Granice swobody wypowiedzi sędziego w świetle Konstytucji RP

Abstract

The basic universal framework of freedom of speech defines the said freedom as latitude for pursuit, collection and proliferation of information and opinion of any type, according to one’s discretion. In a democratic state, the problem of legal protection of an utterance which does not harm any person or brings generally positive reaction among most members of the society is of no major significance. The problem with defining the scope of freedom appears only when a specific utterance sparks controversies or proves unacceptable for the majority. The scale of the problem is only magnified when such opinion is aired by a public official in the course of “performance” of official duties. It becomes even more acute where this official is a judge, whose freedom of speech is undoubtedly determined, on one hand, by judicial immunity, and, on the other one, by the principle of public nature of judicial proceedings. In practice, it is restricted by the obligation to foster the status of the judicial position and avoid anything which could prove detrimental to judge’s dignity or erode the confidence in his or her impartiality, the duty to keep secrecy of the circumstances of the case he or she learnt, about as a judge, out of the courtroom, and, finally, the need to follow the official procedure.