Title: "Our house has burnt" : beyond the dialectics of place and space

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To talk about space is more than merely to describe it. Due consideration must be given to the phenomenology of perception which discloses the preconditions of seeing that regulate our conceptualizations of places: cultural modes of space formation and appreciation as well as various practices of visual or verbal representation through which places make themselves available in social intercourse. The overall effect of our response to a given space lies in our shifting sense of its well-placedness (a space categorized in terms of specific objects and the spatial niches in which these objects find their ideal localization, i.e. where they are 'well-placed') or its dis-placedness, which speaks less of the aesthetic value of a given space and more of the way in which things 'disturb' one another in a specific realm, are not 'localizable' but themselves tend to designate their 'own' domains. As a result, the reality described as 'ill-placed' cannot be easily subsumed under the heading of one specific type of space (e.g., 'home', or 'motherland') but generates a multiplicity of local, peripheral spaces operating in their own terms. This tension between things that are 'well-placed' (localizable) and 'dis-placed' (localizable but unorganizable, inasmuch as they resist strategies of homogenization) is already traceable, for example, in the traditional American controversy between the Romantic sense of at-homeness in nature and the expansionist aversion to wilderness. Roderick Nash's claim that 'Romanticism had cleared away enough of the old assumptions to permit a favourable attitude toward wilderness without entirely eliminating the instinctive fear and hostility a wilderness condition had produced', can thus also be represented as a clash between the sense of 'well placedness' (eminent in the Romantic attitude to nature) and 'dis-placedness' which entailed in its programme a whole series of purgative and sanitary practices.
through which a given territory was to assume aspects of 'well-placedness', i.e. space. If the wilderness was to remain a model of man's operations in nature, then it would necessarily imply a radical limitation of man's interventionism, which is aimed at imposing upon a given area (i.e. man's system of preferences and which, through strategies of homogenization may transform a multiplicity of chaotic places into one cosmic (i.e. orderly and regulated) space.

As has been argued above, however, these two models never appear in their 'pure' form but always simultaneously and unassumingly shape our response to spatiality, thus exerting a powerful influence upon the sense of one's (individual and cultural) identity. As Mark Trehearne claims in his essay on the topographical poetry of Philippe Jaccottet, another way of presenting this interplay is through the concepts of the 'familiar' and the 'unfamiliar'. The former would stand for what we call 'well placedness', the latter for 'dis-placedness' of things and their spatial relations. At the junction between the two stands the 'epiphany', a moment when 'the world is not at anchor'.

Thus, to see a place, to live in it as its citizen (with all the political and social implications of the term) means to experience crises in its mode of familiarity. A way towards one's authentic identity within a culture leads through this night of radically critical insight into a complex network of familiarization mechanisms. These crises (or epiphanies) rest on two disclosures: the first is contained in Jaccottet's phrase that the world in 'not at anchor'; the other undermines the notion of the transparency of everyday places which, as a result, can become one homogeneous 'space'. In the world of the 'well-placed', things are 'at anchor', i.e. they are stabilized (if not immobilized) by their essences (familiarity implies that we know what a given thing 'is') and their applicability (we know what the 'use' of a given object is) and thus they can be clearly mapped in two ways. Firstly, each thing has an identifiable location where it can best actualize its value and where a thing is defined as belonging to a particular sphere of the public everyday. Secondly, on a personal level, places function as memory locations, i.e. objects can be described and defined not only in terms of their everyday value (i.e. their common applicability) but as memory units in which the public is linked with the private.

Such mapping is most typically applied to the realm of 'home' which, like a country mansion described by Adam Mickiewicz in the 1834 Polish national epic Pan Tadeusz, is constructed as a result of several procedures: a coherent synchronizing of the natural, theological, and social; a clear ordering of social and domestic roles leading to the allotment of specific, unquestionable spaces to each member of the community; a profound internalizing of such an ordering which functions on the strength of revelation rather than consensus; the formation of 'home' as a replica and substitute of the state, leading, in effect, to the historization of the everyday in which the object frequently functions as a reminder and a secret codification of national history. In Pan Tadeusz the main protagonist returns home after many years of schooling in a distant city:
Since he had seen the house long years had past,
And now, his schooling over, he returned at last.
The ancient walls he hastened to behold
As tenderly as they were friends of old.
The hangings and the furniture that day
Were just as when a child he used to play
... He saw the chiming clock in wooden case;
With childish joy the young man pulled the string
To hear Dabrowski's old mazurka ring.4

