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Title: Teoriogrowe modele bezpieczeństwa narodowego – podstawowe zagadnienia i przykłady
Authors: Wajzer, Mateusz
Keywords: Game theory; National security; Trade relations; Prisoner’s dilemma
Issue Date: 2018
Citation: Annales Universitatis Mariae Curie-Skłodowska. Sectio K. Politologia, 2018, vol. 25, nr 1, s. 39-50
Abstract: The article is a brief introduction to the use of game theory models in studies of national security. It is divided into four parts. The first part discusses basic theoretical issues, i.e. the division of game theory into analytical and behavioural, the concept of the rationality of players, the assumption that the rationality of players is common knowledge, the Nash equilibrium, Pareto efficiency and the classification of games. The second part briefly describes the evolution of game theory analyses in national security. Attention is drawn to the relationship between the development of game theory and military requirements. The third part provides an example of how game theory models can be used in national security studies. Trade relations, which adopt the schema of interactions of the prisoner’s dilemma, are discussed in detail. During the analysis, the general model of the prisoner’s dilemma, the initial game defining the problem under consideration, and its solutions in the form of an iterated game and metagame are presented. The entire discussion concludes with a summary. The analyses indicate the following advantages of the application of game theory models to the study of national security: 1) game theory models significantly simplify the analysed interactions, thus, allowing to penetrate the processes, bringing out features and relations which have hitherto escaped researchers; 2) the application of game theory models does not require researchers to be familiar with complex mathematical formalisms; 3) game theory models enable the identification of social dilemmas, i.e. situations where the short-term interests of an individual are at odds with the long-term interests of society.
DOI: 10.17951/k.2018.25.1.39
ISSN: 1428-9512
Appears in Collections:Artykuły (WNS)

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