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## Chapter 15

# Differences in self-presentational patterns: A community-of-practice perspective

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To allow for a more contextualized analysis of social discourse, political discourse in particular, many researchers (e.g., Wodak 1997; Holmes and Meyerhoff 2003; Mills 2005, 2011; van Dijk 2009) suggest the use of the concept of community of practice. It can also be applied to an analysis of politicians' self-presentational styles. Members of different political parties, apart from having different views on relevant social issues and different hierarchies of values, can be easily identified by the way they behave and self-present. Political parties function as their communities of practice which determine practices in which they engage, discursive practices included. The aim of the study is to compare self-presentational styles of members of two Polish leading political parties, the Civic Platform, and the Law and Justice. Due to the specificity of the discourse to be analyzed, two approaches have been employed: Critical Discourse Analysis, and the post-modern/discursive approach to face and (im)politeness. The data used in the study come from TV political interviews.

Key words: community of practice, self-presentation, Critical Discourse Analysis, politeness, political discourse

### 15.1 Introduction

Members of different political parties, apart from having different views on relevant social issues and different hierarchies of values, can be easily identified by the way they behave during social interactions, self-present and deal with their opponents. Political parties can be considered as communities of practice in which politicians share ideology and social practices. *Social practices* can be defined as “things that

people do, with greater or lesser degree of freedom, fixed by custom or prescription, or some mixture of these two” (van Leeuwen 1993: 30). They constitute a dynamic whole made up of such elements as: participants, activities, goal orientation, and relationships (van Leeuwen 1993).

The aim of the study is to compare self-presentational styles of members of two major Polish political parties, the Civic Platform (PO), and the Law and Justice (PiS). Due to the specificity of the discourse to be analyzed, two approaches have been employed:

- Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough and Wodak 1997/2009; van Dijk 2009; Wodak 2011),
- the post-modern/discursive approach to face and (im)politeness (Watts 2003; Locher 2006).

The data used in the study come from political interviews presented in the Polish private TV channel TVN24.

Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) defines *discourse* as “a form of ‘social practice’” which implies a dialectical relationship between a particular discursive event and the situation, institution, and social structure which frame it (Fairclough and Wodak 1997: 258). Understood in this way, discourse is both socially constitutive and socially conditioned; it constitutes situations, objects, people’s social identities and relationships between individuals and groups. As Fairclough and Wodak (1997: 258) claim,

[d]iscursive practices may have major ideological effects – that is, they can help produce and reproduce unequal power relations between (for instance) social classes, women and men, and ethnic/cultural majorities and minorities through the ways in which they represent things and position people.

CDA implies a dialogue between the social and the linguistic. Different social issues are represented by different discourses, produced by people of different professions and of different worldviews. Discourse constitutes an integral element of the self-presentational style, and as such can be analyzed in terms of the impact it has on social identity and self-image.

The post-modern/discursive approach to face and (im)politeness has been developed in opposition to Brown and Levinson’s (1987) theory of politeness. (Im)politeness and facework are considered by the representatives of this approach in a broader, discursive, perspective. Face no longer belongs to an individual, but is conjointly created by interactants who negotiate their relationship during social interaction, which is in line with Goffman’s (1967) ideas on face. The conceptualization of (im)politeness as something that emerges within discourse is here opposed to the concept of (im)politeness of decontextualized utterances, as suggested by Brown and Levinson (1987). The approach stems from

Bourdieu's theory of practice (1977). According to its main proponents, (im)politeness is constructed discursively during social interaction, and as such should be perceived as a form of social practice (Eelen 2001; Watts 2003; Mills 2003; Locher and Watts, 2005).

The discursive approach to (im)politeness and face postulates the focus on the analysis of *relational work* (Locher and Watts 2005; Watts 2003, 2005a; Goffman's concept of *facework* (1967); cf. Arundale 2006), involving actions in which individuals engage to negotiate relationships with others. I suggest the distinction between two types of facework (Bogdanowska-Jakubowska 2016). *Unmarked facework* involves actions intended to maintain or enhance self and/or other face; it is behavior aimed at establishing a good relationship or at sustaining the current state of a relationship – appropriate/politic/polite behavior (cf. Watts 2003; Locher 2006; Mullany 2008: 235). *Marked facework* involves actions which do not meet the addressee's expectations – inappropriate behavior: overpolite behavior, or impolite or rude behavior.

