DC pole | Wartość | Język |
dc.contributor.author | Machura, Piotr | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-03-15T08:50:15Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2018-03-15T08:50:15Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2015 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Folia Philosophica, T. 33 (2015), s. 211-230 | pl_PL |
dc.identifier.issn | 1231-0913 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 2353-9445 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12128/1181 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The paper addresses some of the aspects of the neo-Aristotelian concept of good
on the basis of Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach. The author’s general
thesis is that the idea of good organizes its normativity along two vectors pointed
towards nature and emancipation, which are interlinked, that is — the normativity
of the good is always organized by both of them and it is inappropriate to refer to
one of them only. This fault is made, the author believes, by Nussbaum who does not
offer enough resources to establish a sound naturalistic evaluative standard in her
theory. To address this issue the author starts by discussing the capabilities
approach as a form of the concept of good and proceeds by analysing Nussbaum’s
view on family as an exemplar of the inadequacies of the approach. | pl_PL |
dc.language.iso | pl | pl_PL |
dc.publisher | Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego | pl_PL |
dc.rights | Uznanie autorstwa-Użycie niekomercyjne-Bez utworów zależnych 3.0 Polska | * |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/pl/ | * |
dc.subject | Martha Nussbaum | pl_PL |
dc.subject | dobro | pl_PL |
dc.subject | wolność | pl_PL |
dc.subject | arystotelizm | pl_PL |
dc.title | Dobro a wolność. Wokół teorii możliwości Marthy Nussbaum | pl_PL |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | pl_PL |
dc.relation.journal | Folia Philosophica | pl_PL |
Pojawia się w kolekcji: | Artykuły (W.Hum.)
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