dc.description.abstract | The work deals with the issue of theology understood as science according to
John Duns Scotus. The first chapter discusses the problem opening Scotus’s deliberations
on theology, namely, the problem of confirming what science is in general and
what is its first subject. Scotus considers here the question of the status of science as
such, within the frames of confrontation between the traditional Christian model, deriving
from Saint Augustus, in which knowledge-science is treated as wisdom, and
the perypathetic model, which is important for scholasticism. The goal of the study
is to show the importance of science and academic knowledge (academic cognition)
in the context of four Aristotle’s conditions that science has to fulfill. Scotus broadens
the very issue by the problem of the status of theology as knowledge-science of
God. Aiming at presenting the essence of theology and examining whether it fulfills
the conditions of the academic knowledge, one has to above all establish what in
general the knowledge-science is. Finally, according to Scotus, theology meets the
conditions of being a science given by Aristotle, though not all of them. The fourth
condition is not fulfilled, which, in Scotus’s opinion, is not necessary to formally
consider theology as science.
The second, equally important, issue is defining the first subject of science.
Scotus emphasizes here, above all, a subjective nature of the subject of knowledge
which, as the first subject of cognition, must virtually contain all that can be learned
in a given science. Only after establishing the status of science as such and defining
its first object does Scotus refer to the issue of theology, demonstrating in what sense
it is science (whether it meets the conditions of scientificity), as well as what its first
object is (must be). The condition of the first object for theology is met only by God
understood fully in Its nature, that is God as God. Theology understood in this way is
absolute knowledge and possible only for intellect proportionate to its object — God
as God. Thus, Scotus limits theology understood sensu stricto to the highest intellect,
that is God’s intellect, because only His intellect can learn the nature of God alone.
Such theology is called by Scotus theology in itself (in se).
The second chapter considers whather God can be learned in the sense of academic
cognition within the contents different from those under which He is labeled in His nature. Scotus contemplates on the existence of another knowledge of God
available for man’s intellect which would be beyond theology in itself available only
for God. The very question is important because it refers to a human being and cognitive
abilities of his/her intellect. Theology in itself is not available for a human being,
which in consequence, however, does not mean that it is impossible for
a human being to learn God. Scotus did not want and could not negate the existence
of theology available for human thought, theology that bases on revelation. On the
other hand, however, he wanted to show that theology as human knowledge on God
does not fully concern the nature of God because a human being pro statu isto is restricted
and unable to learn God as God. So, in final, the object of theology available
for a human being, that is, as Scotus claims, theology for us (pro nobis) is not God
understood fully in His nature but God labeled under a certain aspect, perceived in
qualities Him deserves.
The consequence of the considerations is chapter three in which I discuss
Scotus’s thoughts referring to learning God. Therefore, Scotus defines conditions of
theology in itself and, at the same time, theology for us, that is, theology revealed
that is available for a human being — a pilgrim. If, however, God can be understood
here fully in His nature, and from the angle of the qualities ascribed to Him, Scotus
ponders how it is possible. The possibility of such cognition is consolidated in two
ways. Above all, the possibility of learning God in any aspect must comprise of both
the intellect which learns God as God and the one that does not fully understand
God in His nature. Thus, such cognition is subjectively based — on the part of the
learning subject. However, learning God must also be subjectively conditioned,
which means that God as the subject of intellect cognition must contain order in
Himself, according to which any cognition of God is possible no matter if it is perfect
cognition of God fully in His divinity or restricted and imperfect cognition available
for human intellect.
Chapter four includes considerations on the possibility of learning God by a human
in his earthly state of being. This chapter is the longest in this work because it
covers several broad issues, above all concentrating on natural and extra-natural cognition.
Theology available for man bases on revelation and possibility of intellectual
analysis of its contents. By definition, human intellect is limited, whereas revelation
constitutes the basis for getting the knowledge of God. In Scotus’s times the very
problem was widely discussed as two opinions clashed here; one based on Aristotle’s
conception on the autonomicity of human intellect, the other deriving from Saint Augustus
which pointed to the necessity of illuminating-enlightening human intellect by
God in the act of grace, illumination constituting the basis of extra-natural cognition.
Thus, Scotus asks to what an extent human intellect is able to learn the messages
transmitted by means of revelation. The very problem characterizes scholastic considerations
on the connections of faith with reason, which comes from Anselm’s
maxim of “faith seeking understanding” (fides quaerens intellectum). In Scotus’s
times two important standpoints were revealed in this context: one represented by
Thomas of Aquinas, the other by Henry of Ghent, a distinguished Master of Parisian
University and Scotus’s teacher (Scotus probably listened to his lectures during his
student stay in Paris). The problem boiled down to the following question: Is mind
enlightenment by means of some extra-natural cognition necessary for man’s current
earthly state of being or is he able to possess science of God without this factor,using the message from revelation. A heated debate took place as regards the issue
concentrated on Augustus’s conception of illumination which was modified by Henry
of Ghent at that time. It resolved the status of theology as science. On the one hand,
it was the knowledge based on reason-based premises, that is intuitive cognition
placed within the limits of the abilities of human intellect — theology understood in
this way would be a true philosophy answering the ultimate questions on the reason
of reality. On the other hand, theology based on revelation, that is extra-natural gift
received from God, could exist. Henry of Ghent resolved this dilemma accepting in
reference to God a certain type of extra-natural cognition which would locate itself
between what the human cognition is capable of in mortal life and the knowledge
that is ascribed to the saved ones. Scotus rejects such a kind of indirect enlightenment.
He also disagrees with the opinion of Thomas Aquinas who pointed to the
mutual completion of inherent and revealed truths. Scotus thought that the real
knowledge of God, if it is to be science, must be based on truths received by means
of faith though carefully reasoned. It allowed Scotus to work out the conception of
human theology deriving from revealed truths which can be considered and learned
by human intellect pro statu isto.
The possibilities of learning God in a natural way are discussed in chapter five. It
presents Scotus’s meditations on the problem of the relation between theology and
metaphysics (philosophy), namely the question which knowledge: theology or metaphysics
is a proper science of God. The very discussion boils down to the opinions
presented by two Arabic philosophers: Avicenna and Averroes. Avicenna claimed that
God is not the subject of metaphysics, whereas Averroes, on the contrary, believed
that it is metaphysics as the highest knowledge available for man is the science on
God. Finally, Scotus is in favour of Avicenna’s position as he accepts the fact that
metaphysics is the highest knowledge available for a human in the earthly state of
his being, whereas its object is not God but being perceived as alone in itself, that is
as being (ens inquantum ens). Only being as being meets the condition of the first
object adequate for human intellect, and thus, is the borderline object — simpliciter
simplex beyond which man pro statu isto cannot learn anything any more. God is
perceived by man from the being perspective — substantially and, above all, God is
being (an infinite being — this is the aspect of learning God which human intellect is
capable of). Thus, the scope of theology available for man is subjectively restricted to
metaphysics. Human theology derives from metaphysics (philosophy) and therefore,
the notion of an infinite being reached at metaphysical level covers for theology available
for a human in the earthly state of being with the message taken from revelation.
Chapter six presents in brief a series of issues with the substantial problem of the
unity of theology. Basing on the principle of the unity of theology, Scotus raises important
issue connected with a practical or theoretical understanding of theology. | pl_PL |