To allow for a more contextualized analysis of facework, it is worth to use the concept of *community of practice* (CoP), developed by Lave and Wenger (1991; cf. Mills 2005, 2011). The judgments whether a particular behavior is polite, impolite or rude, appropriate or inappropriate, are made on the basis of norms constructed by a given community of practice. Different communities of practice have different norms of social behavior, specifying what is appropriate/politic/polite and what is inappropriate/impolite (Mills 2011).

## 15.2 Political parties as communities of practice

### 15.2.1 *The concept of community of practice*

Many researchers use the concept of CoP analyzing social discourse, political discourse in particular (e.g., Wodak 1997; Holmes and Meyerhoff 2003; Mills 2005, 2011; van Dijk 2009). According to Etienne Wenger, every CoP, which he views “as a social learning system” (Wenger 2010: 1), should be characterized by:

- the domain of interest – members of a given community of practice share interests and a competence which distinguishes them from other people;
- the community – members of a CoP engage in joint activities, build relationships, help each other, and learn from each other;

- the practice – members of a CoP are practitioners. They develop a shared repertoire of resources (a shared practice): experiences, stories, tools and ways of addressing recurring problems.

CoP, then, is more than a group of friends or a group of people working in the same profession or having the same hobby; it is

[a]n aggregate of people who come together around mutual engagement in an endeavor. Ways of doing things, ways of talking, beliefs, values, power relations – in short, practices – emerge in the course of this mutual endeavor. As a social construct, a CofP is different from the traditional community, primarily because it is defined simultaneously by its membership and by the practice in which that membership engages. (Eckert and McConnell-Ginet, 1992: 464)

As social constructs, CoPs appear in various spheres of social life and “are part of broader social systems that involve other communities” (Wenger 2010: 3). Political parties have all the features which turn a group of people into a CoP. Virtually every political party can be characterized by:

- the domain of interest – members of a political party share a system of values, a world-view and ideas about the way the country should be governed, and seek to achieve common goals, which distinguishes them from members of other parties;
- the community – members of a political party engage in joint activities (actively participate in an election campaign, work on constructing a common policy, build relationships, help each other and learn from each other (e.g., how to be a good member of one’s party, be efficient in parliamentary work, get as many votes of the electorate as possible);
- the practice – members of a political party are practitioners. They develop a shared repertoire of resources (a shared practice): ways of arguing, addressing recurring problems and dealing with political opponents.

According to the social constructionists, identity is seen as situationally motivated and achieved (Bauman 2000: 1). Tajfel (1981: 255) claims that identity is “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership”. Thus being a member of a community of practice also has an impact on an individual’s identity. The process of identity construction and attribution is grounded in different kinds of social practices and activities (De Fina 2011: 353). In different interactional contexts people choose from “an inventory of identities” those which are most suitable

for the situation and for their interlocutors (De Fina 2011; Bogdanowska and Bogdanowska-Jakubowska 2014).

[T]he identities that people display, perform, contest, or discuss in interaction are based on ideologies and beliefs about the characteristics of social groups and categories and about the implications of belonging to them. These ideologies and beliefs underlie in complex ways the discourse produced in interaction by social actors. Thus, situated displays of identity relate in many ways to the more general identities that are built by social groups. (De Fina 2011: 353–354)

“The feeling of belonging to a community of practice and the phenomena of identification are only possible in connection with groups or categories one does not belong to” (Wodak 2011: 77). An individual (politician) perceives her/himself as similar to others of the same background (*we* are members of the same group (e.g., political party) or have similar social identities) and different from members of other groups (e.g., other political parties) or categories (*them*) (Wodak 2011). Differentiation between *us* and *them* implies opposition and contrast (see Example 1). Metaphorically speaking, they use a different language (Bogdanowska-Jakubowska 2015; Bogdanowska and Bogdanowska-Jakubowska 2014).

- (1) Jarosław Kaczyński (PiS leader): *MY to wiemy i jesteśmy blisko ludzi, bo jeździmy po Polsce. A w tym czasie rządzący [ONI] zajęci są sobą, walką o kasę i nie wiedzą, co mają robić* (Gazeta.pl).  
(WE know it and we are close to people, we are traveling across Poland. In the meantime, [members of] the government [THEY] are occupied with themselves, with fighting for money and they do not know what to do.)

However, it is important to remember that even for an individual, identities are not stable (Wodak 2011: 77). For various reasons (ideological or pragmatic), people re-shape their identities, sometimes moving from one community of practice to another. This also happens in politics, when politicians move from one party to another. Such transfers usually evoke comments from both sides (see Examples 2 and 3).

