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Title: Obrona Kartezjusza. O toposie dualizmu w badaniach nad umysłem
Other Titles: Ap ology of Descartes. Ab out a Certain Topos in the Philosophy of Mind
Authors: Marzęda, Witold
Keywords: Kartezjusz; dualizm
Issue Date: 2018
Citation: Śląskie Studia Historyczno-Teologiczne, T. 51, nr 2 (2018), s. 251-262
Abstract: The article describes the topos of the Cartesian dualism, characteristic for different trends in philosophy of mind. The topos is based on the well-known argument against soul existence: it assumes that if soul and body exist, there must be also causal relations between them. But it seems impossible, because we can think about causes only in a physical sense. So only bodily relations are comprehensible and body cannot cause something that is non-corporeal and vice versa. Author of the article points that on the one hand, this strict dualism does not belong to Cartesian philosophy, and on the other hand, this argumentation fails because there is a wide range of relations (for example logical or social) that are not physical. So he reaches conclusion that the Cartesian topos in the philosophy of mind is based on the so-called straw man fallacy.
ISSN: 0137-3447
Appears in Collections:Artykuły (W.Hum.)

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