Problem przedmiotu znaku w semiotyce C. S. Peirce'a

Abstract

The present paper contains six parts. In part I an outline is presented of Peirce’s triadic sign theory in which the sign is defined as an irreducible relation of a representamen, an object, and an interprétant. Part I I reports the views of D. Greenlee, A. Ayer, and U. Eco which are critical of Peirce’s sign theory, particularly of the dual nature of the object of the sign, that is the distinction into the dynamical and the immediate object, which distinction derives from a fundamental distinction between to be and to be represented. In part I I I the immediate object is presented as a precondition for the continuity of the process of semiosis and for the interpretability of signs. In part IV the usefulness of the concept for fictive semiosis is discussed. In part V the degeneration of linguistic signs, exemplified by the cliché, linguistic taboo, and authoritarian distortion of discourse, is presented. Similarties and differences between fictive and degenerate semiosis are discussed. In part V I it is pointed out that the source of controversies around Peirce’s triadic sign theory is an oversight of Peirce’s principle that all the mind can know has the nature of signs. Hence Peirce begins his inquiry not by investigating the entities to which signs refer but by investigating the structure of the sign and the laws which govern processes of semiosis.