- (2) Donald Tusk (PO leader): *Cieszę się, że spotykamy się z takimi ludźmi jak Michał Kamiński, którzy zmieniają opinię na temat Platformy Obywatelskiej i chcą nam pomóc utrzymać stabilność polityczną. (...) Michał Kamiński, tak jak gorliwie potrafił uderzyć Platformę wtedy, kiedy prezentował konkurencyjne ugrupowanie, z jeszcze większą energią będzie wspierał to, co ma sens* (<http://www.tvn24.pl>).

(I'm glad that we can meet such people as Michał Kamiński, who are able to change their opinion on the Civic Platform and want to help us maintain political stability. (...) As eagerly as he used to strike the Civic Platform when he represented a rival party, Michał Kamiński will support now, with even greater energy, the cause which makes sense.)

- (3) Jacek Kurski (Michał Kamiński's former party colleague): (...) w planie politycznym, oczywiście, to oznacza, że jesteśmy ..., ani nam się witać, ani żegnać, żyjemy na archipelagach, jakby powiedział poeta. I mogę powiedzieć, że, Michał nie obraź się, przeszedłeś na złą stronę mocy (<http://www.tvn24.pl>). ((...) on a political level, it means that we are ...; we can neither greet each other nor bid goodbye; we live on different archipelagoes, as the poet would say. I can say that, Michał don't get offended, you joined "the dark side of the Force".)

### 15.2.2 An overview of the two main political parties in the present-day Poland

As has been mentioned above, the aim of the study is to carry out an analysis of patterns of behavior and self-presentation styles of members of the two major political parties in Poland, the Civic Platform (center-right) and the Law and Justice (right wing). To be able to see and understand differences and similarities in self-presentation between politicians belonging to the two parties, it is necessary to possess some knowledge of the parties in question.

The Civic Platform (PO), a leading party at the time when the text was written, is strongly pro-European. Its "voters share the following characteristics: higher education than the average, better off, and native to the western parts of the country" (Holm-Hansen 2011: 280), and living in big cities. Among the values mentioned in the PO statute (*Statut PO RP* 2013, [www.platforma.org](http://www.platforma.org); [www.platforma.org/en/about-us](http://www.platforma.org/en/about-us)), there are *democracy, the rule of law, civil rights, social solidarity, family, equality, quality of life, economic development, and prosperity*.

The Law and Justice (PiS) is a national-conservative party, at that time the main opposition party in Poland. The PiS is described as "a continuation of the populist and justice-oriented currents present in proletarian upheavals against Polish state socialism since 1956". Its voters have little or no education, low income and live in small towns and in countryside (Holm-Hansen 2011: 277). Among the values mentioned in the PiS statute (*Statut Prawa i Sprawiedliwości* 2013, [www.pis.org.pl](http://www.pis.org.pl)), there are *nation, democracy, the rule of law, civil rights, patriotism, solidarity, family, and social equality*.

Although the two parties are constantly in opposition to each other, they appear to share some values and have a lot in common.

### 15.3 Politics in the media

In political interviews, two types of public discourse are created, political discourse and media discourse. Political discourse on TV belongs to what Sarcinelli (1987) calls the presentation of politics, which takes place in the media and is shown to the general public. By contrast, the production of politics takes place behind the scenes and the general public has no access to it (Sarcinelli 1987). Political discourse in the media can be understood in many different ways. According to Lauerbach and Fetzer (2007: 15), what we can observe in political interviews on TV is “[d]iscourse *with* politicians and other political personnel” which is produced during dialogic speech events in which they interact with journalists.

Political discourse in the media, and elsewhere, created by members of a community of practice – one political party – bears the mark of their worldview and membership in general. As a result, the form (patterns of interactional behavior, self-presentation, and politeness styles) and the content of political discourse signify the speaker’s party membership. As Caldas-Coulthard (2003: 272) maintains, in the discourses of the media, *we* signifies “the civilized world, the free democracies, the West, the free world”, in contrast to *the others*, usually classified negatively (see Example 4).

(4) Marzena Wróbel (PiS) to a member of Twój Ruch: *Proszę się przyjrzeć swoim listom, proszę się przyjrzeć osobom, które wielokrotnie obrażały Polaków, zwłaszcza katolików, zwłaszcza ich uczucia religijne. I wy uważacie, że to jest norma i że to jest mądre?*

(Look at your [the Your Movement party’s] lists [of candidates for the European Parliament]. Have a look at the persons who offended Poles many times, especially Catholics and their religious feelings. And you think that it is a norm, and that it is wise?)

Political interviews, like news, provide the audience with the *recontextualization* of the topic, as comments made by interview participants (invited politicians and the host) are not objective representations of facts, but rather ideologically-grounded constructs that encode fixed values (cf. Caldas-Coulthard 2003). Analyzing what they say and how they behave, one can identify their political affiliation.

