Abstrakt: | The aim of the paper is to compare the role played by logical analysis in
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-philosophicus and Russell’s On Denoting. Whereas in
Russell’s work it is an important element of his argument in support of description
theory, in his pupil’s it does not function this way. Russell, while analysing various
propositions, including descriptions translates them into formal language, indicating
that those propositions, despite the appearances, in fact do not denote. Logical analysis
shall be a tool decisive in favour of Russell’s thesis. Wittgenstein similarly analyses
some troublesome propositions (i.e. philosophical theses) and claims that they
are meaningless. The difference is that Russell’s final conclusion is derived from logical
analysis, whereas Wittgenstein’s from pure speculation. In Tractatus
logico-philosophicus logical analysis is not a method thanks to which the author gets
certain result, just as it was the case with his teacher and his On Denoting. In
Wittgenstein’s early philosophy logical analysis concerns just a few technical problems
connected only to some ideas from Principia mathematica, and not to the main
subject of his work, which is the analysis of philosophical theses. |