Abstrakt: | The aim of the article is to elucidate the question of the factual existence of
transcendental consciousness in Kant’ s philosophy. Transcendental consciousness,
which Kant refers to as the transcendental unity of apperception, expresses itself
in the representation of the “I think” that “must be able to accompany all my
representations” (B 131–132). According to Kant, the proposition “I think” contains
the proposition “I exist” and signifies “something that in fact exists” (B 422–423).
The author presents the question of existence of the “I think” from the point of view
of two interpretations: transcendental-logical and transcendental-egological. The
transcendental-logical interpretation considers the existence of the “I think” as
a consequence of an act of thinking so that the phrase “something that in fact exists”
means “something that in act exists”. In contrast to the logical interpretation, in the
light of egological interpretation the “I think” can be understood as a statement of fact
of existence of my consciousness. Thus, “I think” appears to be an original fact of the
“I exist”, which, as the highest point of philosophy, exceeds the limits of cognition and
constitutes an irrational fact. According to the author, the transcendental-egological
interpretation is more convincing and inspiring as it explains the existential meaning
of the proposition “I think” and shows that the transcendental unity of apperception
does not indicate the logical I but rather my actually experiencing consciousness. In
this context, the author tries to indicate an analogy between Kant and Husserl with
reference to the original fact of the “I exist”. |