### 15.4 An analysis of politicians’ self-presentation

In this section I focus on the forms which individual party members use to construct and present their group identity, deal with the

question of representing the other, and interact with their political opponents. I will analyze extracts from an interview with the PO and PiS campaign managers, given before the elections to the European Parliament, May 2014.

Analyzing politicians' behavior in the media, one should do so at three levels:

- interpersonal level, depending on the context of situation (participants' social status, interpersonal relations between the participants, place and time of interaction, topic);
- individual level, including the participants' personality and personal identity;
- affiliation level, concerning the party they belong to (its ideology, its position in the country's political arena: major/minor party, leading/opposition party).

Taking such a multi-level perspective may help account for differences in the politicians' behavior.

The analyzed interview has a symmetrical structure; the interviewer asks the two interviewees questions of the same type. In Example 5, the PO campaign manager, Tadeusz Zwiefka, responds to the interviewer's question in a chronological (*od początku* 'from the beginning') and logical way, providing detailed arguments for his decisions. His lengthy utterance has two main aims, to discredit the leader of the opposition party – PiS, Jarosław Kaczyński, and to create a positive self-image, both individual and group (the PO party). He realizes the first aim by accusing the PiS leader of not providing the necessary information in his declaration of income, and breaking the regulations. To mitigate his attack, he mentions that Kaczyński is willing to provide the information if the ethics committee asks for it, at the same time showing his own and his party's good will and tolerance (*Więc czekamy na uzupełnienie*. 'Thus we are waiting for the supplementation.'). However, he presents the problem of Kaczyński's failure to provide the financial information as something serious, aggravated by the facts that Kaczyński is a lawyer, and due to his profession he should know the consequences of breaking the law, and that he is not an average party member, but its leader. The PO campaign manager's answer is given in a calm voice and to the point, and its main aim is to show the high moral standards of the speaker and his party.

- (5) 1. Interviewer: *Pan zarzucił prezesowi Jarosławowi Kaczyńskiemu to, że nie powiedział, od kogo pożyczył pieniądze i że nie wpisał tego do oświadczenia.*  
 2. *I że państwo mieli nawet iść do prokuratury, i co?*  
 3. *Tadeusz Zwiefka (PO): Nie, nie ma wniosku do prokuratury, ponieważ...*  
 4. *Od początku: zarzut powstał dlatego, ponieważ to jest niewypełnienie ustawy.*

6. *Ustawa mówi bardzo wyraźnie, co powinno być zawarte w oświadczeniu majątkowym.*
  7. *Punkt jedenasty również dokładnie precyzuje, jakiego rodzaju informacje powinny się tam znaleźć.*
  8. *Ale ponieważ pan prezes Jarosław Kaczyński oświadczył,*
  9. *że jeśli komisja etyki zażąda, żeby uzupełnił, to on uzupełni. Więc czekamy na uzupełnienie.*
  10. *Interviewer: Więc nie było problemu i to było takie malutkie czepiałstwo.*
  11. *PO: A nie. To jest poważny problem, ponieważ ponieważ szef największej partii opozycyjnej,*
  12. *który jest prawnikiem, powinien wypełniać zapis ustawowy, ustawę, którą on sam tworzył.*
1. Interviewer: You accused chairman Jarosław Kaczyński
  2. of not saying who had lent him the money and not providing this information in his declaration of income.
  3. And that you [plural] were to bring a prosecution against him. And what happened?
  4. **Tadeusz Zwiefka (PO):** No, there hasn't been any charge put against him, because...
  5. Well, once again: the charge was formulated, because this constitutes the law infringement.
  6. The law clearly states what should be included in a declaration of income.
  7. Point 11 also precisely states what kind of information should be provided.
  8. But because party leader Jarosław Kaczyński promised
  9. that if the ethics committee requires that he should supplement it, he would do so. Thus we are waiting for the supplementation.
  10. Interviewer: So there was no problem, and this was simply picking on him.
  11. PO: But no. This is an important problem, because because the leader of the main opposition party,
  12. who is a lawyer, should adhere to the law he himself created.

