Zarzut błędnej wykładni

Abstract

“Incorrect interpretation” is a term that comes up not only in the interpretative discourse but also in legal texts. Understanding it is essential for at least two reasons. Firstly, because due to its substantial persuasive force the argument of incorrect interpretation is frequently used in practice where a given legal rule might give rise to different constructions (or interpretations) of its meaning, and secondly, and more importantly, because in many procedures a claim of incorrect interpretation may constitute the grounds for an appeal. The attempts of defining the term “incorrect interpretation” seen in the literature and judicial practice and legal interpretation boil down to statements encumbered with the logical fallacy “ignotum per ignotum” in which incorrect interpretation is nothing less than mistaken, faulty interpretation without specifying the nature of the mistake or explanation of what really constitutes the fault or incorrectness referred to. The starting point of the onsiderations presented in the paper is an analysis of a court case and a judicial decision following it, in which interpretation discrepancies arose and the authors of either of the judgement with contradictory theses found the results leading to an interpretation contrary to theirs incorrect. Next, the main reasons why interpretation discrepancies occur are presented. Since the idea of incorrectness is defined as a disagreement upon patterns or rules, incorrect interpretation can be claimed if there were only one “true” and “real” understanding, or construction of a legal text or a widely accepted method of its interpretation. In the paper arguments against the existence of one “correct” understanding of a legal text are presented and far-reaching discrepancies in the accepted methods of interpretation are pointed out. It has been concluded that the claim of incorrect interpretation may only be treated as a persuasive claim. Finally, certain de lege ferenda postulates are formulated.