Reguły gramatyki jako argument w sądowej interpretacji prawa

Abstract

The paper deals with the issue of the influence of the grammar of regulations on the interpretation of law by the courts. Grammar, as a series of rules concerning the structure and combination of words, seems to play a vital role in the process of reading any type of a text, also a legal one. In judicature, though, apart from the notion of a linguistic interpretation, the notion of a grammar interpretation functions. The paper presents a series of judicatures where the grammatical issues (number, gender, participle, and semi-colon) played an important role in the process of the interpretation of regulations. It turns out that in analogical situations, in terms of the language, and when referring to the grammatical rules, the courts may come to totally different conclusions. It leads to a conclusion that grammatical rules are only one of many arguments available for an interpreter, not a set of rules definitely restricting his/her activity. In the end, two possible cause of such a state of affairs were presented. Firstly, in the case of a legal text editing, the grammatical rules tend to be used inconsistently. Even, though, their consistent usage does not always lead to the same results, what is pointed to in the literature. Secondly, the meaning of legal texts is conventional in nature, not exclusively grammatical (an example could be the way of formulating behavior orders in regulations). The very distinction leads to the distinction well-known in linguistics, namely a linguistic and communicative competence. It is only the latter one (being composed of a series of social and cultural factors apart from a linguistic competence) that makes a successful communication. It is clearly visible that the very conclusions correspond well with the practice of law usage.