In Example 6, the PiS campaign manager, Andrzej Duda, attacks the PO and its leader, Prime Minister Donald Tusk, in a different, indirect way. He uses the word *znamienny* (striking characteristic, typical of whom? of what? – of the PO and this party members' ways) and the expression *ciekawa sytuacja* ("an interesting situation; worth investigating?"). The PiS campaign manager's utterance (lines 4–6) can be treated as a kind of understatement whose main function is to threaten the prime minister's face, its moral aspect in particular. He apparently agrees with the interviewer, who states the obvious (line 7), and, smiling, he expresses pity that the prime minister's declaration of income has not been published before the election (lines 8–9). The implicature arising from this sentence is made explicit in

the interviewer's question (line 10). Answering it, the PiS politician starts with *Ale rozumiem* (But I understand), implying that he does not think Prime Minister Tusk hides anything, but he does not want to say it explicitly, as this would constitute a positive comment. Duda's criticism is aimed at the PO in general, which as a leading party favors its members (line 11). He does so indirectly, commenting on the Sejm office run by the PO – *no tak po prostu działa* ("it simply works like that"). While he considers his own criticism aimed at Tusk and the PO as justified, he claims that accusations against Kaczyński made by the PO (lines 12–13) are not, as what is presented as Kaczyński's fault is a general routine in the PO (lines 14–17).

- (6) 1. Interviewer: *A państwo dziś z kolei zaatakowali premiera Donalda Tuska.*  
 2. *że wcale nie złożył oświadczenia,*  
 3. *a okazuje się, że Sejm doszedł do litery 'T' i nie doszedł do premiera.*  
 4. **Andrzej Duda (PiS):** *No właśnie to bardzo znamienne jest. Też bardzo ciekawa sytuacja.*  
 5. *Jan Tomaszewski już ma opublikowane oświadczenie,*  
 6. *a trzy pozycje dalej Donald Tusk jeszcze nie ma opublikowanego oświadczenia.*  
 7. Interviewer: *Według alfabetu, to jest o, p, r, s, t ...tak? Po kolei.*  
 8. PiS: *Tak, oczywiście. Szkoda, że przed wyborami pan Donald Tusk,*  
 9. *jego oświadczenie nie jest jeszcze jawne, ale... (smiling)*  
 10. Interviewer: *Sądzi pan, że coś premier ukrywa?*  
 11. PiS: *Ale rozumiem, że Sejm, w kancelarii Sejmu, którym dzisiaj kieruje PO, no tak po prostu działa.*  
 12. *Natomiast to jest zupełnie inna sprawa,*  
 13. *dlatego myśmy byli tak przykro zdumieni tym atakiem na pana prezesa Jarosława Kaczyńskiego.*  
 14. *Bo wystarczy otworzyć oświadczenia majątkowe posłów, posłów także i PO,*  
 15. *można zobaczyć oświadczenie majątkowe pani marszałek Kopacz,*  
 16. *gdzie wpisuje cały szereg kredytów, podaje, że to są kredyty bankowe,*  
 17. *ale nie podaje, jaki to jest cel, mimo, na jaki cel były pobierane. Mimo że...*
1. Interviewer: and you have attacked Prime Minister Donald Tusk.  
 2. that he has not presented his declaration of income,  
 3. it turns out that the Sejm has reached the letter 'T' and has not reached the prime minister.  
 4. **Andrzej Duda (PiS):** Well, that's just typical. And a very interesting situation as well.  
 5. Jan Tomaszewski has already had his declaration published,  
 6. and three positions ahead Donald Tusk hasn't had his declaration published yet.  
 7. Interviewer: In alphabetical order, it goes o, p, r, s, t, ... doesn't it?  
 8. AD: Yes, certainly. It's a pity that Mister Donald Tusk,

9. his declaration hasn't been published before the election, but ...(smiling)
10. Do you think that the prime minister is hiding anything?
11. PiS: But I understand that the Sejm, the Sejm office, which is now operated by the PO, simply works like that.
12. However, this is a completely different matter,
13. that's why we were so sorrowfully astounded by the attack on chairman Jarosław Kaczyński.
14. Because it will do to open the declarations of income of members of the Sejm, members of the PO included,
15. one can see the declaration of income of the Speaker Ewa Kopacz,
16. in which she enumerates a list of loans, she informs that these are bank credits,
17. but she does not inform what was the purpose, why she took them. Although...

In Example 7, which is a continuation of Example 6, the PO politician tries to undermine the PiS politician's confidence, implying that he has not checked the information properly (line 2). The latter reciprocates the request, which he also addresses to the TV viewers. Again the PO member takes the moral high ground to enhance the moral aspect of his own face (line 5).

