Edmund Husserl; fenomenologia; redukcja transcendentalno-fenomenologiczna; modyfikacja neutralnościowa; teza naturalnego nastawienia; phenomenology; transcendental-phenomenological reduction; neutral modification; natural attitude thesis
"Folia Philosophica" T. 31 (2013), s. 61-83
The paper addresses the relation between transcendental-phenomenological reduction
and neutral modification in Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology. According to
Husserl, there is both essential kinship and fundamental difference between them.
What makes them akin is that they both are characterised as disconnection or
bracketing judgement about natural world. What differs them, however, is that neutral
modification is a kind of transformation of conviction of existence of the world
into neutral consciousness, which does not constitute the world, whereas the transcendental-
phenomenological reduction disconnects the world in a way which leads
to uncovering the subjectivity that does constitute the world (and subjectivity that constitutes the world is not the neutral consciousness, but a thetic consciousness —
positionales Bewusstsein). Hence, the transcendental-phenomenological disconnection
of the world does not mean its neutralisation, but rather recognition of being of
the world as a result of constitutive performances of transcendental subjectivity.