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Zastosuj identyfikator do podlinkowania lub zacytowania tej pozycji: http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12128/2894
Tytuł: Husserl a problem istnienia świata
Autor: Łaciak, Piotr
Słowa kluczowe: Edmund Husserl; generalna teza naturalnego nastawienia; istnienie świata; świadomość; idealizm transcendentalny; monizm transcendentalny; general thesis of the natural attitude; the existence of world; consciousness; transcendental idealism; transcendental monism
Data wydania: 2014
Źródło: "Folia Philosophica" T. 32 (2014), s. 129-156
Abstrakt: In my paper I discuss Husserl’s standpoint on the existence of world. Addressing this issue the philosopher thinks of the kind of being, outer of consciousness, which is realized in the general thesis of natural attitude. The aim of phenomenological research is to reveal correlation of consciousness and the world, which according to Husserl, becomes transcendental constitution. In the course of explaining this correlation Husserl reveals that the existence of world might be recognized as a correlate of the general thesis of natural attitude, which after phenomenological reduction becomes recognised as the constitutive achievement of consciousness. Transcendental idealism is interpreted in the paper as transcendental monism. Husserl not only questions the possibility of non-cognizable things-in-themselves, but also he uses some broad concept of transcendental subjectivity. The transcendental subjectivity is not opposed to the world, but it includes the world as the subjectivity’s correlate. Strictly speaking, the world is conceived as structure transcendental subjectivity, and the natural attitude might be taken as anonymous modus of transcendental life.
URI: http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12128/2894
ISSN: 1231-0913
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