- (7) 1. PiS: *Nie ma celów, w oświadczeniu pani Kopacz, nie ma celów.*  
 2. PO: *Proszę sprawdzić.*  
 3. PiS: *No, proszę sprawdzić. Proszę widzów, w takim razie, żeby sprawdzili.*  
 4. *Ale to samo jest w wielu innych oświadczeniach majątkowych posłów.*  
 5. PO: *Ale nikogo to nie usprawiedliwia, każdy z tych posłów powinien to zrobić.*
1. PiS: There are not purposes included, in Ms. Kopacz's declaration there are no purposes.
  2. PO: Please, check it.
  3. PiS: Well, please, check it. I request TV viewers to check it.
  4. But the same refers to many other declarations of income of the members of the Sejm.
  5. PO: But nobody can be excused, each member of the Sejm should do so.

The interviewer's next question (Example 8) is oriented at making the PiS member present his opinion on PO members in the European Union. Duda (PiS) takes the opportunity to say a few critical words about the PO (lines 6–7). To make the negative representation of the PO in the European Union more convincing, he contrasts it with a self-presentational comment (line 8). The contrast involves the opposition *we*

– *they/others*. In political life the meaning of personal pronouns *my* ‘we’ and *oni* ‘they’, like in everyday social interactions, differs from situation to situation. Teun van Dijk (2009) writes about the political pronoun *we*, which may refer to a particular group or a political party, or it can be used as *pluralis majestatis* with reference to the prime minister, the prime minister and his government, or a group of politicians having the same opinion on a particular issue. In this particular case, the political pronoun *we* is used with reference to the members of one political party – the PiS.

- (8) 1. Interviewer: *W wyborach tych chodzi o coś ważniejszego, kto będzie z Polski rządził w Brukseli,*  
 2. *kto będzie rządził w Unii Europejskiej.*  
 3. *Jeżeli wygra PO, to, co to będzie oznaczało dla nas – Polaków?*  
 4. **Andrzej Duda (PiS):** *Jeżeli wygra PO, będzie to oznaczało dla nas – Polaków – tyle,*  
 5. *że, w moim osobistym przekonaniu,*  
 6. *że będą ludzie, którzy niekoniecznie są przeświadczeni,*  
 7. *że w europarlamencie muszą bronić polskich interesów.*  
 8. *My jesteśmy do tego przekonani.*
1. Interviewer: In this election something else matters, namely who from Poland is going to rule in Brussels,  
 2. who is going to rule in the European Union.  
 3. If the PO wins, what would it mean to us – Poles?  
 4. **Andrzej Duda (PiS):** If the PO wins, it could mean for us – Poles –  
 5. that, in my personal opinion,  
 6. that people who are not necessarily convinced  
 7. that they must look after our Polish interests in the European Parliament.  
 8. We have taken to doing so.

The negative representation of the PO in the European Union, in Example 8, is depicted by the PiS member in the following words (Example 9), where he mentions the PO MEP Róża Thun. To emphasize his point of view he uses repetition (lines 3, 4, 5).

- (9) 1. PiS: *Proszę posłuchać, co mówi moja konkurentka,*  
 2. *startująca także z okręgu małopolsko-świętokrzyskiego, pani Róża Thun.*  
 3. *Ona cały czas mówi o wspólnotowej Europie, ona mówi, że trzeba budować wspólną Europę.*  
 4. *A gdzie w tym wszystkim są nasze polskie interesy?*  
 5. *Dzisiaj przede wszystkim w europarlamencie trzeba bronić polskich interesów, bo...*  
 6. Interviewer: *Polskie interesy chyba sobie zapewniliśmy do 2020 roku.*

1. PiS: Listen to what my rival
2. in the Małopolska-Świętokrzyskie constituency, Róża Thun, says.
3. She is talking all the time about common Europe, she is saying that it is necessary to build common Europe.
4. And where are our Polish interests in all this?
5. Today one has to first of all look after the Polish interests in the European Parliament, as...
6. Interviewer: We have taken care of the Polish interests to 2020.

In Example 10, the interviewer goes back to the issue of identifying the purposes of the loans in the MPs' declarations of income, showing the very declaration, including the information concerning the purposes of the loans, on the screen. In spite of that the PiS member does not want to accept the fact and denies it. Finally, the PO member directly threatens the PiS member's face, accusing him of lying. This is a mere statement of the fact, what really damages the PiS member's face is the material proof – Ewa Kopacz's declaration of income.

