DC pole | Wartość | Język |
dc.contributor.author | Marzęda, Witold | - |
dc.date.accessioned | 2019-03-28T12:23:15Z | - |
dc.date.available | 2019-03-28T12:23:15Z | - |
dc.date.issued | 2018 | - |
dc.identifier.citation | Śląskie Studia Historyczno-Teologiczne, T. 51, nr 2 (2018), s. 251-262 | pl_PL |
dc.identifier.issn | 0137-3447 | - |
dc.identifier.uri | http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12128/8694 | - |
dc.description.abstract | The article describes the topos of the Cartesian dualism,
characteristic for different trends in philosophy
of mind. The topos is based on the well-known
argument against soul existence: it assumes that
if soul and body exist, there must be also causal relations
between them. But it seems impossible, because
we can think about causes only in a physical
sense. So only bodily relations are comprehensible
and body cannot cause something that is non-corporeal
and vice versa.
Author of the article points that on the one hand,
this strict dualism does not belong to Cartesian
philosophy, and on the other hand, this argumentation
fails because there is a wide range of relations
(for example logical or social) that are not physical.
So he reaches conclusion that the Cartesian topos
in the philosophy of mind is based on the so-called
straw man fallacy. | pl_PL |
dc.language.iso | pl | pl_PL |
dc.rights | Uznanie autorstwa-Użycie niekomercyjne-Bez utworów zależnych 3.0 Polska | * |
dc.rights.uri | http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/pl/ | * |
dc.subject | Kartezjusz | pl_PL |
dc.subject | dualizm | pl_PL |
dc.title | Obrona Kartezjusza. O toposie dualizmu w badaniach nad umysłem | pl_PL |
dc.title.alternative | Ap ology of Descartes. Ab out a Certain Topos in the Philosophy of Mind | pl_PL |
dc.type | info:eu-repo/semantics/article | pl_PL |
Pojawia się w kolekcji: | Artykuły (W.Hum.)
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