‘Home’ is a territory where individual places coalesce into a harmonious whole, where the personal is likely never to remain on the level of the purely and exclusively personal but is saturated with the communal and historical. In brief, ‘home’ is where many ‘places’ become one ‘space’. The result of this process is a marked simplification of the public or social. If, as François Lyotard claims, this sphere appears always and inevitably at the ‘moment of the phrase’5 and is always complex, then a clear arrangement of all the participants in the scene of communication makes the social, if not less complex, then necessarily more transparent and subject to an easier mapping. In the world ‘at anchor’, as in the traditional community described by Mickiewicz, the individual has access to the public past through his/her immediate surroundings in which objects acquire the status of index-cards, or sources of power, which afford access to past events. Through the objects of everyday life, one is connected with the events of the past. In the text in question, written in 1834, during a period in which Poland had been absent as a political entity from the map of Europe for over a century, this aspect is particularly striking as it is only through the revelatory power of everyday objects as power points transmitting the energy of the past that an individual could retain his/her national identity in the absence of any available political structure which he/she could define as his/hers.

In the reality of ‘home’ there is no room for forgetfulness because even if one’s private memory weakens or is blurred, everyday objects ‘remember’ the past for us. At ‘home’ one is remembered by a larger power (the past). Home is part of a structure whose visible foundations are in the immediate surroundings but whose apex escapes human sight due to its temporal extension (past events which are no longer ‘present’, or may even be ‘banned’ from the now, nevertheless still reside or ‘haunt’ the everyday world by having been encoded in the objects at hand) and theological construction.

The latter is significant because the reality of the ‘well-placed’ is kept together partly by what we may refer to as a certain ‘gravitational pull’ due to which an object both attracts the human glance and, at the same time, refuses to be the sole addressee of this glance, sending it on to a larger power which acts as a guarantor of the whole system which allows for the transformation of places into one space. This guarantor has the status of a God and in this way we can assume
there can be no ‘home’ which would be ‘Godless’, which would not gravitate towards a center, a God; no ‘home’ which would not have its ‘theology of the everyday’ on the strength of which identity is established and perpetuated.

The everyday locates at its center the past in which the individual blends with the community thus establishing his/her presence. To put it more dramatically, it constitutes the now as a mourning for the past which is clearly outlined, mapped or encrypted in the present. In theological discourse, which, as has been suggested, is inevitably coded in the ‘well-placed’ this reading of the enduring role of the past, which is only apparently neglected and forgotten, is significant because it evokes the scene of the crypt, the central and most powerful story of Christianity: the pious gather round the encrypted body of Christ. The piety of home is constituted, constructed (the importance of this word will become immediately clear) by the power of the dead (the past) which generates hope for the future. In this system the now is a moment of mourning without despair, a scene of melancholy, a moment of death which displays the construction of reality in the figure of a dead body: ‘For wheresoever the carcase is there will the eagles be gathered together’ (Mt, 24, 28). The carcase is not only a dead body but also a construction, a skeleton of an architectural structure. Thus one could claim that the everyday of home, of the ‘well-placed’, is no less than a gathering of the pious round the dead body of the past buried in the objects at hand and which is revealed as the true construction of reality. The athandedness of the everyday, of the ‘well-placed’, is founded upon remembrance which facilitates the identity determination processes and upon the (hidden) presence of the center, a source of legitimation and ordering.

This brings us back to the question of perception mentioned at the beginning of this essay. The ‘well-placed’ generates its power and its legitimation of individual and cultural identity strategies from the ultimate overcoming of the difference in the disclosure of the foundational One. As Emmanuel Levinas puts it: ‘To see is to make use of separation ... as a form of the immediate, the non-mediated. In this sense also, to see is to have the experience of the continuous, and to celebrate the sun, that is to say, beyond the sun itself: the One’.