- (10) 1. *Interviewer: A wracając do tego, co mi pan powiedział,*  
 2. *pani Kopacz wpisała cele, kolega mi podpowiedział.*  
 3. *PiS: Nie wpisała celi, bo osobiście sprawdzałem.*  
 4. *PO: Ja też osobiście sprawdzałem, nie wracajmy już do tego.*  
 5. *PiS: Proponuję, żebyśmy na antenie otwarli oświadczenie majątkowe pani Kopacz.*  
 6. *PO: Mówi pan nieprawdę.*
1. Interviewer: And going back to what you have said,
  2. Ms. Kopacz identified the purposes [of the loans], my colleague has told me.
  3. PiS: She did not identify the purposes [of the loans], I have personally checked.
  4. PO: I have personally checked too, let's leave it.
  5. PiS: I suggest that we open Ms. Kopacz's declaration of income here on the air.
  6. PO: What you say is not true.

By analogy to the question (Example 8) oriented at making the PiS member present his opinion on PO members in the European Union, the interviewer, now, asks the PO member a similar question (Example 11). To stress his objectivity in creating the picture of the PiS position in the EU Parliament, he starts with the expression *Prawda jest taka* 'The truth is' (line 2) and repeats it twice (lines 7, 13). The poor situation of the PiS MEPs in the EU Parliament (lines 2–4) is contrasted with the powerful

position of the PO MEPs (lines 5–6). The PO member uses the political pronoun *my* (referring to the PO MEPs) in opposition to the PiS MEPs. To give credence to what he said, he admits that the PO and the PiS were able to reach agreement on matters important for Poland; in this case, enhancing both the PO group face and the PiS group face.

- (11) 1. Interviewer: *Tadeusz Zwiefka, co będzie jak wybory wygra PiS?*  
 2. *Tadeusz Zwiefka (PO): Prawda jest taka, że PiS zasiadało w takich frakcjach,*  
 3. *które są w europarlamencie mało znaczące, niewielkie, 50-osobowe.*  
 4. *To oznaczało, że jeżeli PiS chciało pilnować polskich interesów, musiało to robić z nami.*  
 5. *To myśmy walczyli w dużych frakcjach o to,*  
 6. *żeby zadbać o polski interes w ramach interesu europejskiego.*  
 7. *Oczywiście, prawda też jest taka, pani redaktor,*  
 8. *że gdzie były ważne dla Polski sprawy, myśmy potrafili się tam porozumieć.*
1. Interviewer: Tadeusz Zwiefka, what will happen, if the PiS wins?  
 2. Tadeusz Zwiefka (PO): The truth is that the PiS had its members in such factions  
 3. which do not count much in the European Parliament, are small,  
 4. that meant that if the PiS wanted to look after the Polish interests, they had to do so with us.  
 5. It was us who fought in big factions  
 6. to look after the Polish interests within the European interests.  
 7. Certainly, the truth is that, [Ms. Editor],  
 8. that if there were matters important for Poland, we were able to reach an agreement.

In Example 12, Duda (PiS) describes inconsistency in Donald Tusk's actions and defines it as hypocrisy. Zwiefka's (PO) response (line 4) to Duda's aggressive insinuations about Tusk's motives can be characterized as unmarked facework, involving actions intended to maintain or enhance self and/or other face, behavior aimed at establishing a good relationship or at sustaining the current state of a relationship – appropriate behavior; politic behavior rather than polite. Zwiefka uses the expression *Ja bardzo przepraszam, ale* 'I'm very sorry, but', but in this context it is rather a marker of disagreement than a marker of politeness. On the one hand, Zwiefka does not disrespect his opponent; he acknowledges his political competence and knowledge (e.g. *pan doskonale wie* 'you perfectly know'). On the other hand, he feels the need to explain the mechanisms of such official visits, which is a good opportunity to engage in the PO party self-presentation (lines 6–10). He presents it as a party with a leader of international stature who knows the rules of

international politics (lines 12–13). Duda interprets Zwiefka's words in a completely different way: as a proof that he is right (line 11). Once more he tries to discredit Prime Minister Tusk by questioning his political competence (line 14).

