Nicolaia Hartmana koncepcja wolności woli

Abstract

The present work has two main purposes. One is to show Nicolai Hartmann’s concept of the free will, while the other is to demonstrate that this philosophy derives inspiration mainly from Kant. Hartmann’s solution of the problem of the free will shows clearly enough that the scheme of that solution comes from Kant and is incorporated into the framework of Hartmann’s critical ontology. From this point of view, the author places Hartmann within the Kantian and Neokantian tradition, rather than in phenomenology. The first chapter is devoted to phenomenological problems, and particularly to the terminological distinctions which Hartmann places, as is his custom, before embarking on the analysis proper. The aim of the chapter is to emphasise Hartmann’s concept of the ideal being, which plays an important role in the problem of value. It is against the backdrop of value, understood by Hartmann as endowed with ideal being, that the problem of the person and of the obligation is showed. The understanding of the person is here fundamentally différant from Max Scheier’s one. The second chapter deals with the solution of the anitinomy of causality. Of particular importance is here the distinction between the positive freedom (freedom from something), and the negative freedom (freedom to something). The positive freedom, which can be also called ontological, or structural, is the necessary condition for the rise of the negative freedom. That positive freedom is possible, in Hartmann’s opinion, because of the perculiar structure of the causal relationship, owing to which the purposeful relation. The third chapter shows the other side of the problem of freedom, i.e. its realisation by man. Hartmann connects here freedom with ethical phenomena, such as the consciousness of selfdetermination, man’s responsibility, soundness of mind, and awareness of guilt. It is exactly the ethical phenomena that show in full the person’s autonomy, with respect to the causal relation, and moral values, i.e. the person’s self-determination. The work may be placed in the mainstream of the ongoing discussion on ethical problems undertaken by modem philosophy.