The metamorphic, rather than transformative, model of the everyday, which we refer to as the world of the ‘dis-placed’ can also be presented, in contradistinction to the ‘well-placed’, as the OPAQUE structure which sees predominantly in ‘the swarming mass’. According to Michele de Certeau, the story of masses ‘begins on the ground floor, with footsteps. They are myriad, but do not compose a series. They cannot be counted because each unit has a qualitative character: a style of tactile apprehension and kinaesthetic appropriation. Their swarming mass is an innumerable collection of singularities. Their intertwined paths give their shape to spaces. They weave places together ... They are not localized; it is rather that they spatialize’. 
The 'opaque', equivocal, translational character of everyday practices, which start developing in industrial and postindustrial Europe, seems to focus on two elements. Firstly, as Walter Benjamin has noted, it allows for a strange co-existence of the regulated and organized alongside the de-regulated and 'un-organized'. The town results from a series of administrative, technological and sociological decisions imposed by the whole apparatus of force, but, at the same time, the multitude of inhabitants living in these regulated spaces exercise every day their right to 'give shape to [their] spaces'. Secondly, the whole series of everyday life practices and constructions of spatiality (e.g. daily shopping routes, afternoon strolls, etc.), although occurring within the functionalist reality of planning and design, all of a sudden reveals traces of an 'artistic' activity.

Although the opacity of the 'dis-placed' does not result in the elimination of identity, it does render its character problematic. If Jaccottet is right in his claim that 'self-absorption increases the opacity of life', then the opacity in question in the modern and postmodern 'dis-placed' (the difference between the two being the nostalgic rejection of displacedness in the modern and its affirmative appreciation by the postmodern) is generated by the self which 'absorbs' each particular situation and determines its identity strategies according to the demands of the local, temporary scene without permanent reference to an external, over-arching system of validation. Thus, while in the 'well-placed', we identify not only the self, but also its movement through a multiplicity of places and events on the strength of the strategies which turn places into one homogeneous space identifiable as 'home' (in the 'well-placed' there is always a steady and reassuring line of relationship between personal self identity and the identity and nameability of the space it occupies), in the 'dis-placed' we may only use the term 'sous nature'. In the 'dis-placed', the verb to 'live' (predicating all the actions undertaken at, and in the name of, 'home') finds its three supplements.

The first comes from the late Romantic period, the other two from much more recent discourse, but both emphasize the element of estrangement, unfamiliarity, the opacity of man's relationship to places which stubbornly slip away from the incursions of one homogeneous space, away from the continuous seeing which, according to Levinas, is the experience of 'the One'. In the 'dis-placed', seeing is dis-continuous. The 'well-placed' believes in the measurable relationship between immeasurability (God, for instance) and the defined and determined (particular essents): this is the source of the transparency of its system (See Carlyle's famous dictum 'Nature is a living garment of God'). The 'dis-placed' stems from the awareness of the fissure and incommensurability between the two. The maps of the 'dis-placed' are still maps, but they are carried out so as to compromise the very idea of the precision of map-making.

David Thoreau, in his essay on walking, describes man's relationship with places as that of 'sauntering'. The dictionary meaning of the verb, given as 'leisurely walking' is, in Thoreau's lesson, amplified by two etymological digressions.
According to the first, the verb comes from *La Sainte Terre* which name was given in the Middle Ages by beggars as the answer to the inquisitive questioning of almsgivers who wanted to know the destination of their vagrant paths. The other harks back to an equally distorted French phrase *sans terre*, i.e. 'without land, home, permanent dwelling'. To saunter therefore combines the sense of homelessness characteristic of the modern and postmodern identity with a decisive hint at the final destination (the Holy Land) which is embedded in the seemingly centerless and meandering lines of errancy. As Thoreau himself points out, the situation described refers to one who has no particular home 'but [is] equally at home everywhere'. The question of both individual and cultural identifiability in this model of the 'displaced' is paradoxically based on turning the dis-placedness into well-placedness (one is homeless not because one does not have a home but because home is everywhere): by uncovering our dis-placedness we find our place which is never quite 'proper' in itself, but is authenticated by the ultimate goal embedded in its structure. The source of the identity construction is then the awareness of displacedness which is controlled and countered by the security of the destination which (through the dictate upon our actions) stabilizes and, in part, solidifies our self. This marks an unexpected turn towards Thoreau's contemporary, Hegel, who claimed that the identity of philosophy, the dignity of thought, stems from the 'between, a narrow separation of a scission, from a cleavage, from a separation, from a division into two', and a similar turn towards sanctity, although this time it is not a sanctity of the land, but of the family. As Derrida notices, 'A fissure – which reaches its absolute in the absolute religion – spells the need for philosophy. Philosophy, like its proper object, stems from Christianity whose truth it is, from the Holy Family (*la Sainte Famille*) which it overcomes'.

