DC pole | Wartość | Język |
dc.contributor.author | Łaciak, Piotr | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-07-21T13:24:35Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2019-07-21T13:24:35Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2018 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | "Roczniki Filozoficzne" (T. 66, z. 1 (2018), s. 33-49) | pl_PL |
dc.identifier.issn | 0035-7685 | - |
dc.identifier.issn | 2450-002X | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12128/9872 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The article presents Kant’s and Husserl’s philosophies with reference to Hartmann’s understanding
of irrationality. In Hartmann’s metaphysics of cognition, irrationality, which corresponds
with partial unknowability of being, appears to be an argument against idealism that
assumes a complete rationality of our knowledge and its object. In this article the author shows
that it is possible to indicate similarities between Kant’s idea of the unknowability of the transcendental object, Husserl’s conception of the transcendental constitution of the world, and
Hartmann’s concept of gnoseological irrationality. In Kant’s transcendentalism, irrationality implies
an asymmetry between the conditions of the possibility of experience and the conditions of
the possibility of the objects of experience, because the unknowability of a transcendental object
and a thing in itself indicates that not all conditions of the objects are at the same time conditions
of the possibility of experience. According to Husserl, transcendental subjectivity is not a sufficient
reason for the world in its Dasein and Sosein, because the fact of the constitution of the
world is an irrational one and it cannot be derived from the essence of subjectivity. The author
tries to demonstrate that this analogy between Husserl and Hartmann, in the question of the
irrationality, opens new interpretational possibilities for the relation between transcendental
phenomenology and Hartmann’s philosophy. | pl_PL |
dc.language.iso | pl | pl_PL |
dc.rights | Uznanie autorstwa-Użycie niekomercyjne-Bez utworów zależnych 3.0 Polska | * |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/pl/ | * |
dc.subject | fenomenologia | pl_PL |
dc.subject | metafizyka poznania | pl_PL |
dc.subject | konstytucja świata | pl_PL |
dc.subject | subiektywność transcendentalna | pl_PL |
dc.subject | idealizm | pl_PL |
dc.subject | phenomenology | pl_PL |
dc.subject | metaphysics of cognition | pl_PL |
dc.subject | constitution of world | pl_PL |
dc.subject | idealism | pl_PL |
dc.subject | transcendental subjectivity | pl_PL |
dc.title | Irracjonalność jako argument przeciwko idealizmowi. Transcendentalizm Kanta i Husserla w świetle rozumienia irracjonalności Hartmanna | pl_PL |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | pl_PL |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.18290/rf.2018.66.1-2 | - |
Pojawia się w kolekcji: | Artykuły (W.Hum.)
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