DC pole | Wartość | Język |
dc.contributor.author | Wojciechowski, Bartosz Wojciech | - |
dc.contributor.author | Pothos, Emmanuel M. | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2018-12-17T08:47:34Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2018-12-17T08:47:34Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2018 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Frontiers in Psychology, Vol. 9 (2018), Art. No. 391 | pl_PL |
dc.identifier.issn | 1664-1078 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12128/7470 | - |
dc.description.abstract | Classical probability theory (CPT) has represented the rational standard for decision
making in human cognition. Even though CPT has provided many descriptively excellent
decision models, there have also been some empirical results persistently problematic
for CPT accounts. The tension between the normative prescription of CPT and human
behavior is particularly acute in cases where we have higher expectations for rational
decisions. One such case concerns legal decision making from legal experts, such as
attorneys and prosecutors and, more so, judges. In the present research we explore
one of the most influential CPT decision fallacies, the conjunction fallacy (CF), in a
legal decision making task, involving assessing evidence that the same suspect had
committed two separate crimes. The information for the two crimes was presented
consecutively. Each participant was asked to provide individual ratings for the two crimes
in some cases and conjunctive probability rating for both crimes in other cases, after all
information had been presented. Overall, 360 probability ratings for guilt were collected
from 120 participants, comprised of 40 judges, 40 attorneys and prosecutors, and 40
individuals without legal education. Our results provide evidence for a double conjunction
fallacy (in this case, a higher probability of committing both crimes than the probability of
committing either crime individually), in the group of individuals without legal education.
These results are discussed in terms of their applied implications and in relation to a
recent framework for understanding such results, quantum probability theory (QPT). | pl_PL |
dc.language.iso | en | pl_PL |
dc.rights | Uznanie autorstwa 3.0 Polska | * |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/pl/ | * |
dc.subject | conjunction fallacy | pl_PL |
dc.subject | legal decision making | pl_PL |
dc.subject | quantum cognition | pl_PL |
dc.subject | quantum probability theory | pl_PL |
dc.subject | legal psychology | pl_PL |
dc.title | Is There a Conjunction Fallacy in Legal Probabilistic Decision Making? | pl_PL |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | pl_PL |
dc.relation.journal | Frontiers in Psychology | pl_PL |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.3389/fpsyg.2018.02281 | - |
Pojawia się w kolekcji: | Artykuły (WNS)
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