Annie Dillard's version of Thoreau's 'sauntering', interestingly, also builds upon an etymological excursion into the French language, emphasizing the mobility and uprootedness of man in relation to places (hence questioning the idea of 'home' which is where we leave from in order to, eventually, come back) in the term 'sojourning'. Referring to mangroves which, floating on oceans and rivers, 'make their own soil from scratch', Dillard identifies humanity as 'sojourners' aiming 'nowhere'. This last word is of particular importance as it distinguishes Dillard's 'sojourning' from Thoreau's 'sauntering' with its inherent sense of destination. According to Dillard, 'The word “nowhere” is our cue: the consort of musicians strikes up, and we in the chorus stir and move and start twirling our hats. A mangrove island turns adrift to dance. It creates its own soil as it goes over the salt sea at random...'

Finally, Deleuze and Guattari who, like de Certeau, speak of 'swarms' focus on the concept of the 'nomad' whose 'self is only a threshold, a door, a becoming between two multiplicities'. Like Kleist, Lenz and Büchner, the nomad has a different mode of travelling which is definable only 'as coming and going rather than starting and finishing', a situation in which even 'the proper name is the instantaneous apprehension of a multiplicity'.
‘Sauntering’, ‘sojourning’, and ‘deterриториализирован nomadism’ replace ‘dwelling’ as well as ‘home’ and also establish other identity procedures. The implication of discontinuity is obvious: a linear system of the ‘well-placed’ (which, as we have seen, entailed memory as the central part of the present) is replaced by the punctual antimemory of the ‘dis-placed’ where each ‘now’ forms, as it were, a separate block between which no straight line of mere recollection is possible.

End-note: ‘Our house has burnt’ the place(s) of Osijek

A series of haunting pictures of ‘homes’ and ‘family places’: drawings by children from Osijek in Croatia where the territory of ‘home’ (i.e. of the ‘well-placed’) was not ‘dis-placed’ but brutally destroyed and shattered; the places where ‘death and destruction belong to their [children’s] everyday experience’ (Tod und Zörsterung gehören zu ihren alltäglichen Erfahrungen).14

‘Our house in Bosnia has been burnt’, says 13 year old Dragana Ereiz. ‘Home’ is destroyed by fire: not the fire of spirit and of soul but of hatred and murderous zest. This is a story well-recorded in history, a conquest lit up by stakes and burning houses, and yet there is something particularly tragic when, as a psychologist from Zagreb says, ‘The children have lost their beds, toys and friends – simply everything’. To lose everything, to lose simply everything (sinfach alles), is possibly a kind of loss unknown to philosophy which talks about nothingness but which does not live it because it always finds shelter in the Holy Land, among the Holy Family, of concepts and ideas which neutralize a loss. Therefore a loss experienced by philosophy can never be qualified as happening ‘simply’, it is never sinfach; it happens in the company of metaphors and thoughts which cover up the ‘simply’, the sinfach, by the professional fluency in discourse. The calling, the profession of thought, the Fach of philosophy, is to achieve a certain regularization, a certain ‘well-placedness’ of the world through divisions and categorizations. The Fach of philosophy is to think various rubrics where the phenomena of the world could find their shelter. It is all a story of the Fach and of the multiplicity of its German meanings: Fach as ‘profession’, Fach as a ‘rubric’ and/or a drawer (even a secret one where one hides shameful or dangerous letters and documents), Fach as a ‘shelter’ (Dach und Fach) where one finds protection against the darkness and cold of night. A philosopher is a man of Fach, sin Fachmann therefore for him/her the loss is never ‘simple’, it never occurs ganz sinfach, it is always accompanied by the hope of a word or concept. Even the postmodern, postfordist world of the ‘dis-placed’ with its discontinuities and opacity preserves a thread of continuity, of identity, even if it is a changing, protean one. It can do it precisely because when thinking its thoughts it blocks the way for the ‘simply’, it does not allow the sinfach to come in.

