversive potential it accumulates. *De Profundis*, as a text, allows for both literal friendship and allegorical homosexual relationship and thus reverses the actual circumstances of Wilde and Douglas's affair. By intimating sexual undertones of his text Wilde stimulates "a liberation of symbolic energy", to borrow Barthes's expression.⁴³ It is let loose and allowed to proliferate at large, even at the risk of running wild.

Paradoxically enough, to tame what Wilde allegorically describes in his letter, the Law has to rely on a discourse which is hardly less equivocal. The sentence that Mr Justice Wills meted out to Wilde was based on The Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1885 which was supposed to designate, in legal terms, the nature of his offence. It reads as follows:

Any male person who, in public or private, commits, or is a party to the commission by any male person of, any act of gross indecency with another male person, shall be guilty of misdemeanour, and, being convicted thereof, shall be liable, at the discretion of the Court, to be imprisoned for any term not exceeding two years with or without hard labour.⁴⁴

Apparently, the judge had no doubts about the necessity of passing the severest possible verdict⁴⁵ though the formulation "any act of gross indecency" leaves much scope for interpretation. It must function in a specific cultural and ethical context, otherwise it becomes vague and, instead of stigmatising a transgression, it raises questions about the varying social attitudes towards morality. In a sense, Wilde's transgressive potential is opposed by the exercise of legal power resorting to a very similar discursive quality.

There is much more to Wilde's legal and social position than just his ethical transgression. His sexuality is interwoven with other aspects of his existence. Just like at the end of the nineteenth century aestheticism became synonymous with homosexuality, the former being a euphemism for the latter,⁴⁶ the term "homosexual" was supposed to define an individual to the extent that, according to Jonathan Dollimore, "by the time of Wilde, homosexuality could be regarded as

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 104.

⁴³ Roland Barthes, *Image-Music-Text* (London: Fontana, 1977), p. 158.

⁴⁴ Quoted in Richard Ellmann, *Oscar Wilde*, p. 386.

⁴⁵ *Cf. ibid.*, pp. 448–9.

⁴⁶ *Cf. ibid.*, p. 80.

rooted in a person's identity and as pathologically pervading all aspects of his being".⁴⁷ Therefore from numerous facets of Wilde's biography, his sexual orientation comes to the fore and becomes constitutive of his subjecthood, at least in the view of his prosecutors. Society concentrates its legal, canonical and even medical resources to identify the perpetrator of sodomy with his transgression;

The nineteenth-century homosexual became a personage, a past, a case history, and a childhood, in addition to being a type of life, a life form, and a morphology, with an indiscreet anatomy and possibly a mysterious physiology. Nothing that went into his total composition was unaffected by his sexuality. It was everywhere present in him: at the root of all his actions because it was their insidious and indefinitely active principle; written immodestly on his face and body because it was a secret that always gave itself away. It was consubstantial with him, less as a habitual sin than as a singular nature.⁴⁸

Wilde's homosexuality appears, thus, to be hardly "a temporary aberration"; it is rather a symptom of what Michel Foucault describes as "a hermaphroditism of the soul".⁴⁹ For his judges, Wilde ceases to be an artist, a personality or a member of society. For them, he is *exclusively* a homosexual.

It is not surprising, then, that sexuality is the only formative element of his identity ostensibly, or even ostentatiously, left out of Wilde's epistolary autobiography. In fact, his attachment to his lover probably does not consist in merely sexual attraction. But Wilde's letter must counterbalance the prejudice of the public, hence the necessity to disguise the virtual character of their friendship. However, though Wilde pretends to settle his affairs with his lover, he actually indulges in the allegorical overview of his affection for Douglas, just as *De Profundis* purports to lay the foundations of Wilde's new subjectivity but in the guise of the discourse of the self it manifests a longing for the Other. That Wilde invests too much in Douglas gives indications of the excessive nature of their relationship culminating in Wilde's confinement. Evidently, one should not yield entirely to the Other.

⁴⁷ Jonathan Dollimore, *Sexual Dissidence: Augustine to Wilde, Freud to Foucault* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 67.

⁴⁸ Michel Foucault, *An Introduction*, Vol. I of *The History of Sexuality* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1990), p. 43.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*