Sermonizm jako stanowisko recentywizmu w sporze o powszechniki

Abstract

The article discusses the differences between a nominalistic and sermonistic conception of universals from the perspective of recentivism. The standpoint of nominalism can be minimized to the statement that general notions do not exist, only words do (nomina) which are the signs for many units. Sermonism, on the other hand, says that general notions are just words which have no meaning beyond the human speech (sermo). General notions have the being of speech, but they do not possess the being as such. From this perspective, it is possible to return to the conception of J.L. Austin saying that a dispute on universals is an example of an inappropriate usage of words in the speech. Such a point of view would equal to sermonism. Recentivism completes this judgement with a statement that only the utterances produced in our speech in the present tense meet the condition of sermonism.