O pieniądzach, których nie było, na wojnę, której miało nie być

Abstract

The interregnum following John III Sobieski’s death was not only long but was also marked by a vicious political struggle exposing the deficiencies of the candidates proposed for the crown. It was predicted from the beginning that the election may end up in a split, or even war. Indeed, the summer of 1697 witnessed the split resulting in high tension, political struggle and incidents – opponents were threatened and there was some bloodshed, but it never escalated to a civil or external war. The sources, especially French, show that, although many were predicting war, either with willingness or fear, in fact, none intended to take up arms. Instead, they were looking abroad for military and financial help. Otherwise, no one would fight, and there was not a chance of getting French money, of which Louis XIV informed his emissary. The charges put forward to the French ambassador by Prince Conti’s supporters concerning France’s falling short of their expectations can be acknowledged as justified. It was the empty promises of money that made them persevere, which was pointless since the French money was never going to come. In view of this, the Poles’ readiness to take up arms was rather moderate. It could have been boosted by the flow of money from Versailles. However, as there was no money, there was no chance of war from the beginning.