Abstrakt: | The aim of the present article is to outline the characteristics of Polish and German policy
towards East, especially towards Russia. The author indicates the areas of common and different
interests as well as objectives in the Polish and German policy towards East, particularly
at the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century. In spite of observing fewer differences
between Poland and Germany in their present policy towards Russia, the article aims to
emphasize the discrepancies that still exist and are visible in the bilateral as well as multilateral
relations.
At the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, the Polish and German positions
towards Russia and post‑soviet
countries are noticeably more coherent than before. One
of the main reasons is the modification of Polish Eastern policy by introducing pragmatic
thinking (so‑called
positive realism), implemented at the end of 2007 by the Polish government
run by the Civic Platform (PO) and Polish People’s Party (PSL). At the same time, the
Angela’s Merkel government introduced more critical attitude towards Russia.
Nonetheless, in spite of growing convergence of interests in Polish and German policy
towards Russia, there have been significant discrepancies. The main differences have been
related to the role of Russia in the Commonwealth of Independent States and in the European
security system. Therefore, Poland and Germany have had different opinion on the role of
Russia: should it be a partner or a threat? To what extend the process of Europeanization of
Russia should be introduced? There is also a discrepancy between Poland and Germany related
to the following question: which relations among the post‑soviet
countries should be prioritized,
should it be relations with Ukraine or with Russia? |