A child is barred from such a possibility; a child is not a Fachmann, a child is an amateur, the one who loves, not the one who categorizes and qualifies, or – rather – he/she is an amateur because he/she does both things (loves and thinks) simultaneously. There is no fissure, no cleavage, no slippage into two, and therefore, as Hegel has shown and Derrida confirmed, there is no need of philosophy. Dragana’s drawing belongs nei-
ther to the ‘well-placed’, nor to the ‘dis-placed’; it locates itself somewhere in the sphere of brutality where the wounded and mutilated bodies haunt the shattered houses and the fissure is not a mental one but a corporeal experience of suffering and pain. A world of no identity, where no identity is possible. In the ‘well-placed’, things belong to their respective realms but, first of all, they never shut themselves in them to the total exclusion of another, and, secondly, they are never disintegrated, never fall apart, but form a whole due to the power of what we have called here the ‘gravitational pull’. What is more, they never utterly exhaust their usability, neither are they thrown away as useless and wasted. Human use (no matter how distorted and how different from the original purpose) is always the fate of things in the ‘well-placed’.

The ‘dis-placed’ treats things differently. They are no longer subject to the ‘gravitational pull’ of the One and have two courses to follow. Either, with the inexorable logic of production which never deviates from its purpose, they fulfil their functions, or – when used or supplanted by later and more up to date models – they are discarded and abandoned. Whereas memory is the element of the ‘well-placed’, forgetfulness and oblivion belongs to the ‘dis-placed’.

Dragana’s drawing hovers on the border, a ghastly and dark territory between the two. As in the ‘well-placed’ at-homeness, things do belong to their realms, but evidently they are locked for ever in their frames or cages without the slightest possibility of communication and interrelatedness. With the ‘dis-placed’ they are linked by their state of abandon and the status of throw-aways. But what is traumatic in the drawing is the fact that the things are disintegrated parts of a whole which once is represented as the human body (mutilated and scarred, torn into parts), another time as the system of clothing which remains oddly empty and discarded without the human body in it, in yet another version it becomes a broken symbol of ideological discourse and home mythology. These fragmented, used up objects do not disappear as they should in the ‘dis-placed’, neither can they form a homogeneous whole, as they should in the ‘well-placed’. Dragana has painted them as immobilized for ever in the patches of light emerging from the sea of darkness: they are fragmented objects which refuse to disappear, to fall into oblivion and which will never make another ‘healthy’ whole: a ghastly ‘home’ of amputated legs and heads, neither ‘well-placed’ nor ‘dis-placed’, beyond even such a broad and comprehensive category as the postmodern.

This is the end-note. One cannot go further without getting lost in the darkness – the end-note which marks the end of much more than this unimportant and humble paper. The end of the European Renaissance myth of society as a body with the king as its head, the phallocratic rex erectus. The end of the Enlightenment myth of society in the march towards ever greater perfection, the myth at the end of which there emerged Adam Smith with his division of labour, wealth of nations and pragmatic concepts of the use value of objects. ‘This is the end, my beautiful friend. This is the end.’

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Selves and Others

Fig. 1 Der Stern, 5 January 1994

Notes

4 A. Mickiewicz, Pan Tadeusz, trans. K. MacKenzie (New York: Everyman, 1996), p. 3. All the previous characteristics of the 'home' as a transformation of places into a space are strikingly present in a passage from an early section of the poem showing the company returning from fields at the end of the day's work:

And now the company are turning home,
Gay but in order: first the children come
Accompanied by their tutor; in their train
The Judge himself with Mistress Chamberlain,
And at their side the Chamberlain is found,
The rest of all their family around;
Behind the old folk the young ladies stepped,
The young men walked beside them, though they kept
A half-pace back: decorum so demanded
The marching order no one had commanded,
Each kept his proper place of his own will.

