A. Biłgorajski (red.), "Wolność wypowiedzi i jej granice : analiza wybranych zagadnień" (S. 209-222). Katowice : Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego.
The basic universal framework of freedom of speech defines the said freedom as latitude
for pursuit, collection and proliferation of information and opinion of any type, according
to one’s discretion. In a democratic state, the problem of legal protection of an utterance which
does not harm any person or brings generally positive reaction among most members of the
society is of no major significance. The problem with defining the scope of freedom appears only
when a specific utterance sparks controversies or proves unacceptable for the majority. The scale
of the problem is only magnified when such opinion is aired by a public official in the course of
“performance” of official duties. It becomes even more acute where this official is a judge, whose
freedom of speech is undoubtedly determined, on one hand, by judicial immunity, and, on the
other one, by the principle of public nature of judicial proceedings. In practice, it is restricted by the obligation to foster the status of the judicial position and avoid anything which could prove
detrimental to judge’s dignity or erode the confidence in his or her impartiality, the duty to keep
secrecy of the circumstances of the case he or she learnt, about as a judge, out of the courtroom,
and, finally, the need to follow the official procedure.