- (12)
1. PiS: (...), jeżeli on na kilka dni przed wyborami jedzie do ojca świętego,
  2. wyjednuje sobie tam wizytę, no to jest to znamienne, pani redaktor.
  3. PiS: To jest hipokryzja.
  4. PO: Ja bardzo przepraszam, ale pan doskonale wie, że nie ma wyjednywania wizyty u ojca świętego.
  5. PiS: Jak nie ma, przecież to jest dyplomacja, panie pośle.
  6. PO: Tak, to jest dyplomacja właśnie. Ta wizyta w Rzymie była planowana od dawna.
  7. Od dawna było wiadomym, że jest rocznica okrągła, 70-ta, bitwy pod Monte Casino,
  8. i przy okazji tej wizyty Donald Tusk również zapragnął,
  9. aby odbyły się bardzo poważne spotkania z ojcem świętym papieżem Franciszkiem
  10. oraz z premierem Włoch. Oraz z premierem Włoch!
  11. PiS: Czyli jednak zapragnął, czyli jednak starał się o to, o tym właśnie mówimy!
  12. PO: Tak starał się o to, bo jest politykiem międzynarodowym,
  13. rozumiejącym politykę międzynarodową, europejską.
  14. PiS: A co nie wiedział, że będą wybory?
1. PiS: (...) if a couple of days before the election he goes to the Holy Father,
  2. he wheedles the visit there, so it is striking.
  3. It is hypocrisy.
  4. PO: I'm sorry but you (Sir) perfectly know that you can't wheedle the visit to the Holy Father.
  5. PiS: But you can, this is diplomacy, the honorable gentleman.
  6. PO: Yes, that is diplomacy, exactly. This visit to Rome was planned a long time ago.
  7. It has been known for a long time that it is the round, 70th, anniversary of the battle of Monte Casino,
  8. and Donald Tusk took this opportunity
  9. to meet with the Holy Father Pope Francis
  10. and the Prime Minister of Italy. And with the Prime Minister of Italy!
  11. PiS: So he wanted it, after all, he sought to meet them. That's what we are talking about!
  12. PO: Yes, he sought to meet them, because he is an international politician,
  13. who understands international and European politics.
  14. PiS: Didn't he know that the election would soon start?

## 15.5 Conclusions

The aim of the study was to compare self-presentational styles of members of the two major political parties in Poland, the Civic Platform and the Law and Justice. I focused on the forms by means of which individual party members construct and present their group identity, deal with the question of representing the other and interact with their political opponents.

On the basis of the presented analysis of a political interview, one can draw a number of conclusions. The two interviewees, the PO member and the PiS member, use the same strategies of self-presentation (cf. Leary 2005):

- describing their own party in the way to make a desired impression on the electorate;
- expressing opinions suggesting that as a party they have particular attributes, highly valued by the electorate;
- public attributions: explaining their behavior in accordance with the projected image of their party;
- non-verbal behavior, such as facial expressions, and prosodic features, such as tone of voice.

However, the actual realization of the strategies differs. The PO member responses to the interviewer's questions are to the point. His responses to the PiS member's accusations and criticism are logical and pertinent to the ongoing exchange. He is self-confident, which is visible in his civilized manners and calm, emotionless and relatively slow way of speaking. He is creating a positive image of his party, providing detailed arguments to enhance it. His main aim is to maintain and enhance the moral and competence aspects of the party's face, his own individual face included. He is also engaged in maintaining the relational aspect of his face, behaving in a polite or at least in a politic/appropriate way (he uses proper words of address, different linguistic markers of politeness, such as *przepraszam* 'I'm sorry', *proszę* 'please', and he does not attack or offend his opponent). He threatens the other interviewee's individual face, the group face of the PiS party and the individual face of its leader in a direct way, *on record without redress* (using Brown and Levinson's (1987) terminology), but the tone of his statements is mitigated by emotionless expression of pertinent arguments. In the same, emotionless way he reacts to the criticism and accusations directed at him and at his party.

The PiS member manages his own face and his party's face in a different way, but the aspects of face he focuses on are the same, moral face and competence face. Criticizing the PO, he resorts to ungrounded

accusations and lies (in fact both interviewees are caught lying). Unlike his opponent, he often says something indirectly, in the form of understatements and allusions. His utterances are not emotionless as those of his opponent: he frequently smiles with satisfaction; satisfaction can be heard in the few exclamations he makes. Sometimes he fails to refrain from aggressive comments, sometimes he is ironical.

The main objective for the two interviewees is not their individual face, but the group face of their respective parties, in some cases epitomized in the individual face of their leaders.

On the basis of the observation of the two parties' members behavior presented in the media and the analysis of a corpus of TV interviews given by members of the two parties, I have come to the following conclusions:

1. Although certain self-presentational strategies can be observed as most frequently employed by politicians in general, e.g., lying (as a self-presentational strategy, it is used to enhance the individual's and his/her party's face and to denigrate the opponent), some patterns of behavior aimed at self-image creation are specific for a particular political party, functioning as a community of practice.
2. The two parties in question differ in this respect.
3. Generally speaking, the PO members' statements are less aggressive, more to the point and logical, than those made by the PiS members, who are more emotional (they often express aggression, hostility, and satisfaction from the opponents' failure) and like to offend the opponent.
4. All the enumerated features attributed to one party or the other can be observed in both, but their intensity differs. Besides, individual variability also has to be taken into consideration.

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