5 'The social is the universe which is formed by their situation insofar as that situation is related to human names, and which is signified by the phrase.' F. Lyotard, The differend, Phrases in Dispute, trans. G. Van den Abeele (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p. 139.

8 Because the places refuse to speak the language of one and the same space, therefore, since there is no one vernacular common for all of them, one must indulge in constant 'translational' operations which render a phrase of one place into that of another.

9 In D. Miller, *op.cit.*, p. 17.


„Nasz dom spłonął”: poza dialektyką miejsca i przestrzeni

**Streszczenie**

Opierając się na pracach Derridy, de Certeau, Deleuze’a i Guattariego, a także nawiązując do tragedii ziem południowosłowiańskich, autor próbuje zaproponować typologię relacji człowieka i przestrzeni. Systematyzuje ją w dwa typy związków. W jednym rzeczy pozostają w pewnym niezakłóconym porządku, są dobrze zakotwicone i miejscowe (well-placed) w świecie; w drugim typie relacji przedmioty zostają uwolnione ze swych miejsc i niejako wprawione w ruch (dis-placed). Moment przejścia między jednym porządkiem a drugim nazywamy „kryzysem znajomego obrazu świata” (crisis in familiarity). Na przykładzie romantycznej literatury zostaje przedstawiony tradycyjnie rozumiany model świata jako „domu”, tj. przestrzeni, w której przedmioty codzienne zachowują w sobie rewelatorską siłę odsłaniania przeszłości i w ten sposób pozwalają jednostce zachować poczucie przynależności grupowej. Dwie inne cechy „domu” to traktowanie teraźniejszości jako trudnej do pokonania (mourning) przeszłości oraz sens relacji między żywnymi a zmarłymi. Te właśnie predyspozycje stanowią szczególną wartość „domu” w niesprzyjających warunkach historycznych (np. Polska rozbiorowa). Ta formacja związku ze światem zostaje zastępowana przez relację, w której „dom” i „zamieszkiwanie” ustępuje miejsca „wędrowce” (Thoreau i sauntering), „pomieszkowaniu” (Dillard i sojournning) i „nomadyzmowi” (Deleuze i Guattari).

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„Notre maison a brûlé”: en dehors de la dialectique du lieu et de l’espace

**Résumé**

Se servant des travaux de Derrida, de Certeau, de Deleuze et de Guattari, mais aussi en évoquant la tragédie des pays post-yugoslaves, l’auteur propose une typologie de relations de l’homme avec l’espace. Il les systématisé en deux types de relation. Dans le premier type de relation les choses
demeurent dans un ordre non troublé, sont bien ancrées, bien placées (well-placed) dans le monde alors que dans le deuxième type de relation les objets se détachent de leurs lieux d'origine et sont, pour ainsi dire, mis en mouvement, dé-placés (dis-placed). Nous appelons „crise de l'image familière du monde” (crisis in familiarity) le moment de passage d'un ordre à l'autre. A l'exemple de la littérature romantique, on présente le modèle du monde traditionnellement imaginé comme „maison” c'est-à-dire un espace dans lequel les objets quotidiens gardent en eux une force révélatrice du passé ce qui permet à l'individu de maintenir le sentiment de l'appartenance au groupe. Deux autres traits de la „maison” c'est le fait de traiter le présent comme un dépassement difficile, un „deuil” (mourning) du passé et la signification de la relation entre les vivants et les morts. C'est ces prédispositions qui constituent une valeur particulière de la „maison” dans les conditions historiques défavorables (p. ex. la Pologne à l'époque des partages). Cette formation de la relation avec le monde est remplacée par une relation dans laquelle „maison” et „demeure(r)” cède la place à la „migration” (Thoreau et sauntering), à „séjour(ner)” (Dillard et sojourning) et au „nomadisme” (Deleuze et Guattari).

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