freedom of speech; preventive censorship; injunction on publication; authorization; excessive penalization for activities of journalists; a ban on publishing information of the private sphere of life
Katowice : Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego
A. Biłgorajski (red.), "Wolność wypowiedzi i jej granice : analiza wybranych zagadnień" (S. 50-88). Katowice : Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego.
In the light of the categorical formulation of Art. 54 paragraph 2 of the Constitution
of 1997 any exception to the prohibition of preventive censorship is unacceptable. Hence the
conclusion that the absolute prohibition of preventive censorship implied in the current Basic
Law protects freedom of speech in the media at a higher level than required by the standards
developed on the basis of the European Convention on Human Rights or Amendment I to the
United States Constitution. This, however, does not change the fact that the prohibition is circumvented
with the use of institutions and procedures, serving the same purpose and fulfilling
analogous functions of preventive censorship. The above mentioned equivalent, in a sense, institutions
and procedures must be assessed themselves as to their possible non‑compliance
with constitutional norms, because formally ban on preventive censorship does not apply to them.
I am primarily referring to: an injunction on publication; excessive penalization for activities of
journalists, which may cause the so‑called
‘chilling effect’ in the form of specific auto‑censorship
of the authors of press releases discouraging from participation in public debate; the institution
of the authorization; ban on publishing information connected with the private sphere of life.